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EPIGRAPH
Here might I pause, and bend in reverence
To Nature, and the power of human minds,
To men as they are men within themselves.
How oft high service is performed within,
When all the external man is rude in show,—
Not like a temple rich with pomp and gold,
But a mere mountain chapel, that protects
Its simple worshippers from sun and shower.
Of these, said I, shall be my song; of these,
If future years mature me for the task,
Will I record the praises, making verse
Deal boldly with substantial things; in truth
And sanctity of passion, speak of these,
That justice may be done, obeisance paid
Where it is due: thus haply shall I teach,
Inspire, through unadulterated ears
Pour rapture, tenderness, and hope,—my theme
No other than the very heart of man,
As found among the best of those who live,
Not unexalted by religious faith,
Nor uninformed by books, good books, though few,
In Nature’s presence: thence may I select
Sorrow, that is not sorrow, but delight;
And miserable love, that is not pain
To hear of, for the glory that redounds
Therefrom to human kind, and what we are.
(The Prelude, 1850, Book Thirteen, 224-49)
It begins to be clear, to me at least, why Wordsworth wears so well. There are
in our world currents of thought that are central, and others that are merely
contributaries, or wander off into the bogs and deserts of philosophy. That
stream which first became defined in Kant’s philosophy, and continued to flow
however irregularly through the minds of Schelling, Coleridge, Kierkegaard,
Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, divided by a watershed from the contrary
stream to which we can attach the names of Locke, Condillac, Hartley,
Bentham, Marx and Lenin — that first stream to which we give the
fashionable name of Existentialism, but which is really the main tradition of
philosophy itself — in that stream Wordsworth is confidently carried. Other
poets of his time and since his time may give us keener thrills of pure aesthetic
pleasure. Wordsworth can move us in that way, too, but his singular distinction
is the centrality and traditional validity of his philosophical faith. We go to
Wordsworth’s poetry for something more lasting than pleasure, and for
something more human than beauty. (Herbert Read, The True Voice of
Feeling: Studies in English Romantic Poetry, p. 210-11)
iii
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ABSTRACT
In complementary response to socio-historisists who discuss the
concept of “freedom” in William Wordsworth’s poetry as determined from
without — be it by socio-historical conditions, gender, or imposed ideology —
I draw from the theory of Nicholas Berdyaev, one of the prominent
continental existentialists of the twentieth century, tracing the development of
Wordsworth’s understanding of freedom towards “genuine liberty” as
progressively determined from within. Thus focusing on existentia rather than
essentia, I pay particular attention to shaping inner efforts and developing
visions of the growing and conscious personality as they are described in The
Prelude. Wordsworth hinges his ability to perceive — and make perceivable
— the “external man” upon his own evolving understanding of inner
freedom, claiming that his theme is “no other than the very heart of man.” In
The Prelude, especially of 1850, I find a direct link between the degree of
personal freedom gained by the poet and the perfection of the human
gestalten he depicts, the connection detailed by this dissertation.
The dissertation offers the following chapters: (1) “Introduction. ‘To be
young was very heaven:’ Two Thinkers Bred by Two Revolutions:
Wordsworth and Berdyaev;” (2) “The Human Form and Human
Independence in Wordsworth: A Link;” (3) “‘Man Ennobled Outwardly
Before My Sight’;” (4) “‘Uncouth Shapes’ and Their Progress from
Transgression to Transcendence;” (5) “Wordsworth’s Trans-Figuration on
Mount Snowdon and ‘Genuine Liberty.’ Conclusions.”
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My conclusion suggests that increasing degree of growing personal
independence, gained by the developing poet and, possibly, by his reader, is
manifested, on the level of imagery, by way of the perfecting of the human
gestalten, from one Spot of Time to another, until the poet himself gets into a
position to be seen as “an index of delight.” Also, agreeing with Herbert Read
(p. 210 of The True Voice of Feeling), I see Wordsworth among the first
existentialist poets, a position which my comparison with Berdyaev supports.
Visually, in The Prelude, the perfect, sublime, human form signals a shift to and
back from transcendence, which equals “genuine liberty.”
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INTRODUCTION: “TO BE YOUNG WAS VERY HEAVEN;”
TWO THINKERS BRED BY TWO REVOLUTIONS: WORDSWORTH
AND BERDYAEV
William Wordsworth (1770-1850), surely never read any “true-blue”
existentialist philosophers, because existentialism as a movement was formed
only in the beginning of the twentieth century. An existentialist Nicholas
Berdyaev (1874-1948), with his profound knowledge of German, French, and
Russian letters, read those English writers who were well-known on the
Continent at the turn of the nineteenth century. Wordsworth hardly was one
of them. Nevertheless, each thinker, Wordsworth and Berdyaev, had his close
experience with one of the most bloody revolutions of modern history: the
French Revolution of 1791 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, respectively.
The tragic aftermath of both revolutions somewhat cooled the revolutionary
zeal of both champions of justice. Even though neither Wordsworth, nor
Berdyaev, ever came to accept political and social oppression, in the eyes of
the radicals they became known as conservatives, egotists, and almost traitors
to revolutionary ideals. In their post-revolutionary personal writings, be it
poetry or philosophical essays, the similarities also abound, even though
Berdyaev’s name is not commonly evoked in connection with the bard of
Rydal Mount.
There are, of course, similarities and ideological affinity between the
French and Russian Revolutions. However, in this work, I have no intention to
go into structural, point by point, comparison of the two events or of the
biographies of the two thinkers: such a comparison would be fitting for a
detailed and profound historical and biographical study, which is beyond the
1

scope of this work. From an existential standpoint, which sets the tone of the
pages below, it is the times of crisis, which are brought about by all kinds of
revolutions, that matter. When, during revolutions, the external structures
crumble away, the seemingly stable balance of powers collapses, the just
revolutionary theories are found impracticable and spinning out of control,
men and women – and especially young men and women – start searching for
stability elsewhere: in their own experience, minds and souls. To employ
existentialist parlance, at a time of crisis, human beings, with sudden clarity,
become aware of their concrete existence and begin to regard it as preceding
essence. After that preference is established, the existential themes of anxiety,
absurdity, nothingness, death, and alienation are usually opened up by
existents.1 All of these themes are bound up with the perceptions and feelings
of the human subject, who strives to overcome alienation from the outer world.
This dissertation looks at several existential themes in the works of two
thinkers, a poet and a philosopher, who had their own very personal
experience with the revolutionary time of crisis. Wordsworth not only visited
France during that country’s most turbulent time, but also weathered the
ensuing war between France and England, while Annette Vallon, his French
love, bore him a daughter on the other side of the then uncrossable Channel.
Berdyaev also had suffered through the revolution. And the question, what is
freedom and how to stay free, despite all immutable constraints imposed from
without, was of vital importance for both Wordsworth and Berdyaev.2
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Nicholas A. Berdyaev 3 was born in Kiev into an aristocratic family.
Almost all of his ancestors were Russian military officers of high ranks, but he
himself resigned from the army quite early and became active in the social life
of Kiev aristocracy. Berdyaev read voraciously from a very early age, a habit
which he kept till his last day. His father's library provided him with the works
of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Voltaire, and Kant, whom he began reading when he
was only fourteen years old. Like most of the aristocrats at the time he was
fluent in French and German, to which he was exposed since early childhood.
Beginning in 1894 he studied at the University of Kiev, majoring in natural
sciences and then, in jurisprudence. Berdyaev, like many university students of
that period, became a Marxist and participated in political activities. In 1898 he
was arrested during a student demonstration, and was expelled from the
University. He was released, but his consequent involvement with the illegal
press was discovered and he was sentenced to three years of exile in the
Vologda province of Central Russia.
In 1904 Berdyaev returned to Kiev, where he married Lydia Trusheff,
his life-long love and companion. This same year the married couple moved to
St. Petersburg, the center of intellectual, philosophical, literary, and
revolutionary activity in Russia. Berdyaev became a frequenter of philosophic,
religious, and political circles. During this period of his life Berdyaev
completely moved away from the radical Marxists, who aimed towards an
armed revolt against the czarist regime. His attention became drawn to spiritual
development, rather than political struggle.
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Although a revolutionary himself, Berdyaev could not accept the
Bolshevik regime that was violently established in the country in 1917,
because of its suppression of personal freedom. However, he was allowed to
continue to lecture and write. For a brief time he was professor of philosophy
at Moscow State University. For his philosophical views and criticism of the
Bolsheviks, Berdyaev was arrested, and charged with treason, which resulted
in his deportation from Russia in 1922. In Berlin he founded the Academy of
Philosophy and Religion, which he moved to Paris in 1924. In Paris he also
founded and edited the influential journal “Putπ” (“The Way,” 1925-1940).
In France, he continued to teach, lecture, and write extensively. In 1947
Cambridge University conferred upon him the degree of doctor honoris causa.
His work was partially interrupted by the Second World War and the Nazi
occupation of France. He died on March 23, 1948, at his writing desk.4
N. A. Berdyaev was a prolific writer, both before his exile from Russia in
1922, and afterwards in the West until his death in 1948. The 1978 YMKA
Press "Berdiaev Bibliographie" by Tamara Klepinine lists a total of 483 books
and articles by Berdyaev, not including those "sans signature" or under a
pseudonym. A significant portion of this body of works remains untranslated
into English. But the Internet has made for dramatic changes: much that was
inaccessible is gradually coming to light.
By Berdyaev's own estimation his most important books are The
Meaning of the Creative Act (1916; translated 1955), The Destiny of Man
(1931; translated 1937), Solitude and Society (1934; translated 1939), Spirit
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and Reality (1937; translated 1939), and Slavery and Freedom (1939;
translated 1944).
In this dissertation I use Robert French’s 1944 translation of Slavery
and Freedom, Berdyaev’s essay on the personalistic philosophy of the
existential type, as he himself calls it (p. 8). Even though Berdyaev’s
philosophic ideas were subject to change, and there are some differences
between his earlier and later writings (that is why I choose to dwell on only
one book of his, written in his more mature years), his main concern with
freedom remained the same throughout. He himself talks about some
inconsistences of his thought in the 1939 introduction to Slavery and
Freedom, playing on the contrasts of two Russian words of the same root,
“ izm∫nen∂e” and “ izm∫na,” meaning, respectively, such incongruent things as
“modification” and “betrayal” (translated as “change” and “treason” by R.
French). Berdyaev holds that since his young rebellious days his thought
underwent only some changes and developments, “ izm∫nen∂e”, rather than a
total reversal, “izm∫nu.”
Podlinnoe edinstvo mysli, svqzannoe sƒ edinstvomƒ liçnosti,
estπ edinstvo xkzistenc∂alπnoe, a ne logiçeskoe.
Xkzistenc∂alπnostπ we protivor∫çiva. Liçnostπ estπ
neizm∫nnostπ vƒ izm∫nen∂i. Xto odno izƒ suµestvennyhƒ
opred∫len∂j liçnosti. Izm∫nen∂q proishodqtƒ vƒ odnomƒ i tomƒ
we subƒekt∫. Esli subƒektƒ podm∫nqetsq drugimƒ subƒektomƒ,
to n∫tƒ vƒ nastoqµemƒ smysl∫ i izm∫nen∂q. Izm∫nen∂e
razrußaetƒ liçnostπ, kogda ono prevraµaetsq vƒ izm∫nu.
Filosofƒ soverßaetƒ izm∫nu, esli m∫nq√tsq osnovnyq temy
ego filosofstvovan∂q, osnovnye [sic.] motivy ego myßlen∂q,
osnovopolownaq ustanovka c∫nnostej. Mowetƒ m∫nqtπsq
vzglqdƒ na to, gd∫ i kakƒ osuµestvlqetsq svoboda duha. No
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esli l√bovπ kƒ svobod∫ zam∫nqetsq l√bovπ√ kƒ rabstvu i
nasil∂√, to proishoditƒ izm∫na. (Berdqevƒ, str. 10)

[True integrality of thought, which is bound up with integrality of
personality, is an existential unity, not a logical. Existentiality
indeed is a controversial conception. Personality is changelessness
in change. That is one of the essential definitions of personality.
Changes arise in one and the same subject. If one subject is
replaced by another, there is then no change in the proper sense of
the word.
Change destroys personality when it is transformed into treason.
The philosopher is guilty of treason if the basic themes of his
philosophical thinking are altered, the fundamental motifs of his
thought, the groundwork of his scale of values. One can change
one’s view about where and how freedom of the spirit is realized.
But if love of freedom is replaced by love of servitude and
violence, then treason is the result.] 5
Berdyaev described his philosophical method as "intuitive and
aphoristic rather than discursive and systematic." The foundation of his world
view was his concept of the “Ungrund,” the mysterious primordial freedom
from which God emerges. This concept looks back to Boehme, even though
for Berdyaev, this Ungrund, or uncreated potentiality, is not a dark side of
God; rather, out of the “Ungrund,” God creates humans, spiritual beings
whose freedom and capacity for creativity were of the utmost importance to
Berdyaev. He has been called the philosopher of freedom, for he was
preoccupied with the liberation of personality from all that inhibits free
creativity. This concern led him to struggle against an objectivized,
“collectivized and mechanized society,” envisioning a community in which
religious, social, and political relations would enhance personal freedom. It is
for this articulated philosophy of freedom I will use Berdyaev to read and
illuminate stages in Wordsworth’s intellectual autobiography, The Prelude.
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Interestingly, much of Berdyaev’s thought about freedom and
personality, as well as his gradual shift from radical revolutionism to what
others labled as conservatism, seems to me very similar to Wordsworth’s. More
than that, Wordsworth too, could have — and tried — to explain and justify
his “change” rather than “betrayal” in writing. One such writing is the much
revised Prelude itself. As John Beer, who has traced closely Wordsworth’s
changing definition of liberty confirms:
Wordsworth’s position might have been better understood if the
account of his upbringing and youth in The Prelude had been
available to his contemporaries. That poem is about many things;
but one of its subjects, the gradual definition of the idea of liberty
in Wordsworth’s mind during his boyhood and youth, charts in
more detail the development just described. The matter had not
been in the forefront of Wordsworth’s mind as he looked back on
his earliest youth, and in the 1799 version there is little or no
reference to it. But by 1805, he had added the famous opening in
which he presented himself as a figure who sees a period of liberty
opening before him and is deciding how best to employ it: “Now I
am free, enfranchised and at large, / May fix my habitation where I
will... With a heart / Joyous, nor scared at its own liberty, / I look
about, and should the guide I chuse / Be nothing better than a
wandering cloud / I cannot miss my way.” The discussion of
liberty in The Prelude continues into the revisions, so that by
1850 the opening emphasizes it still more.6
Also, in the later, post-revolutionary, writings of both Wordsworth and
Berdyaev, there is marked interest in idealistic ideas of Boehme and Kant.7
Taking into account such similarities between Wordsworth and one of
the Russian post-revolutionary thinkers who arrived at existentialism, I will
look at some existentialistic aspects of The Prelude. For my definitions, I use
Berdyaev’s explanation of existentialism, which, in his words, is opposed to
ontologism, meaning that for existentialists, it is not essentia that is primary, but
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existentia.8 For Wordsworth, too, often human existence used to be of more
consequence than its material attributes, which I will show in this dissertation.
From this, for Berdyaev, the main assumption of personalism follows:
“Personality [which exists] is more primary than being [essentia in his
terminology].”9 Similarly, in The Prelude of 1850, Wordsworth defines himself
not as an essence, but as an existence: “I rose / As if on wings, and saw
beneath me stretched / Vast prospect of the world which I had been / And
w a s . ” 1 0 Hence, Berdyaev defines personalism as a position when
“communality” is initiated not by the society but by the person. In other
words, it is not man who should obey society implicitly; rather it is society that
should look up to the spiritual and individual values of most concrete men. It is
not man who should be socialized by reducing himself to a materialistic
dimension of just another replaceable tool; it is society that should strive to be
humanized.11 In Wordsworth’s text, especially by the end of the poem, there
are enough verses supportive of such a personalistic position. “That idol
proudly named / ‘The Wealth of Nations’” is not primary for him any more;
instead, he starts looking at concrete people in a personalistic way and gains
A more judicious knowledge of the worth
And dignity of individual man,
No composition of the brain, but man
Of whom we read, the man whom we behold
With our own eyes.12
In this study of The Prelude, I will follow Wordsworth in his attempt to behold
concrete human beings with his eyes. I will be looking mostly at the human
form, rather than body (which is often defined by corporeality, age, sex, class,
8

or property). Contemporary criticism does a great job of explaining romantic
bodies from the ontological perspective, that is focusing on the essentia: be it
socio-historical approach or gender studies. 13 While, undoubtedly, gender,
class, and national issues are vital to understanding literature and its reception,
an existentialist response to Romanticism cannot but be complementary. In this
study, I turn away from empiricism, because empiricism limits knowledge to
sense perception. Such a change in perspective gives me an opportunity to
define the human sublime from other than corporeal, economical, or
psychoanalytical perspective. Thus, acknowledging numerous versions of the
human sublime, such as the “androgynous sublime,” the “patriarchal
sublime,”14 Altieri’s “performative sublime,” Bloom’s parricidal struggle of the
artist with his precursor, the grotesque human sublime,15 the obscure, uncertain
human sublime, 16 and others (which do not account for all human figures
depicted in The Prelude, because Wordsworth is not normally seen as a poet
who depicts sensual bodies), I read the poem in the light of yet another human
sublime, which is informed by Kant’s views. As Eve Walsh Stoddard explains,
there are key similarities (if not to say affinities) between Wordsworth and
Kant:
Despite their differences in culture and mode of thought, Kant and
Wordsworth face the same philosophical issues with equal
passion. Both reject the materialistic and mechanistic paradigms of
eighteenth-century empiricism, both seek an epistemology that
recognizes the interdependence of the mind and the external
world, and both seek a firm basis for morality.17
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In Chapter Three of this dissertation, I reread Wordsworth’s fragment on “The
Sublime and the Beautiful,” tracing how in Book VIII of The Prelude the
natural sublime, with its three components — individual form, power, and
duration — aids in understanding the human sublime. With the help of
Berdyaev’s personalistic existentialism, I am able to define one of the
components of the human sublime, the human individual form, which allows
me to notice many human forms in The Prelude, otherwise inconspicuous.
From this perspective, I would say that other kinds of the human
sublime, which are informed by sense perception, are not really about the
individual human form; 18 rather, they concern the second, complementary,
component of Wordsworth’s sublime, power. Thus, Aidan Day, in his “Gender
and the Sublime,” draws attention to Anne K. Mellor’s account of “the typical
male Romantic appropriation of the feminine,” which has much to do with
“the gender implications of romantic love.” However, I think, it has nothing in
common with the perfect human gestalt:
Given the central role played by passionate love in masculine
Romanticism, where love is the means by which the poet attempts
to rise on an almost Platonic ladder to the most transcendent and
visionary of human experiences, and the explicit valorization of
the beloved woman contained within this secular myth, we might
expect a recognition of the erotic power and spiritual equality of
the female to be essential to their poetry. But when we look
closely at the gender implications of romantic love, we discover
that rather than embracing the female as a valued other, the male
lover usually effaces her into a narcissistic projection of his own
self.19
While in Anne Mellor’s summary above the gendered, female, figure is shading
into silence and submission, in Sharon A. Weltman’s insightful discussion of
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Keats’s Lamia, 20 this mythic phallic woman is in continual metamorphosis:
“even while Lamia lives within a phallic ‘prison house’ (1.203), she uses her
serpentine body to create traditionally feminine forms”21 to seduce, to
manipulate others, to rule. As with the Arab-Quixote of Book V of The
Prelude, the gestalt of Lamia is not perfect. Her sublimity, however, is not in
the perfect form, but in the power of her anatomy. Lamia’s is a different kind
of sublime, to which Wordsworth never resorts in The Prelude. In fact,
Wordsworth’s men and women look very similar when they experience the
same passion. So, in his “tender scenes of London,” the poet describes a man,
a father with a child in his lap. The man’s pose resembles the iconic feminine
image of Mary holding Jesus. The body, anatomy, is not emphasized here. The
Burkean distinction between terror (masculine) and beauty (feminine) does
not seem very illuminating in this instance.
But foolishness and madness in parade,
Though most at home in this their dear domain,
Are scattered everywhere, no rarities,
Even to the rudest novice of the Schools.
Me, rather it employed, to note, and keep
In memory, those individual sights
Of courage, or integrity, or truth,
Or tenderness, which there, set off by foil,
Appeared more touching. One will I select;
A Father — for he bore that sacred name —
Him saw I, sitting in an open square,
Upon a corner-stone of that low wall,
Wherein were fixed the iron pales that fenced
A spacious grass-plot; there, in silence, sate
This One Man, with a sickly babe outstretched
Upon his knee, whom he had thither brought
For sunshine, and to breathe the fresher air.
Of those who passed, and me who looked at him,
He took no heed; but in his brawny arms
(The Artificer was to the elbow bare,
11

And from his work this moment had been stolen)
He held the child, and, bending over it,
As if he were afraid both of the sun
And of the air, which he had come to seek,
Eyed the poor babe with love unutterable.22
To define the poet’s asexual human sublime, I turn away from empiricism to
existentialism, especially to its religious strand.
Intending to read Wordsworth through an existentialistic and
personalistic lens, I am far from being in intellectual isolation. In several
chapter-length studies, Wordsworth has already been compared in various
contexts to some existentialist thinkers: Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Dostoevski, and
Heidegger, to name a few. 23 Herbert Read, for instance, is very explicit about
his understanding of Wordsworth as an existentialist poet:
In the preceding essay I tried to make out a case for regarding
Coleridge as an early existentialist. The considerable identity
which exists between Wordsworth’s philosophical faith and that
of Karl Jaspers now compels me to make a similar claim for
Wordsworth. The identity is far more extensive than I can
demonstrate here, but it is not so astonishing if we remember that
the common source of all these varieties of existentialism is
undoubtedly Kant, a source to which Wordsworth could have had
access only through the intermediaries of Schelling and Coleridge.
But Wordsworth was a philosophical poet, and not a poetical
philosopher. This implies that his faith was based on intuitions
rather than on processes of reasoning. No doubt he received some
guidance from Coleridge: Coleridge may have defined for him the
philosophical problem. But the solution came in such flashes as
that which fell upon his vision when he reached the crest of
Snowdon, and saw that ‘universal spectacle’, ‘shaped’ for his
‘admiration and delight.’24
When Wordsworth is read through Berdyaev’s personalistic
philosophy of freedom, freedom and liberty are linked with the person’s
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existentia. The existent has a visible human image. And it is this human image
that I look at in my dissertation.
In my next chapter, “Chapter 2. The Human Form and Human
Independence in Wordsworth: A Link,” I show how the poet’s search for
truth in the Crossing the Alps episode becomes his striving to transcend both
his unfeeling objective reasoning and escapist subjectivism and thus to reach
communication between existents. He singles out the peasant from the natural
background and questions him with the result that the information he receives
through true communication, however short it is, is conductive to
transcendence. This chapter offers a close reading of the Alpine episode, with
occasional reference to Wordsworth’s biographical data and criticism, rather
than a theoretical explanation of the link.
Chapter Three, ‘Man Ennobled Outwardly Before My Sight,’” traces
how, in Book VIII, the Wordsworthian human sublime evolves from, and
supersedes, the natural sublime. This theoretical chapter also gives attention to
different kinds of time — pastoral, historical, and existential — and depicts the
sublime human form as perfectly gestaltic (as opposed to the comparatively
poor gestalten of the “uncouth shapes”).
A Dictionary of Philosophy by Antony Flew defines Gestalt as follows:
An organized, coherent whole whose parts are determined by laws
intrinsic to the whole rather than being randomly juxtaposed or
associated. The concept gives its name to the 20th-century school
of psychology founded by Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler,
and Kurt Koffka.
Gestalt theory was originally set up on general principles in
opposition to the prevailing psychological atomism of the
empiricist tradition. But its most significant contributions have
occurred in the field of psychology of perception, in virtue of a
13

number of classic experiments designed to show how the eye
naturally tends to organize, for example, a series of lines or dots
into coherent patterns. For Gestalt theory, seeing is essentially a
phenomenological process in so far as what is ‘seen’ is what
appears to the seer rather than what may actually be there.25
Pertinent to my discussion of gestalten in Wordsworth’s poetry is Lawrence J.
Lujan’s definition of the term. Lujan, in his dissertation on the applications of
structural principles derived from Gestalt psychology to an understanding of
English romantic poetry and criticism (U. of California, Berkeley, 1977), breaks
the ground for a detailed investigation into how the two philosophies, that of
romanticism and of gestalt coexist. Even though he applies the theory to
poetic forms and rhetoric rather than to the figures of human beings, the claim
is that mediums in which gestalten can be perceived may be various.
The German word Gestalt basically means “form” or “shape”; it
is often translated in English psychological texts as
“configuration,” “structure,” or “pattern.” A gestalt may be
defined as a configuration, structure, pattern, or system of
phenomena, events, or experiences which is so integrated as to
constitute a functional whole with specific properties which can
neither be derived from the individual parts of the whole nor
considered simply as the summation of these parts. . . .
[A] gestalt is a segregated whole. “A form is characterized by
being separated and standing out in relief. It is closed and
structured.” A figure so deeply embedded in its background that
it cannot function independently is not perceived as an object at
all. (This is the principle of camouflage: the number Ç is not seen in
the letter N.) It is only when a figure separates itself from its field
so that it can function and be perceived in itself that a gestalt is
formed. The first and simplest configuration is a figure on a
ground.26
Berdyaev, whose philosophy I use, also prizes the gestaltic way of
perception as most appropriate for transcendence in his personalism.
Obrazƒ liçnosti c∫lostnyj, onƒ c∫lostno prisutstvuetƒ vo
vs∫hƒ aktahƒ liçnosti. Liçnostπ im∫etƒ edinstvennyj,
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nepovtorimyj
obrazƒ,
G e s t a l t . Takƒ nazyvaemaq
Gestaltpsychologie, kotoraq viditƒ perviçnyq kaçestvennyq
c∫losti, formy, bol∫e blagopr∂qtna dlq personalizma, ç∫mƒ
drug∂q napravlen∂q psiholog∂i. (22)

[The form of personality is integral, it is present as a whole in all
the acts of personality, personality has a unique, an unrepeatable
form, Gestalt. What is known as Gestalt psychology, which
regards form as the primary qualitative value, is more acceptable to
personalism than other systems of psychology.]27
Building on these definitions of gestalt, and putting to use N. P. Stallknecht’s
interpretation of Wordsworth’s “transcendence” and J. B. Twitchell’s study
of the Romantic sublime, I argue that the definite outline of the human form
serves as the sublime “horizon” or “threshold” to the infinity of the human
spirit and to the transcendent.
Chapter Four, “‘Uncouth Shapes’ and Their Progress From
Transgression to Transcendence,” looks at the series of human figures in The
Prelude, including the poet’s sketchy self-portraits, and illustrates the
movement of Books I-VIII from the bodily freedom and willfulness of the
transgressing “uncouth” human figures to the perfect but abstract gestalten of
the freemen, the Lake country’s “spiry rock” shepherds; while Books IX-XIII
proceed from the abstractness of revolutionary ideals (without gestaltic human
sketches) to the gestaltic figures conjured up out of the abysm of social and
personal history. In this chapter I heavily rely on Berdyaev’s philosophy of
freedom. I also indebted to John Beer’s study on the concepts of liberty,
freedom, and independence in Wordsworth. My own contribution is that I
look systematically at the human gestalten in connection with the poet’s
evolving notion of independence. Also, I find that by the end of The Prelude,
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Wordsworth shifts from the universal as general and abstract to the universal
as concrete and personalistic. 28 The relevant definitions of the universal, the
general, and the concrete are also given in that chapter.
My final chapter argues that the reader, who has been conditioned by
Wordsworth through the poet’s use of rhythmic sketching, can recognize in
the figure of the poet on Mount Snowdon the same sublime human form
Wordsworth discerned in the spiry rock shepherds of VIII. However, this
perfect human gestalt is no abstraction any longer: it becomes concrete. Even
though in the Snowdon passage Wordsworth dwells on his transcendent
vision, which is beyond the sublime threshold, in the 1850 text, this vision is
framed by the sublime human gestalten.
My conclusion suggests that a growing personal independence, gained
by the developing poet and, possibly, by his reader, is manifested to the
imaginative inner eye by way of the perfecting of the human gestalten, from
one Spot of Time 29 to another, until the poet himself gets into a position to be
seen as “an index of delight.” Throughout The Prelude (especially of 1850),
Wordsworth redefines his understanding of liberty till it approximates
independence. He becomes resistant to all kinds of determinism from without,
be it the determinism of matter or of abstract ideas. Finally, it is transcendence,
a feeling communion with the outer world, initiated by the person, that equals
“genuine liberty.” Visually, in The Prelude, the perfect, sublime, human form
serves as the horizon, the aperture to the transcendent, because it invites the
on-looker to approach another existent30 understandingly, to form a “bond of
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brotherhood,” and to be enriched by his experience and vision of the world in
an imaginative and transforming way.
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28 I use Berdyaev’s definition of personalism, which does not contradict other
traditional philosophic meaning of the term, for which see T. Flewelling, pp.
323-41.
29 The “Spots of Time” are the high-lights of Wordsworth’s personal growth.
They are “places in the inner and outer world, fused in a moment of vision” (E.
L. Stelzig, All Shades of Consciousness, p. 157). Wordsworth himself applies
the term only to two occasions, both found in Book XII of The Prelude: (1) to
his being lost and found not far from the Penrith gibbet; and (2) to the much
anticipated Christmas holidays during which, unexpectedly, his father died.
Despite the unhappiness of those first experiences, the moments bring comfort
and healing with each passing year:
There are in our existence spots of time,
That with distinct pre-eminence retain
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A renovating virtue, whence, depressed
By false opinion and contentious thought,
Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight,
In trivial occupations, and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds
Are nourished and invisibly repaired;
A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced,
That penetrates, enables us to mount,
When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen.
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks
Among those passages of life that give
Profoundest knowledge to what point, and how,
The mind is lord and master—outward sense
The obedient servant of her will. Such moments
Are scattered everywhere, taking their date
From our first childhood. (XII, 208-25)
There is no definitive list of the Spots of Time to which all the
Wordsworthian scholars conform. John T. Ogden, in his 1975 article on “The
Structure of Imaginative Experience in Wordsworth’s Prelude,” however,
systematically lists more than twenty such passages, which are usually
considered to be the spots of time by most scholars.
The evolving function of the spots of time is discussed, among others,
by Eve Walsh Stoddard in “The Spots of Time: Wordsworth's Semiology of
the Self.” She shows how the spots of time of the 1799 text differ from the
later versions, particularly of 1805. In 1799, these spots were used to purify
“the elements of feeling and of thought” and were formulated in terms of the
Burkean sublime (p. 10). In 1805 and later, the chief function of such moments
is “to heal the mind” (p. 17), which is another kind of the sublime,
approximating that of Kant.
Jonathan Bishop is interested in the structure of those passages, the
imagery they involve. He traces how in spots of time the repeated action gets
broken, bringing along with such a sudden interruption the realization of
something new. As an instance of such an interruption he mentions — though
does not explicate gestaltically — the separation of a solitary shape from the
crowd.
We seem to have in the ‘spots’ a repeated action, something a
crowd does, or the protagonist does over and over, an action with
guilty overtones, expressive of power and pride, rising as it
proceeds to a boundary, there to be checked and retaliated upon
from without, by counter-motion, or by a voice or the appearance
of a grim shape, whose arrival precipitates an oppressive
catastrophe. Is this rehearsal too abstract? Objections will arise, for
many a ‘spot’ mixes or omits elements of this story: the relation
between the protagonist and the grim shape, for example, is very
changeable, in some memories reducing to identity. And many of
the early memories never rise to a distinct crisis; we hear of
customary actions, repeated experiences which stay, as it were, in
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the back of Wordsworth’s mind, pleasant but indistinct. When
something does happen, though, the event follows at a greater or
lesser distance this curious pattern. (“Wordsworth and the ‘Spots
of Time,’” p. 140)
J. Bishop, who is interested in different kinds of time in The Prelude, describes
the nature of the spots of time, defining them as moments separated from the
flux of time, but not a frozenness or “thrombosis.”
Allan Chavkin explains the spots of time as “heightened moments of
illumination,” in which “Wordsworth’s secular imagination manifests its
power” (p. 454). Chavkin calls Wordsworth’s imagination “secular,” because
it does not change reality: “the secular imagination only half creates its world
because it is firmly anchored in the world of the senses. It can color reality, but
it cannot ignore, distort, or transcend reality” (pp. 454-55). Chavkin’s
understanding of “transcendence,” then, is different from the religious
Berdyaev, who does not equate transcendence with distortion and escapism,
and does not think that transcendence and reality should oppose each other.
Likewise, Chavkin differs from Newton Stallknecht’s emphasis on the
undistorted real world of Wordsworth’s transcendence, despite all the poet’s
mysticism.
30 By “existent,” I mean a personality, who makes efforts to grow mentally
and spiritually. When the personality is destroyed (as it happens with
Robespierre, or even with the hanged criminal of the gibbet episode), the
human gestalt is poor or absent, but objectivization dominates the vision.
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CHAPTER 2: THE HUMAN FORM AND HUMAN INDEPENDENCE IN
WORDSWORTH: A LINK
Whether an anti-romantic – as he was considered to be before the
beginning of the twentieth century – or a central figure in British
Romanticism,1 Wordsworth has been especially acclaimed as a poet of nature
and of landscape. Even though his landscapes are often informed by haunting
human presence, the poet seems to distance himself from the human beings he
portrays, making them part of landscape and significantly altering the
appearances of the prototypes and the stories of their lives, as happened, for
instance with the famous Leech-Gatherer figure, which Wordsworth created
after re-reading of one of Dorothy’s journal entries, which he modified
considerably. Wordsworth’s tendency to tamper with the images of real
people and his apparent lack of interest in what they really said or did led some
to parody his lines (Carroll’s famous “I’ll tell you everything I can” is one
such mockery) and to seriously question Wordsworth's love for humankind,
subordinating his interest in people to his feelings for nature. 2 Especially
illuminating to that effect, though not always as sweepingly dismissive as is
Carroll’s parody, are comparative approaches, in which Wordsworth's use of
human figures is weighed against those of Reynolds, Blake 3 or Coleridge.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in particular, whose arrival at Racedown in the
Summer of 1797, where William and Dorothy lived at the time, marked the
beginning of a close creative exchange between the two poets, often provides
a foil to Wordsworth in the context of their dialogue. Poetical experiments
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with human figures and landscapes are no small part of that dialogue, and the
differences between Coleridge’s experiments and Wordsworth’s have been
eloquently discussed in criticism. For instance, in his article, “The Role of
Humankind in the Poetry of Wordsworth and Coleridge” (1991), J. Robert
Barth, S. J., argues that human figures in much of Wordsworth’s poetry are
“more part of the landscape than of the poet’s world of humanity.” 4 Barth
suggests that “Wordsworth’s depth of feeling for the natural world may at
times have blinded him to the actual feelings of some of the human figures in
his landscape;” while for Coleridge, contrastingly, “humankind is both distinct
and separate from its natural setting. The focus is not Nature but humanity, and
the primary relationship is not between humankind and Nature but between
human persons.”5
Wordsworth’s preoccupation with nature has received a good deal of
categorizing. As early as 1962, Geoffrey Hartman drew up an exhaustive
classification of controversial critical approaches to understanding of the role
Nature played in Wordsworth’s poetry, which in the main remains current. 6
The spectrum ranges from those who see the poet as a worshipper of Nature, to
those who find an opposition between the “images culled from Nature” and
the poet’s Imagination, which can transcend Nature. Analogously, the
controversy around the position of humanity in Wordsworth’s poetry can be
distributed along a spectrum between two extremes: those who see humanity
in Wordsworth as inconsiderately effaced by Nature and those who argue for
the poet’s unconditional love of humankind.7
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In this study, my primary interest lies with the human figures, their
enabling presence in Wordsworth’s poetry, with the way this presence is
manifested — or not — to the inner eye of the reader, and the effects of such
manifestation. Indeed, many human images in Wordsworth’s poetry, despite
their close connection with landscape, are not lost in it, but stand out in the
minds of many generations of readers and loom large, be it the girl with the
pitcher struggling against the wind, Margaret ever searching the horizon with
her eyes, the double-bent Leech Gatherer, the cheerless Michael sitting by his
unfinished sheep-fold, the boy Wordsworth looking back at Black Crag from
the stolen boat. Why do such figures sometimes stand out and, at other times,
seem camouflaged, blending with the environment and its shadows, as
happens with the discharged soldier? Are human figures mere pawns in the
loco-descriptive game or guides to and interpreters of the landscape, which
can lead beyond itself towards liberating the imagination? Are Wordsworth’s
figures readable and to what effect?
The problem of the readability of landscapes and signs within them,
including human figures, was central to the minds of Wordsworth and
Coleridge during the years of their most intense collaboration, before the
appearance of The Lyrical Ballads. With many drafts continuously being
rewritten and poems reread in each other’s presence, each of the poets was
honing his own technique: while Wordsworth was making a case for the
possibility of reliance upon signs within landscape, provided that the onlooker, like the Pedlar, has a “worthy eye,” Coleridge was exploring the
inscrutability of landscapes and the perplexing influence of aliens, such as
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Geraldine, who pass all understanding and irrevocably disrupt the literal. Thus
Paul Magnuson, who in his book-length study, Coleridge and Wordsworth: A
Lyrical Dialogue (1988), gives close attention to poetic exploration of the
problem as it appears in “The Ruined Cottage” and “Christabel” (17971798), writes:
Coleridge’s response to both Margaret’s story and the Pedlar
material, in the first part of ‘Christabel,’ took what must have
seemed to Wordsworth a strange turn. ‘Christabel’ questions both
the optimism of hope and the certainty of the meaning of signs
within landscape that the Pedlar claims to be able to read. In the
context of their poetic dialogue, Coleridge’s response argues that
the divisions occasioned by wandering, once opened, and the
necessity of interpretation and figuration, once established, allow
no return to the secure certainty of the literal. The mariner returns
to his own country only temporarily and continues to be the
enigmatic wandering figure, just as, later, Leonard in ‘The
Brothers’ remains unknown to the Priest of Ennerdale. Christabel
is aware, at the end of the first part, of having been presented with
the figure of Geraldine, an enigmatic figure. Both parts of the
poem, the first implicitly and the second explicitly, question the
Pedlar’s ability to read landscape with a worthy eye.8
The variants on the questions raised in the exchange above — whether
unfamiliar landscapes can be understood or interpreted adequately; whether
this understanding can be passed on from one human being to another and
under what circumstances — surface in the poetry of both for years later. In
The Prelude (or “the poem to Coleridge” as Wordsworth used to call it), in the
“Crossing the Alps” episode, Wordsworth works his own example of the
difficulties of reading landscape and some enigmatic human figures within it,
when he and Robert Jones, themselves wanderers during the tour of the
continent in August 1790, having no practical knowledge of the place and no
timely signal from the locals they follow in the Simplon Pass, reach the highest
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point of the Alpine Crossing unawares. The poet uses the incident to explore
the discrepancies between his preconceptions about the landscape and its
reality. At first, the travellers cannot read the signs within that landscape,
including human beings, correctly and get themselves lost. At a halting place
the young men get separated from their guides and, figuring that the relief of
the crossing should be steeper (when actually the Simplon Pass has a level
top), the boys continue to climb the nearby mountain. Consequently, they fail
to overtake the muleteers, who are well on their way down. Their departure
from the literalness of the landscape is mendable, however. Moreover, it is
mendable with the help of a local peasant, who is not at odds with the
landscape, and unlike Coleridge’s characters, is capable of bringing back
clarity to the confused travellers at a critical juncture. The importance of that
eye-opening human exchange, however short it is, especially stands out, when,
by comparison, we watch the development of Wordsworth’s account of his
tour in The Prelude, starting with his first mountaintop experience, that of
Mont Blanc, which took place a few days prior to his Alpine crossing and in
which no human figures appear in the focus.
Mont Blanc, the highest point in Europe, was the mount with the
reputation. Horace-Bénédict de Saussure, who had climbed it three years
before Wordsworth first saw it, and William Coxe, who praised its prospect in
his Sketches on the Natural, Civil, and Political State of Switzerland, were
among the major inspirations for Wordsworth when he set out to experience
Mont Blanc’s sublimity. 9 Wordsworth sincerely takes these authorities at their
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word, anticipating a very special experience. According to Kenneth Johnston,
Wordsworth “planned in his published account of the tour to place it [Mont
Blanc] as the climax of the whole, as the superlative of the Sublime.” 10 Post
factum, however, as The Prelude makes clear, that mountain turns out to be
one of several letdowns of the tour, rather than its defining moment. And in his
genuine disappointment, Wordsworth does not end up as an original either: his
few lines are very much in unison with the numerous reactions of travellers
unsatisfied with the not-sublime-enough appearance of Mont Blanc. The same
William Coxe whose Sketches helped Wordsworth form the idea of how
sublime this Mount was, on the very same pages of the Sketches, writes of
Mont Blanc in a less than enthusiastic tone: “it ends abruptly, and loses itself
amid the mountains that bound from the vale of Chamouny.”11 Such were the
words of the people who saw the Mount and on whose evidence Wordsworth
was dependent. Contextually, Coxe’s indirect presence in the passage is
undeniable. What The Prelude tells directly, however, is strikingly different: no
human presence is emphasized in the lines, no human figure but “we” –
Wordsworth and his kindred companion – is noticeable, as if on purpose.
That very day,
From a bare ridge we also first beheld
Unveiled the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved
To have a soulless image on the eye
That had usurped upon a living thought
That never more could be.12
The “soulless image” of the real Mont Blanc deadens “a living thought”
completely. In this world of solitude, the only word that points to the vastness
of the hoped-for experience is “usurped,” the word which in its changed
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meaning would figure in the passage on Imagination later in the same Book VI.
The result of this usurpation here is nothingness, a “never more,” quite the
opposite of what the true imagination will inspire.
During his 1790 tour, precisely knowing his position in space and time,
watching the 15,770-feet Mont Blanc from the same standpoint as Coxe, from
the 5,006-feet Col de Balme, on the third anniversary of the day when
Saussure climbed it, Wordsworth is not responding to the mountainscape the
way he expected to. The objective knowledge of dates and places per se,
however precise, does not assist in bridging the gulf between the
preconceived image and reality.
The disappointed travellers, reluctant to give up their illusory
preconceptions, turn away from Mont Blanc and descend into the “wondrous
Vale of Chamouny” with its magnificent cataracts and rivers which, as The
Prelude tells us, charmed the travellers back into thinking that they together
with their expectations, can be “reconciled to realities.” 13 What follows,
however, is not the description of the “realities” of the vale as Wordsworth
saw them during his tour and reflected later in Descriptive Sketches, but an
escape from the haunting “pale-blue hands” and “dead muttering lips” of the
beggars he met in the vale to the quasi-pastoral fictional world reminiscent of
Coxe’s Sketches again.14 In the conflict between the literal and the figurative,
the poet, in his “unripe state / Of intellect and heart,” chooses between the
two and prefers the latter, willingly pulling over his unsatisfied sight the wool
of the fictional world, in which the Winter “like a well-tamed lion walks” and
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the maidens “spreading the haycock in the sun” are as predictable and nonthreatening to the expectations as pastoral shepherdesses. Thus wandering
among the sublime solitudes, while thinking themselves in the fictitious
gardens of the allegorical lady Sorrow, the young poet of The Prelude and
Robert Jones, his “brother pilgrim,” try to allay their thirst for both
pensiveness and sweetness:
Nor. . . could we fail to abound
In dreams and fictions, pensively composed:
Dejection taken up for pleasure’s sake,
And gilded sympathies, the willow wreath,
And sober posies of funeral flowers,
Gathered among those solitudes sublime
From formal gardens of the lady Sorrow,
Did sweeten many a meditative hour.15
But the “gilded sympathies” of this half-imaginary landscape are not the
reconciliation with realities Wordsworth was looking for. He still feels an
unquenched “under-thirst” for sensations of a different kind, not fanciful, but
fully imaginative, even though at this point of his journey he has no name for
imagination 16 yet. It is Basil Willey who can provide the definition for the
fancy-Imagination distinction:
Just as a “known and familiar landscape” may be transmuted by
moonlight or “accidents of light and shade,” so, owing to the
bond between nature and the soul of man, this dead world may be
brought to life by the modifying colours of the “imagination.” Of
the imagination, for this is the faculty which works the required
magic without producing what is now felt to be “fictitious.”
Where there is consciousness of fiction, it is the fancy that has
been at work.17
The Vale of Chamouny is left behind, and Wordsworth has to depart
from Coxe’s Sketches and from the route the book offers18 for a very practical
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reason: to get to the Italian Lake District sooner, he decides to cross the Alps
by way of the quick and easy Simplon Pass, the road not taken by Coxe, who
was more interested in dramatic prospects, for which the Simplon Pass is not
specifically famous. At large, on his own, without the directions of Coxe,
Wordsworth still keeps up the fanciful mood of the “wondrous vale” and
expects “the crossing of the Alps” not only to sound impressive but be so.
Having met a band of real muleteers travelling that road presumably not
for the first time, Wordsworth and Jones followed them as they would their
guides up a hill till the band stopped for a halt. The appearance of the
muleteers is the first emergence of the real human beings in Wordsworth’s
mountaintop experience in The Prelude. However, those figures are not
granted much attention. Where precisely those guides were supposed to lead
the way – to the foot of the mountain on the Italian side or just to the top of
the crossing – is a matter of conjecture. Later in the poem, in a flashback, we
learn that admiring the top of the crossing was the objective of the English
landscape wanderers. Whether there was an understanding between
Wordsworth and the muleteers that the latter would show the exact place of
the top, remains unsaid, as remains unsaid much about the muleteers, their
tongue and their looks, because for the young English wanderers, muleteers
are not interesting in themselves, but only as long as they can lead the way
across the mountains and reveal by their actions certain landmarks. But such
an expectation backfires: at a place where a more poetically minded “Corin of
the grove” or the maiden of “the wondrous vale” would have paid their
respects to the landscape with a gesture or a word, the down-to-earth
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muleteers waste no time and without much talking finish their simple meal and
take off, as if nothing extraordinary happened. No signal is sent to
Wordsworth and Robert Jones as to where to exalt in the very moment of the
crossing, and the experience remains unregistered by the consciousness of the
travellers.
When from the Vallais we had turned, and clomb
Along the Simplon’s steep and rugged road,
Following a band of muleteers, we reached
A halting-place, where all together took
Their noon-tide meal. Hastily rose our guide,
Leaving us at the board; awhile we lingered,
Then paced the beaten downward way that led
Right to a rough stream’s edge, and there broke off.19
Thus, the travellers stop short on the brink of the readable with a bunch of
enigmas to handle. The readers of The Prelude are also baffled: Were the
muleteers aware that Wordsworth and Jones were eager to enjoy the view of
the crossing? Why did the band leave only the English to linger at that place
and not tell them where to catch up on the way later? And whence this richly
loaded phrase “at the board”? Why from that point on does the beaten road
start to descend? Why does the river, which in The Prelude is usually
analogous to the flowing progress of the journey, 20 now block and bar the
way? All signs, first human and then natural, receive an erroneous or null
reading from the young travellers. The travellers miss all the clues, and
misunderstanding piles up. And so, being left by the road companions on their
own, they turned to landscape for guidelines, hoping eventually to overtake
the muleteers and enjoy the highest point of the crossing. But after their

31

underestimation of the contact with the natives, the landscape wouldn’t
cooperate either.
[We] paced the beaten downward way that led
Right to a rough stream’s edge, and there broke off;
The only track now visible was one
That from the torrent’s further brink held forth
Conspicuous invitation to ascend
A lofty mountain. After brief delay
Crossing the unbridged stream, that road we took,
And clomb with eagerness, till anxious fears
Intruded, for we failed to overtake
Our comrades gone before.21
Tempted in their eagerness to follow the “conspicuous invitation” of the
ascending road, the boys do not gain on the muleteers and spot no human
shapes beckoning them. Fears instead of a more sublime awe arise. The abyss
between expectations and reality dangerously widens. Now the travellers are
disoriented not only in space, but also in time: in their understanding, the
crossing is not only ahead of them, but also at some point in the future, and the
longer they struggle to approach it, the further away they drift off. The conflict
between the figurative and the real is aggravated. Wordsworth and Jones start
suspecting that their self-centered figuration of the landscape is lacking and
there is a need to reach out to the literal world. The question is how to do that.
Before I speak of the possible ways out of their subjective world and
especially of the one Wordsworth picks, which ultimately led him to a new
revelation about the Imaginary power, it is expedient to draw a distinction
between the subjective vision of the world, which was closing upon the lost
travellers, and the existential vision, which also presupposes that a subject has
the center of the existence of the whole world inside of him, and for which
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Wordsworth is also known. As the poet himself dictated to Miss Fenwick in
1843 in his ruminations on the “Ode,”
With a feeling congenial to this [a sense of the indomitableness of
the spirit within], I was often unable to think of external things as
having external existence, and I communed with all that I saw as
something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial
nature. Many times while going to school have I grasped at a wall
or tree to recall myself from this abyss of idealism to the reality. At
that time I was afraid of such processes. In later periods of life I
have deplored (as we have all reason to do) a subjugation of an
opposite character, and have rejoiced over the remembrances, as is
expressed in the lines, ‘obstinate questionings’, etc. To that
dreamlike vividness and splendour which invest objects of sight in
childhood, everyone (I believe, if he would look back) could bear
testimony, and I need not dwell upon it here.22
In such intense moments, there cannot be the other, which is always an object;
there cannot be the past as opposed to and separated from the present; hence,
there cannot exist escapism. Such an existential habit of mind, when the
subject and object are not alienated, in Wordsworth is especially associated
with childhood and its experiences. So, a little girl in “We are Seven” does not
accept death as separation from her brother and sister, even though she uses
the word “died.” She does not treat her dead siblings as objects. But she
counts them, when asked “Sisters and brothers, little maid, / How many may
you be?,”23 expanding her world to include her late brother and sister into her
everyday life and never losing touch with their presence.
So, the difference is that the subjective vision is illusory and does not
square with the outward facts, as it happens in the above crossing episode. It is
precisely the discrepancy between the illusory subjective vision and the real
fact that gets the travellers lost. The existential vision, and here Berdyaev is
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helpful, is different from that. Taking landscapes in is an emotional way of
bridging the gap between the human and the natural, when the human figure
becomes neither alien to the incomprehensible landscape, nor dominated or
effaced by it in a dehumanizing way; rather, the landscape becomes part of the
person’s inner world: the erroneous and lacking-in-feeling vision of the
external objects gives way to the yielding and emotional inner scapes, as
happens in “We are Seven.” Berdyaev wrote:
Liçnostπ, kakƒ xkzistenc∂alπnyj centrƒ, predpolagaetƒ
çuvstviliµe kƒ stradan∂qmƒ i radostqmƒ. Niçto vƒ
obƒektnomƒ m∂r∫, ni nac∂q, ni gosudarstvo, ni obµestvo, ni
soc∂alπnyj institutƒ, ni cerkovπ, xtimƒ çuvstviliµemƒ ne
oblada√tƒ. (25)

[Personality as an existential centre, presupposes capacity to feel
suffering and joy. Nothing in the object world, nation or state or
society, or social institution, or church, possesses this capacity.]24
And futher on:
[Podlinnyj personalizmƒ] ne mowetƒ priznatπ liçnostπ√
c∫lostπ, kollektivnoe edinstvo, vƒ kotoromƒ n∫tƒ
xkzistenc∂alπnago centra, n∫tƒ çuvstviliµa kƒ radosti i
stradan∂√, n∫tƒ liçnoj sudπby. Vn∫ liçnosti n∫tƒ vƒ m∂r∫
absol√tnago edinstva i totalitarnosti, kotorymƒ liçnostπ
byla by podçinena, vn∫ liçnosti vse çastiçno, çastiçenƒ i
samyj m∂rƒ. Vse obƒektivirovannoe, vse obƒektnoe mowetƒ
bytπ lißπ çastiçno. Takovƒ vesπ obƒektivirovannyj m∂rƒ, vse
obƒektivirovannoe obµestvo so svoimi obƒektivirovannymi
t∫lami. Xtotƒ obƒektivirovannyj m∂rƒ otliçaetsq
massivnostπ√, kotoraq mowetƒ davitπ liçnostπ, no ne
c∫lostnostπ√ i ne totalitarnostπ√. Xkzistenc∂alπnyj centrƒ,
stradalπçeskaq sudπba nahoditsq vƒ subƒektivnosti, a ne vƒ
obƒektivnosti. [...] Kosmosƒ, çelov∫çestvo, nac∂q i pr.
nahodqtsq
vƒ
çelov∫çeskoj
liçnosti,
kakƒ
vƒ
individualizirovannomƒ universum∫ ili mikrokosm∫, i
vypaden∂e, vybrasyvan∂e ihƒ vo vn∫ßn∂q realπnosti, vƒ
obƒekty, estπ rezulπtatƒ padßesti çelov∫ka, podçinen∂q ego
bezliçnoj realπnosti, xkster∂orizac∂i, otçuwden∂√. Solnce
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xkzistenc∂alπno nahoditsq ne vƒ centr∫ kosmosa, a vƒ centr∫
çelov∫çeskoj liçnosti i ono xkster∂orizirovano lißπ vƒ
padßemƒ sostoqn∂i çelov∫ka. Realizac∂q liçnosti, koncentrac∂q
i aktualizac∂q eq sily prinimaetƒ solnce vnutrπ, prinimaetƒ
vnutrπ vesπ kosmosƒ, vs√ istor∂√, vse çelov∫çestvo. (36-37)

[Authentic personalism cannot recognize a whole, a collective
unity in which there is no absolute existential centre, no point of
sensitiveness to joy and suffering, no personal destiny, as a
personality. Outside personality there is no absolute unity and
totality in the world, to which personality would be subordinate:
outside personality everything is partial, even the world itself is
partial <fragmented>. Everything objectivized, everything which
is an object can be partial only. Such is the whole objectivized
world, and the whole of objectivized society with its objectivized
bodies. This objectivized world is distinguished by a solidity
which is able to threaten to crush personality, but it is not
distinguished by wholeness nor by totality. An existential centre,
and a suffering destiny are to be found in subjectivity, not in
objectivity. . . . The cosmos, mankind, nation, etc., are to be found
in human personality as in an individualized universe or
microcosm, and their falling away from it, their ejection into
external reality among objects, is the result of the fall of man, of his
subordination to impersonal reality, exteriorization, and alienation.
In the existential system the sun is to be found not in the centre of
the cosmos but in the centre of human personality and it is
exteriorized only in the fallen state of man. The realization of
personality, the concentration and actualization of its strength,
takes the sun into itself, it inwardly receives the whole cosmos, the
whole of history, all mankind.]25
In the subjectivized vision of Mt. Blanc, the Vale of Chamouney, and of
the missed crossing alike, the travellers strived to substitute their own ideas
about the world for the reality, which on the emotional level brought either
utter disappointment or blinding illusion. But what they did not attempt is to
get through their heart, without any biases or comparing, every moment of
what they really saw. From the subjective perspective, with its emotional
dissonance with the reality, which dominates the crossing, if we apply
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Berdyaev’s existential personalism, there can be two ways out: (1) by way of
objectivization; (2) by way of transcendence. And so Berdyaev explains:
Çelov∫kƒ hoçetƒ vyjti izƒ zamknutoj subƒektivnosti i xto
proishodit vsegda vƒ dvuhƒ raznyhƒ, dawe protivopolownyhƒ
napravlen∂qhƒ. Vyhodƒ izƒ subƒektivnosti proishoditƒ putemƒ
obƒektivac∂i. Xto putπ vyhoda vƒ obµestvo sƒ ego
obµeobqzatelπnymi formami, xto putπ obµeobqzatelπnoj nauki.
Na xtomƒ puti proishoditƒ otçuwden∂e çelov∫çeskoj prirody,
vybrasyvan∂e eq vƒ obƒektnyj m∂rƒ, liçnostπ ne nahoditƒ
sebq. Drugoj putπ estπ vyhodƒ izƒ subƒektivnosti çerezƒ
transcendirovan∂e. Transcendirovan∂e estπ perehodƒ kƒ
transsubƒektivnomu, a ne kƒ obƒektivnomu. Xtotƒ putπ lewitƒ
vƒ glubin∫ suµestvovan∂q, na xtomƒ puti proishodqtƒ
xkzistenc∂alπnyq vstr∫çi sƒ Bogomƒ, sƒ drugimƒ çelov∫komƒ,
sƒ vnutrennimƒ suµestvovan∂emƒ m∂ra, xto putπ ne
oƒektivnyhƒ soobµen∂j, a xkzistenc∂alπnyhƒ obµen∂j. Liçnostπ
vpoln∫ realizuetƒ sebq tolπko na xtomƒ puti. (27)

[Man desires to go out from the closed circle of subjectivity and
this movement always takes place in two different and even
opposite directions. Emergence from subjectivity proceeds by way
of objectivization. This is the way which leads out into society
with its forms of universal obligation, it is the way of science with
its laws of universal obligation. On this path there takes place the
alienation of human nature, its ejection into the object world:
personality does not find itself. The other path is emergence from
subjectivity through the process of transcendence. This is a
passing over into the transsubjective and not to the objective. This
path lies in the deeps of existence, on this path there take place
the existential meeting with God, with other people, with the
interior existence of the world. It is the path not of objective
communication but of existential communion. Personality reaches
full realization of itself only on this path.26]
Even though Berdyaev was not a scholar of Wordsworth, in his distinction
between what he here calls “objectivization” and “transcendence,” he comes
very close to Wordsworth’s differentiation between the two ways of seeking
truth: as undertaken by a man of science and by a poet. Thus, in his 1800
Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth writes:
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[Poetry’s] object is truth, not individual and local, but general, and
operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive
into the heart by passion; truth which is its own testimony. . . .
The man of science seeks truth as a remote and unknown
benefactor; he cherishes and loves it in his solitude: the poet,
singing a song in which all human beings join with him, rejoices in
the presence of truth as our visible friend and hourly companion. .
. . [T]he poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast
empire of human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and
over all time.27
Thus, when lost, had Wordsworth and Jones taken a map, a compass, a
telescope or even a “Claude-Lorrain” glass for that matter, by which to
instrumentally correct their disoriented vision of the Alpine landscape, and had
they returned to the path emotionally untransformed, that would have been
succumbing to objectivization or “science.” Objectivization has already been
attempted by the poet a few junctures earlier, near Mont Blanc. The travellers’
over-reliance upon external testimony with an acute awareness of their
viewing “station,” observed almost with the formality of picturesque tours,
undermined all the impressiveness of one of the pre-eminently sublime views.
Such detached factualness of the travellers leads only to their awareness of the
separateness of the subjective and the objective rather than anywhere close to
finding the truth they wanted, in that case, the adequate experiencing of the
mountain’s sublimity.
What happens in The Prelude after the travellers were placed in check
by the brook and face the peasant’s eye-opening explanation, is
transcendence, accompanied by a discovery of a new feeling and of a new
power: the unifying imagination. 28 Growth of mind and of a personality takes
place. The inner world of the poet expands to receive feelingly the outer
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landscape as it is. To use Wordsworth’s words from the Preface to Lyrical
Ballads, the feeling here “gives importance to the action and situation, and
not the action and situation to the feeling.” From that point on, the path, even
though it descends rather than scales the lofty peaks, is suddenly made open
to the grandeur of the imaginative29 and sublime panorama with the
“immeasurable height / Of woods decaying, never to be decayed, / The
stationary blasts of waterfalls” and “Winds thwarting winds,” the giddy
description of the giddy prospect of the Gondo Gorge that is couched in
Miltonic terms.30
The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light—
Were all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocalypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end.31
The poet’s transcendent vision of the landscape leads to his communion with
God, just as it happens in Berdyaev’s quotation on transcendence above. And
even though Wordsworth in his letters to Dorothy claimed that it was the
Alpine panorama rather than human presence that turned his whole soul to
God, in the text of The Prelude, it all starts with the meeting of the human
being whose words the travellers, for the first time in this mountaintop
experience, “translate by their feelings.”
Nature does not rescue the travellers all by itself. The travellers had to
wish for human guidance and communion starting with the wishful thinking
about the distanced muleteers who now are missed, and whose absence gives
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rise to fears and a belated realization that the lost guides were, in fact,
“comrades.” But what is gone is gone. Another human being appears at a
crucial moment. His appearance is so abrupt that it is often underestimated
even by the modern reader, who sees the peasant as a counterpart of the
muleteers in all ways. E. Hershey Sneath, who wrote about Wordsworth as a
“Poet of Nature and Poet of Man” (placing man second to nature even in the
title of his 1912 book), emphasizes similarities between all human beings met
by Wordsworth during his journey from France to Switzerland and beyond as
they are described in The Prelude and “Descriptive Sketches” alike:
These accounts are all in harmony with what seems to be
fundamental in Wordsworth’s thinking—that Man and Nature are
not far apart. The nearer that social conditions approach those of
primitive or patriarchal man, the more accurately does Man hear
Nature’s voice, and the more fully does she reveal herself to him.32
Without disagreeing with Sneath about the natural man, I stress the contrasts
between the people Wordsworth mentions in the crossing episode, because
after all, the muleteers’ closeness to nature was not of much assistance to the
young English travellers, while the peasant’s knowledge of the locale proved
profitable indeed. From my perspective, what comes to the fore is the poet’s
relationship with the people he meets rather than those people’s affiliation.
In contrast to “making of them [the muleteers] our guide” — a phrase
that distances the muleteers as objects to be used — the peasant’s
introduction into the poem is much more involved. “A peasant met us,” says
the poet, giving precedence of agency to the peasant, even on the level of
discourse. Starting with this speech act, Wordsworth puts to right what went
wrong in his encounter with the muleteers. Despite all differences in languages
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and class, he establishes lines of communication with a person from this
place.33 Wordsworth and Jones approach the peasant “again and yet again,”
with an effort, transcending the barriers of misunderstanding. The
interpretation of the real landscape voiced by a local peasant is as hard for the
wanderers to get through their heads and as strange to their ears as the foreign
language he speaks, but they do not give up and “translate by their feelings”
each word he mouths. Thus the turn towards transcendence starts with getting
in touch with a human being, who, finally, is not reduced to a pastoral figure,
but met honestly, large as life, with his appearance as solid as his experience of
the region. He is more palpable than other people in the Alps described here.
And in the 1850 text his presence is made even more tangible than in all
previous versions of the poem.34
By fortunate chance,
While every moment added doubt to doubt,
A peasant met us, from whose mouth we learned
That to the spot which had perplexed us first
We must descend, and there should find the road,
Which in the stony channel of the stream
Lay a few steps, and then along its banks;
And, that our future course, all plain to sight,
Was downwards, with the current of that stream.
Loth to believe what we so grieved to hear,
For still we had hopes that pointed to the clouds,
We questioned him again, and yet again;
But every word that from the peasant’s lips
Came in reply, translated by our feelings,
Ended in this,—that we had crossed the Alps.35
Words translated by feelings bring home the idea that never crossed the minds
of the travellers before: they had crossed the Alps. This announcement of the
peasant, italicized by Wordsworth in the 1850 text, is in itself yet another
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speech act, an expression that performs an action so that the world is a
different place as the result of this speech. And this word comes from the
peasant and resounds in the poet’s mind. At that very moment, even before
“the melancholy slackening” produced by the news is “dislodged” and the
vision of the landscape changes, the poet makes shift in his terminology and
sidesteps into the passage on Imagination, rethinking and voicing anew all the
terms he used in the course of his Alpine journey. All those terms gain in
significance here, all are understood in a new, more dazzling, light. Instead of
the almost involuntary and imposed lingering at the halting place which was
supposed to be one of the most intense emotional stops near the top of the
crossing, now the poet is “lost as in a cloud, / Halted without a struggle to
break through.” The fear of having lost the thread of the road is replaced by
the far mightier and sublime “awe.”36 The usurpation of the “soulless” image
of Mont Blanc on the living thought becomes pale by the side of the
Imagination’s strength of usurpation. The hopes “that pointed to the clouds”
and were thwarted give place to the “hope that can never die.” The reality
itself is no more the gilded and sugared reality of the “wondrous Vale of
Chamouny,” but the infinitely grandiose actuality fertile like “the whole
Egyptian plain.”
Imagination—here the Power so called
Through sad incompetence of human speech,
That awful Power rose from the mind’d abyss
Like an unfathered vapour that enwraps,
At once, some lonely traveller. I was lost;
Halted without an effort to break through;
But to my conscious soul I now can say—
‘I recognize thy glory’: in such strength
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Of usurpation, when the light of sense
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode,
There harbours, whether we be young or old.
Our destiny, our being’s heart and home,
Is with infinitude, and only there;
With hope it is, hope that can never die,
Effort, and expectation, and desire,
And something evermore about to be.
Under such banners militant, the soul
Seeks for no trophies, struggles for no spoils
That may attest her prowess, blest in thoughts
That are their own perfection and reward,
Strong in herself and in beatitude
That hides her, like the mighty flood of Nile
Poured from his fount of Abyssinian clouds
To fertilize the whole Egyptian plain.37
Even though Book Six of The Prelude is not about the love of man,
and even though Wordsworth is yet to approach this love in the “shepherd on
the mountain” episode, where he will chant the verse of the sublimity of
human form as “an index of delight,” human presence is of crucial importance
in Wordsworth’s Alpine experience as well. Landscape per se does not give
knowledge, nor does it produce exaltation in the minds of the travellers. The
objectivized approach to landscape not tempered by inner feeling, with its
thorough “dissection” of measurable and sensual data, results in emotional
estrangement from nature and aesthetic disappointment in its views. The
subjective vision, on the other hand, with its neglect of the factual reality, leads
to illusions and loss of contact with the outer world. Only transcendence, for
Wordsworth, as for Berdyaev, can unify the observer with the observed, the
human traveller with the travelled world. And for Wordsworth, as for
Berdyaev, transcendence begins — to use Berdyaev’s phraseology — with
reaching out towards the trans-subjective: with the existential meeting with
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other people, with the interior existence of the world, with God. In the Alpine
crossing, before the existential meeting with both the landscape and God is
made possible, the poet has to turn his face toward a human being, look
steadily enough at him, and communicate with him as with a real human being
rather than take him for no more than an instrumental authority, pastoral figure
or the remote and churlish “other.” Only then, the brook previously blocking
the way turns into a “fellow-traveller,” and Nature leads beyond itself.
Through the existential communication with a human, the poet is
capable of receiving at least two types of felt information: (1) human
knowledge and experience of the place he visits and describes in his poetry;
and (2) information which is communicative in a different way than articulate
speech, such as other people’s visions or gestalten. The peasant above mostly
provides the information of the first kind, which is no wonder in the Book
entitled “Cambridge and the Alps” rather than “Love of Man.” In the
“Crossing the Alps” episode Wordsworth is more concerned with the shapes
of the mountains than with those of people and only hints at the pattern he
will develop in Book Eight when speaking about the transformation of a
shepherd before the poet’s eyes from a pastoral figure to the sublime one. In
“The Ruined Cottage,” MS D, as reworked in February-March of 1798, in
addition to the Pedlar’s vision of the landscape, Wordsworth provides the
Pedlar’s vision of Margaret in a set of different gestalten. For both visions the
Pedlar has the “worthy eye.”
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Both types of information can be eye-opening and lead to
transcendence, which in the personalistic philosophy of Berdyaev is equated
with personal freedom and opposed to the objectivization which enslaves.
Vƒ obƒektivac∂i çelov∫kƒ nahoditsq vo vlasti determinac∂i, vƒ
carstv∫ bezliçnosti, vƒ transcendirovan∂i çelov∫kƒ nahoditsq
vƒ carstv∫ svobody i vstr∫ça çelov∫ka sƒ t∫mƒ, çto ego
prevoshoditƒ, nositƒ liçnyj harakterƒ, sverhliçnoe ne
podavlqetƒ liçnosti. Xto osnovopolownoe razliçen∂e. [...]
Liçnostπ ostaetsq c∫lymƒ, ni vo çto ne vhoditƒ i pri eq
otnoßen∂i kƒ vysoçajßemu drugomu. Otnoßen∂e çasti kƒ
c∫lomu estπ otnoßen∂e matematiçeskoe, kakƒ otnoßen∂e organa
kƒ organizmu estπ otnoßen∂e b∂ologiçeskoe. Xto prinadlewitƒ
m∂ru obƒektivac∂i, vƒ kotoromƒ çelov∫kƒ prevraµaetsq vƒ
çastπ i organƒ. No xkzistenc∂alπnoe otnoßen∂e liçnosti kƒ
drugomu, i samomu vysoçajßemu, niçego obµago ne im∫et sƒ
takimƒ otnoßen∂emƒ. Transcendirovan∂e ne oznaçaetƒ, çto
liçnostπ podçinqetsq kakomu-libo c∫lomu, vhoditƒ kakƒ
sostavnaq çastπ vƒ kaku√-libo kollektivnu√ realπnostπ,
otnositsq kƒ vysßemu drugomu, kƒ vysßemu suµestvu, kakƒ kƒ
gospodinu. Transcendirovan∂e estπ aktivnyj, dinamiçesk∂j
processƒ, estπ immanentnyj opyt çelov∫ka, vƒ kotoromƒ
çelov∫kƒ perewivaetƒ katastrofy, perenositsq çerezƒ bezdny,
ispytyvaetƒ preryvnostπ vƒ svoemƒ suµestvovan∂i, no ne
xkster∂oriziruetsq, a inter∂oriziruetsq. Lißπ lownaq
obƒektivac∂q transcendirovan∂q, vybrasyvan∂e ego vo vn∫
sozdaetƒ ill√z∂√ transcendentnago, podavlq√µago liçnostπ i
gospodstvu√µago nadƒ nej. Transcendirovan∂e vƒ
xkzistenc∂alπnomƒ smysl∫ estπ svoboda i predpolagaetƒ svobodu,
estπ osvobowden∂e çelov∫ka otƒ pl∫na u samago sebq. (27-28)

[In objectivization man finds himself in the power of
determination, in the realm of the impersonal: in transcension
<transcending> man finds himself in the realm of freedom, and the
meeting of man with that which excels him has a personal
character, the suprapersonal does not crush personality. This is a
fundamental distinction. . . . Personality remains integral, it enters
into nothing, even in its relation to the highest other. The relation
of a part to the whole is a mathematical relation, just as the relation
of an organ to an organism is a biological relation.
This relation of a part to a whole belongs to the world of
objectivization in which man is turned into a part and an organ.
But the existential relation of personality to an other, and that the
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very highest, has nothing in common with such a relation.
Transcension <transcendence> does not mean that personality is
subordinated to any whole whatever, enters as an integral part
into any collective reality whatever, or is related to the highest
other, to the highest being, as to a master. Transcension is an
active dynamic process, it is the immanent experience of a man in
which he lives through catastrophes, is carried across abysses,
experiences interruptions in his existence, but is interiorized not
exteriorized. Only a false objectivization of transcension, the
ejection of man into the external, creates the illusion of the
transcendent which crushes personality, dominates over it.
Transcension <transcendence> in the existential sense is freedom
and presupposes freedom, it is the liberation of man from captivity
to himself.]38
In Wordsworth, transcendence is also liberating, as we just saw. It liberates the
observer’s mind from the objectivized vision of the world, which is without
feeling, on the one hand, and from the illusory subjectivity always leading off
the track on the other. Both subjectivity and objectivization reflect the world
partially and produce a set of gaps between the self and the other, the inner
and the outer, the feeling and the unfeeling. The adequate perception of the
world in its fullness is achieved only through transcendence.
Transcendence as togetherness with the universe, as it appears in
Wordsworth’s thought and writing, is described by Newton P. Stallknecht in
his study of the poet’s philosophy entitled Strange Seas of Thought (1958).
Comparing Wordsworth to Dewey and Whitehead, the critic notes:
[F]or Wordsworth the most important “fact” of Nature is the
“unity of all,” or “the one life within us and abroad.”
For Wordsworth, apprehension of the togetherness of things in
their primordial beauty is presented rather as the culmination of
the poet’s insight. Hence Wordsworth dwells upon his sentiment
of Being and cherishes its content more persistently and with
greater enthusiasm than do the philosophers. For Wordsworth, this
sentiment is a talent which is death to hide, and its expression in
palpable imagery is the first duty of the lover of Nature.39
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This palpable imagery, resulting from the steady observation of and unification
with the outer world, can be applied to the human figures as well. The
difference is, however, that when the poet communes with natural objects, he
endows them with his human feelings (e.g. “Beside yon spring I stood, / And
eyed its waters till we seemed to feel / One sadness, they and I,” lines 82-84 ),
while when coming into touch with human beings, who have their own
emotions and perceptions, in order to commune with them he has to establish
what he calls in “The Ruined Cottage” a “bond of brotherhood,” rather than
mere endowing them with his feelings. Hence, when the poet gains a worthier
eye in his transcending vision and starts creating that bond of brotherhood, he
not only perceives the images and forms of things better and more definitely, as
it happens with nature, but he also opens his eyes to the real feelings and
experiences of the real people reflected by their forms. Margaret is one such
figure whose emotions are well expressed by her images. A better term for
those images would be gestalten, because they are not portraits of a Margaret
standing before the observer’s very eyes but the Pedlar’s perceptions of her
taken from his mind. Every gestalt in its totality of perception is very much
fitting for the transcendental vision that unifies.
If transcendence liberates and brings emotional and visionary unity, the
opposite process 40 leads to fragmentation of the unified perception of the
world into the objective and subjective and to the loss of gestaltic vision with
its loss of forms perceived. The example of that opposite movement is
Margaret’s disintegration in her world, when the initially expressive forms of
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her with all her stooping and searching the horizon, so easily separable from
the background of the landscape and functioning more or less independently,
by the end of her life story become camouflaged: her image fuses with the
environment of her ruined dwelling. In contrast to the disoriented Alpine
travellers, who found the way through to transcendence, Margaret does not
transcend the limitations of her disoriented vision. On the one hand, by
physically and gestaltically becoming a part of her cottage, she loses all senses
and is objectified. On the other hand, she is overwhelmed by her subjectivity
that feeds upon illusions. Her reading of the landscape is erroneous or null (she
talks about the dying tree and does not see that her baby in her arms is just like
that tree: dying). And Margaret shapes the images of her husband where there
are actually none, so those images are as fanciful and “uncouth” as the ones
Robert carved before his desperate disappearance (“At his door he stood /
And whistled many a snatch of merry tunes / That had no mirth in them, or with
his knife / Carved uncouth figures on the heads of sticks,” lines 162-65).
Instead of transcending, she shuts down more and more. She does not have a
worthy eye. And so Paul Magnuson mentions in his aforementioned study:
For Wordsworth, Margaret’s shaping of figures in the distance is a
fanciful error, that she cannot overcome, and the Pedlar’s
interpretation of the ruined cottage is the reality.41
The Pedlar, unlike Margaret or Robert, has the eye capable of adequate and at
the same time sensitive vision of the world around him. He knows the true
facts of Margaret’s story, and does not deceive himself or the poet that she is
not dead. But what dominates his memory of her in MS D is not the
disintegrated shape of a poor woman, but a well-defined form, cheerful and
47

charitable in its openness to the outer world, as Margaret used to be. When
asked who used to live in the cottage, the Pedlar relates what is preeminently
on his mind:
Many a passenger
Has blessed poor Margaret for her gentle looks
When she upheld the cool refreshment drawn
From that forsaken spring, and no one came
But he was welcome, no one went away
But that it seemed she loved him. She is dead,
The worm is on her cheek, and this poor hut,
Stripped of its outward garb of household flowers,
Of rose and sweetbriar, offers to the wind
A cold bare wall whose earthy top is tricked
With weeds and the rank speargrass. She is dead,
And nettles rot and adders sun themselves
Where we have sat together while she nursed
Her infant at her breast. The unshod colt,
The wandering heifer and the potter’s ass,
Find shelter now within the chimney-wall
Where I have seen her evening hearthstone blaze
And through the window spread upon the road
Its cheerful light.42
After that the Pedlar stops in his description, and paints no further portraits of
Margaret, until he is asked by the poet. Between that first and dominant
gestalt of Margaret, as it is retained and each time re-met by the Pedlar when
he is in the vicinity of the cottage, and all the following desperate and
gradually blurred forms of her in the Second Part of the poem is a vast distance
of more than a hundred lines relating Robert’s story, the Pedlar’s solemn
pause, the poet’s silent meditation and “begging” to continue the story, most
of which were inserted by Wordsworth into MS D in February-March 1798
after numerous revisions. Such thoughtful distribution of Margaret’s
descriptions allows the reader to recognize the first, well-defined gestalt of
Margaret as most important in the Pedlar’s perception and to understand why
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in the end of the poem he is capable of being comforted. Indeed, he is
refreshed by yet another meeting with her not because she had suffered so
much, but because for him she still exists in that landscape ready to offer each
exhausted traveller a refreshing drink from the stream. In imagination, he
accepts this offering with gratitude, now finding refreshment in the raindrops
of a peaceful world of the paradisiacally overgrown spot:
She sleeps in the calm earth, and peace is here.
I well remember that those very plumes,
Those weeds, and the high speargrass on that wall,
By mist and silent raindrops silvered o’er,
As one I passed did to my mind convey
So still an image of tranquillity,
So calm and still, and looked so beautiful
Amid the uneasy thoughts which filled my mind,
That what we feel of sorrow and despair
From ruin and from change, and all the grief
The passing shows of being leave behind,
Appeared an idle dream that could not live
Where meditation was. I turned away,
And walked along my road in happiness.43
It is this refreshment together with his own spot of time and the cheerful
vision of Margaret presiding over it that the Pedlar (whose hat is “Bedewed
with water-drops, as if the brim / Had newly scooped a running stream,” lines
49-51) upholds to the poet, and of which the poet partakes. The poet receives
a lesson in transcendence. His irritated vision of the landscape with the insects
buzzing and his toiling up a hill is enriched by feelings. As minding the peasant
and his words, coming as a flash of lightning, helps the Alpine travellers to
transcend their subjective illusions, in “The Ruined Cottage,” MS D, the
poet’s interiorization of the Pedlar’s feeling vision of the landscape and human
forms in it aid him in overcoming his objectivized and “othering” vision of the
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landscape. The poet’s openness to both the peasant and the Pedlar, to their
words and images, their own and others, related by them, lead to the poet’s
liberation from his limitations. And in both cases, with the increasing degree of
transcendence comes the increasing interest in another human being and
increasing clarity in the awareness of the human form; the worthiness of the
eye increases.
In Wordsworth, well-defined human gestalten signal a better unified
vision of the observer, a deeper interest in the human beings that are met.
Unlike the forms of nature, human gestalten can be colored not only by the
poet’s imagination, but also by the emotions and experiences of the people
themselves. By seeing those emotions truly, through form, the poet creates a
bond of brotherhood with those human beings. He engages himself in a
communion with them, rather than in communication (see Berdyaev’s
distinction above). He transcends and is liberated.
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describes how on a wet night, returning from dinner with the
widow of Richard Watson, Bishop of Llandaff, they met a woman
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She sobbed as she passed us. Mr Wordsworth was much
affected with her condition: she was swollen with dropsy,
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from one lodging to another. It was a dark and stormy
night. Mr Wordsworth brought her back to the Low-Wood
Inn, where, by the landlord’s leave, she was housed in one
of his barns.
In those later years Hazlitt, who wrote in the essay mentioned
earlier [The Spirit of the Age], “His Muse... is a levelling one,”
blamed him for departing from his first principles. For others, he
was, — far more completely and straightforwardly than for
Browning himself — “the Lost Leader.” The evidence of an
incident such as this, however, as of many in his life and poetry, is
that even if his muse was not what Hazlitt and others would have
liked her to be, she had an identity of her own, in which she
remained a leveller — and that in that identity she was not finally
betrayed. (pp. 253-54)
For the opposite view on Wordsworth and humanity see my note 2 above.
8 Magnuson, pp. 97-98.
9 Kenneth Johnston, The Hidden Wordsworth: Poet, Lover, Rebel, Spy, pp.
190/199.
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11 Ibid., p. 200.
12 Book VI, 524-28.
13 Book VI, 533.
14 Kenneth Johnston, The Hidden Wordsworth: Poet, Lover, Rebel, Spy, pp.
201-02.
15 Book VI, 547-56.
16 Imagination is often contrasted with fancy in Wordsworth. Below are some
of the relevant excerpts on the subject. John Ogden, writing about “The Boy
of Winander”spot of time, describes fancy and imagination as follows:
The playful interchange of mimic hootings and responding halloos
is an instance of Wordsworth’s notion of fancy: it is amusing,
somewhat surprising, and even slightly ludicrous; it depends on
the rapidity and profusion of sounds; and it proves to be
capricious and transitory (see PW, II, 441). This fanciful game sets
up a contrast with the imaginative event that ensues, in which
“solemn and tranquillizing images” are planted “for immortality...
in the celestial soil of the Imagination” ([Wordsworth’s] P[rose]
W[orks], II, 440n.). Wordsworth’s distinction between fancy and
imagination is shown by their different but complementary roles.
Fancy excites the mind, while imagination captivates it. Fancy is
often at work in the first stage of a process that completes itself in
a work of imagination. (“The Stucture of Imaginative Experience
in Wordsworth’s Prelude,” p. 291)
Allan Chavkin stresses that Wordsworth “combines feeling and thought
to produce a higher kind of thinking, what he calls the ‘imagination’ for lack
of a better word. This higher kind of thinking is creative—it heightens, molds,
emblemizes, modifies, and interprets reality” (Allan Chavkin, “Wordsworth’s
Secular Imagination and ‘Spots of Time’,” p. 453).
And Wordsworth himself draws the following distinctions between fancy
and imagination:
The law under which the processes of Fancy are carried on is as
capricious as the accidents of things, and the effects are surprising,
playful, ludicrous, amusing, tender, or pathetic, as the objects
happen to be appositely or fortunately combined. Fancy depends
upon the rapidity and profusion with which she scatters her
thoughts and images; trusting that their number, and the felicity
with which they are linked together, will make amends for the
want of individual value: or she prides herself upon the curious
subtilty and the successful elaboration with which she can detect
their lurking affinities. If she can win you over to her purpose, and
impart to you her feelings, she cares not how unstable or transitory
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may be her influence, knowing that it will not be out of her power
to resume it upon an apt occasion. But the Imagination is
conscious of an indestructible dominion;—the Soul may fall away
from it, not being able to sustain its grandeur; but, if once felt and
acknowledged, by no act of any other faculty of the mind can it
be relaxed, impaired, or diminished.—Fancy is given to quicken
and to beguile the temporal part of our nature, Imagination to
incite and to support the eternal. (William Wordsworth, the
Preface of 1815).
17 Willey, p. 226; italics Willey’s.
18 Kenneth R. Johnston in his recent biography of Wordsworth (1998)
writes: “Coxe’s book was well known in Wordsworth’s circle: it had been
donated to the Hawkshead school library by his friends the Raincock brothers
and Edward Birkett, along with John Moore’s A View of Society and
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discussion of localities associated with Rousseau. Wordsworth and Jones
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also Ibid., p. 205.
19 Book VI, 562-69; italics Wordsworth’s.
20 For the meanings of Wordsworth’s Nature imagery see, for instance,
Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company (p. 142-43); Herbert Lindenberger, On
Wordsworth’s Prelude (pp. 69-98); E. de Selincourt’s notes to The Prelude.
21 Book VI, 568-77.
22 Duncan Wu, ed., Romanticism: An Anthology, p. 418.
23 “We Are Seven,” 13-14.
24 Slavery and Freedom, p. 27.
25 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
26 Ibid., p. 29.
27 Hazard Adams, ed., Critical Theory Since Plato, pp. 441-42.
28 Stallknecht, in his Strange Seas of Thought, in connection with
Wordsworth’s poetry, also draws the distinction between the unified,
imaginative, vision of the world (which he calls that of “esthetic objects”) and
the vision of “the scientific object [as] an abstraction”:
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We have just heard Professor Whitehead assert that Wordsworth
apprehends the truly concrete. We might venture, on such
authority, to suggest that the esthetic object is the genuinely
concrete, and the scientific object an abstraction, withdrawn from
the fullness of real things and their concrete fusion of
interrelations. Thus we do not pretend that the mountains are
alive. As concrete, esthetic objects the mountains have embodied
in them characteristics which, in other realms of discourse, belong
only to certain quadrupeds. As esthetic objects, the mountains and
the animals embody one another. They share an “ideal form”
whose presence in both is their interfusion. (p. 86; italics
Stallknecht’s)
29 Even though, as many critics argue (see Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry,
for example), that the realization of the imaginary power came to Wordsworth
years later, the immediate description of the Gondo Gorge is colored by the
language of imagination.
30 Wordsworth’s appropriation of Miltonic rhetoric, especially the famous
“Of first, and last, and midst, and without end,” taken almost verbatim from
Milton’s Paradise Lost (V, 165) is significant for creating the sublime aura in
the poem. Nicola Trott in “The Picturesque, the Beautiful and the Sublime,”
pp. 72-90 of Duncan Wu’s Companion to Romanticism (1999), writes about
the sublimity of the Romantic style and its association with Milton:
The moral qualities of the rhetorical sublime come into play
especially in reference to Paradise Lost, the Romantics’ ‘preeminent’ example: Coleridge contrasts the bogus ‘arithmetical
sublime’ of Klopstock (a German epicist), who ‘mistakes bigness
for greatness’, with the true sublimity of Milton, whose greatness
arises ‘from images of effort and daring, and also from those of
moral endurance’. (p. 78)
31 Book VI, 634-40.
32 E. H. Sneath, Wordsworth: Poet of Nature and Poet of Man, p. 44.
33 Ironically, to establish that kind of communication cost some effort on
Wordsworth’s side. Again Kenneth Johnston is helpful in showing how
dubiously and untrustworthy Wordsworth and Jones themselves looked while
touring the Continent:
Well-off persons traveling by coach, on roads, between inns, could
expect to advance reasonably well in settled regions, but not
young men of uncertain class and dubious appearance, on foot in
the mountains in unsettled times. Wordsworth noted this
lightheartedly to Dorothy: “Our appearance is singular, and we
have often... excited a general smile... and our manner of bearing
our bundles, which is upon our heads, with each an oak stick in
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our hands, contributes not a little to that general curiosity which
we seem to excite.” (The Hidden Wordsworth, p. 190)
34 Compare the earlier, 1805, text, in which neither the peasant’s mouth nor
his lips are made noticeable by direct naming:
By fortunate chance,
While every moment now encreased our doubts,
A peasant met us, and from him we learned
That to the place which had perplexed us first
We must descend, and there should find the road
Which in the stony channel of the stream
Lay a few steps, and then along its banks—
And further, that thenceforward all our course
Was downwards with the current of that stream.
Hard of belief, we questioned him again,
And all the answers which the man returned
To our inquiries, in their sense and substance
Translated by the feelings which we had,
Ended in this—that we had crossed the Alps.
(1805. Book Sixth. 511-24)
35 The Prelude1850, Book VI, 577-91; italics Wordsworth’s.
36 On fear vs. awe, see the Norton Prelude, p. 466n., Wordsworth’s “The
Sublime and the Beautiful” (pp. 354-355 of his Prose Works). Also, see Eve
W. Stoddard, “The Spots of Time” (1985), where she explains:
Both the Fenwick note to the Immortality Ode . . . and
Wordsworth’s fragmentary treatise on “The Sublime and the
Beautiful” take this developmental approach to the
understanding of experience. In the latter, Wordsworth
distinguishes between two interpretations of the Sublime in
Nature. The child’s response is Burkean: he is overcome with fear
or terror. But the cultivated adult responds with awe or reverence,
having developed a different system of rules for interpreting
aesthetic experiences in Nature through the ability to distinguish
between bodily danger and spiritual transcendence. (p. 20)
Berdyaev, following Kierkegaard, also distinguishes between different kinds
of fear and awe.
Nuwno otliçatπ uwasƒ (Angst) otƒ straha (Furcht). Xto
d∫laetƒ Kirkegardtƒ, hotq estπ uslovnostπ terminolog∂i
kawdago qzyka. Strahƒ im∫etƒ priçiny, onƒ svqzanƒ sƒ
opasnostπ√, sƒ obydennymƒ xmpiriçeskimƒ m∂romƒ. Uwasƒ we
ispytyvaetsq ne peredƒ xmpiriçeskoj opasnostπ√, a peredƒ
tajnoj byt∂q i nebyt∂q, peredƒ transcendentnoj bezdnoj, peredƒ
neizv∫stnostπ√. Smertπ vyzyvaetƒ ne tolπko strahƒ peredƒ
sobyt∂emƒ, razygryva√µimsq eµe vƒ xmpiriçeskomƒ
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obydennomƒ m∂r∫, no i uwasƒ peredƒ transcendentnymƒ. Strahƒ
svqzanƒ sƒ zabotoj, sƒ boqznπ√ stradan∂j, udarovƒ. Strahƒ ne
pomnitƒ o vysßemƒ m∂r∫, onƒ obraµenƒ vnizƒ, prikovanƒ kƒ
xmpiriçeskomu. Uwasƒ we estπ sostoqn∂e pograniçnoe sƒ
transcendentnymƒ, uwasƒ ispytyvaetsq peredƒ v∫çnostπ√,
peredƒ sudπboj. (45)

[It is necessary to distinguish anguish <trembling, awe> (Angst)
from fear (Furcht). Kirkegaard <Kierkegaard> does this <1843>,
although it is a relative distinction in the terminology of every
language. Fear has causes, it is connected with danger, and with
the every day world of common experience. Anguish <awe>, on
the other hand, is experienced, not in the face of empirical danger,
but in confronting the mystery of being and non-being, when face
to face with the transcendent abyss, in the face of the unknown
<infinity>. Death arouses not only fear in the face of an event
which constantly occurs in the empirical every day world, but also
anguish in the face of the transcendent. Fear is connected with
anxiety, with the dread of suffering and the blows of fate
<disappointments>. Fear fails to keep the higher world in mind. It
is concerned with a lower level, it is chained to the empirical.
Anguish <awe>, however, is a condition which borders upon the
transcendent. It is experienced when a man is confronted by
eternity, when he is faced by destiny. (Slavery and Freedom, p.
52)]

37 Book VI, 592-616.
38 Slavery and Freedom, p. 30.
39 Stallknecht, p. 83.
40 Berdyaev, consistent with his equating transcendence with freedom, with
liberation from the deterministic power of the impersonal outer world (p. 30),
considers objectivization as enslavement. He writes:
Poraboµennostπ i poraboµa√µee sostoqn∂e m∂ra, determinizmƒ
prirody estπ porowden∂e obƒektivac∂i. Vse prevraµaetsq vƒ
obƒekty, no obƒekty vsegda oznaça√tƒ determinac∂√ izvn∫,
otçuwdennostπ, vybroßennostπ vo vn∫, bezliçnostπ. Rabstvo
çelov∫ka u prirody, kakƒ vproçemƒ i vsqkoe rabstvo, estπ
rabstvo u obƒektnosti. Poraboµennaq priroda, kakƒ obƒektƒ,
estπ priroda determiniru√µaq izvn∫, depersonaliziru√µaq,
ugneta√µaq vnutrennee suµestvovan∂e. Priroda we, kakƒ
subƒektƒ, estπ vnutrennee suµestvovan∂e kosmosa, estπ ego
xkzistenc∂alπnostπ, a sl∫dovatelπno i svoboda. [...] Mater∂q
vsegda oznaçaetƒ zavisimostπ, determinirovannostπ izvn∫.
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Poxtomu mater∂q estπ vsegda obƒektƒ. Mater∂q, kakƒ subƒektƒ,
ne estπ uwe mater∂q, estπ uwe vnutrennee suµestvovan∂e.
Rabstvo çelov∫ka vozrastaetƒ po m∫r∫ vozrastan∂q
mater∂alπnosti. Poraboµen∂e i estπ mater∂alizac∂q. (82)

[The enslavement, the enslaving state of the world, the
determinism of nature are the outcome of objectivization.
Everything is turned into objects, but objects always indicate
determination from without, alienation, ejection into the external,
and impersonality.
The slavery of man to nature, as, of course, every other form of
slavery, is slavery to the object world. Enslaved nature, as object,
is nature which determines from without, it is nature which
depersonalizes and oppresses inward existence. But nature, as
subject, on the other hand, is the inward existence of the cosmos,
its existentiality and consequently also its freedom. . . . Matter
always denotes dependence, and a state of determination from
without. For this reason matter is always object. Matter as subject
is no longer matter, it is already inward existence.
The slavery of man increases in proportion to the growth of
materiality. Enslavement indeed is materialization. (Slavery and
Freedom, 95-96)]

41 Coleridge and Wordsworth: A Lyrical Dialogue, pp. 129-30.
42 “The Ruined Cottage,” MS D, 98-116.
43 Ibid., 512-25.
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CHAPTER 3: “MAN ENNOBLED OUTWARDLY
BEFORE MY SIGHT”
To talk of an object as being sublime or
beautiful in itself, without references to some
subject by whom that sublimity or beauty is
perceived, is absurd; nor is it of the slightest
importance to mankind whether there be any
object with which their minds are conversant
that Men would universally agree (after
having ascertained that the words were used
in the same sense) to denominate sublime or
beautiful. It is enough that there are, both in
moral qualities & in the forms of the external
universe, such qualities & powers as have
affected Men, in different states of civilization
& without communication with each other,
with similar sensations either of the sublime or
beautiful.1
Above, in the discussion of the “Crossing of the Alps” episode, I
showed how in Wordsworth’s Prelude a lost traveller’s awakened regard for
another human presence can be a decisive step towards adequate
understanding of the real world in its wholeness and can liberate him from the
partialities of subjectivity and objectivity. The encountered human being can
pass down his intrinsic knowledge of the place to the lost either by words and
speech acts (as it happens with the Alpine peasant) or by bringing to life a
gallery of human images and their metamorphoses (as the Pedlar’s story
exemplifies). In The Prelude, the poet himself frequently assumes the role of a
guide who passes his rich knowledge of many mental scapes down to the
reader, thereby leading his reader towards a transcendent vision of the
universe. His technique is very similar to that of the peasant and the Pedlar: it
involves both narration and multiple literary sketches of human forms. The
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most prominent example of the latter occurs in Book Eight of The Prelude, in
the shepherds on the mountain passage, in which the readers are presented
with a set of the shepherds’ gestalten, each of which is better defined than the
preceding one, till finally the man is seen as “a solitary object and sublime”:
Thus was man
Ennobled outwardly before my sight,
And thus my heart was early introduced
To an unconscious love and reverence
Of human nature; hence the human form
To me became an index of delight,
Of grace and honour, power and worthiness.2
How exactly the poet attempts to bring his reader to experience
sublimity and infinity when viewing the human form, and how this recognition
of the human form is liberating are two major questions guiding my discussion
in this chapter. Hence, the chapter consists of two parts: first, I trace how the
poet prepares the readers to be affected by the sublimity he describes;
secondly, I inquire into how a human being can be represented so that he and
his form are qualified to impart sublime impressions. Both questions are
prompted by Wordsworth himself. In his fragmented “The Sublime and the
Beautiful,” the poet urges thinkers to note the process of their being affected
by the sublime, not to underestimate the mind’s preparedness for that
experience, and not to rule out completely the objects’s capability to impart
the sublime impressions. And so Wordsworth writes:
The true province of the philosopher is not to grope about in the
external world &, when he has perceived or detected in an object
such or such a quality or power, to set himself to the task of
persuading the world that such is a sublime or beautiful object, but
to look into his own mind & determine the law by which he is
affected.3
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And later on:
[I]t appears that even those impressions that do most easily make
their way to the human mind, such as I deem those of the sublime
to be, cannot be received from an object however eminently
qualified to impart them, without a preparatory intercourse with
that object or with others of the same kind.4
True to his principle, Wordsworth sets out to prepare his readers to be
affected by the sublimity he announces in the shepherd’s trans-figuration by
repeatedly screening out human figures from the pastoral landscape, making
them less fictitious, till we are sufficiently familiarized with the pattern. In
Wordsworth, repetition is never a tautology 5: it always builds up to a richer
and more concentrated understanding of the reiterated, leading from “seeing”
to “perceiving,” to borrow the poet’s terminology. Repetition is meant to
prepare the reader to see eye to eye with the poet when he perceives the
beautiful and the sublime and to fend off the Mont Blancian kind of
disappointment. It is this preparatory role of repetition that is celebrated by
Wordsworth in his poetry and is accounted for in his prose:
Such would have been the condition [disappointment] of the most
eminent of our English Painters if his visits to the sublime pictures
in the Vatican & the Cistine Chapel had not been repeated till the
sense of strangeness had worn off, till the twilight of novelty
began to dispel, and he was made conscious of the mighty
difference between seeing & perceiving. . . .
[I]mpediments arising merely from novelty or inexperience in a
well disposed mind disappear gradually and assuredly. Yet,
though it will not be long before the Stranger will become
conscious of the sublime where the power to raise it eminently
exists, yet, if I may judge from my own experience, it is only very
slowly that the mind is opened out to a perception of images of
Beauty co-existing in the same object with those of sublimity.6

61

Thus, any stranger to the experience, according to Wordsworth, can be
brought to recognize sublimity of a scene or an object easily enough, provided
that he is exposed to them repeatedly.
Also, as the poet explains, repetition is opposed to depression and
disappointment, which it prevents. In that, if we take this thought a step
further, repetition can be opposite to recollection, which in The Prelude often
brings back sad memories of past losses and accentuates evanescence.
Recollection of the past as the past, be it of Mont Blanc as separate from the
following discovery of imagination, of the gibbet separate from the soothing
presence of Mary and Dorothy, or of Margaret’s death without retaining her
charitable and happy image, verges on depression. But it is not so with
repetition. Each time the poet engages in palimpsestic limning, he fuses all past
and present moments together and tends to forget about the sad discreetness
of time. And vise versa, when the transcendent moment of fullness and joy is
interrupted by the recollection of time with the awareness of the separateness
of the past and the present and the future, sadness returns. So it happens most
vividly in the 1813 sonnet to Wordsworth’s daughter Catherine, in which he
struggles with such questions as, what does it mean to lovingly remember
someone? what is the true forgetfulness: when we forget the fact of death or
the discontinuity of time and otherness of objects? The poet tolls changes on
those questions, trying to achieve understanding and consolation through
repetition, even if it is the repetition of self-reproach.
Surprised by joy — impatient as the Wind
I turned to share the transport — Oh! with whom
But Thee, deep buried in the silent tomb,
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That spot which no vicissitude can find?
Love, faithful love, recalled thee to my mind —
But how could I forget thee? Through what power,
Even for the least division of an hour,
Have I been so beguiled as to be blind
To my most grievous loss! — That thought’s return
Was the worst pang that sorrow ever bore,
Save one, one only, when I stood forlorn,
Knowing my heart’s best treasure was no more;
That neither present time, nor years unborn
Could to my sight that heavenly face restore.
And yet, the last line of the sonnet — even though it is not a full grammatical
construction — has no negation in it: “Could to my sight that heavenly face
restore.” The sonnet comes full circle from its opening joy. The heavenly face
could be restored to Wordsworth and it was, only not by self-recollection, or
any kind of recollection.
The Wordsworthian use of nostalgic recollections and repetitions that
ward off depression and lead toward the renovating “spots of time” agree, in
many ways, with Søren Kierkegaard’s understanding of the terms:
Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in
opposite directions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated
backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected
forwards. Therefore repetition, if it is possible, makes a man happy,
whereas recollection makes him unhappy--provided he gives
himself time to live and does not at once, in the very moment of
birth, try to find a pretext for stealing out of life, alleging, for
example, that he has forgotten something.
. . . Hope is a new garment, starched and stiff and glittering, yet
one has never had it on, and hence one does not know how it will
become one and how it fits. Recollection is a discarded garment,
which beautiful as it may be, does not fit, for one has outgrown it.
Repetition is an imperishable garment, which fits snugly and
comfortably, neither too tight nor too loose. Hope is a charming
maiden but slips through the fingers, recollection is a beautiful old
woman but of no use at the instant, repetition is a beloved wife of
whom one never tires.7
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From the gestaltic perspective also, repetition is a unifying agency,
which makes separate elements scattered throughout the time or poem come
together and form a recognizable pattern in the minds of the audience:
The recurrence of similar elements, especially at predictable
intervals, creates and then satisfies a specific pattern of
expectation in the reader, and so provides the impression that we
are dealing with a unified, coherent, and stable structure.8
In fact, all spots of time in The Prelude are defined by their preceding
contexts. Jeffrey Baker in his Time and Mind in Wordsworth’s Poetry, gives a
detailed analysis of repetitions of different kinds in the poet’s Godlike hour
passage, the Chapel Island episode, and the Furness Abbey spot, showing how
Wordsworth in the course of his poem gives his readers a chance to generate
memories of certain experiences, so that when he gets to his next spot of time,
it would be almost as rich in accumulated associations for his readers as it is for
him. For instance, as J. Baker tell us,
In the Furness Abbey lines, all of the suggestions of Prospero’s
Windermere island will be deftly manipulated in the reader’s
memory, producing the sense of a remembered reality of which the
present reality of the abbey nave seems an echo or a repetition.
And thus in turn suggests that it is the remoter past of the abbey
that is reverberating in his mind, a tradition that is felt to persist
among the ruins.9
Going back to my question as to how the poet prepares his readers to
see the sublime in the human form, I would answer that Wordsworth creates
several patterns of repetition, in which he keeps encountering human figures,
each time learning to go beyond the traditional pastoral vision of them, each
time receiving a piece of revelation from them that eventually spurs him into a
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new imaginary leap, and each time focusing his eye more and more steadily
upon those figures.
Like the Alpine Crossing (Book VI), Book VIII also springs from the
poet’s desire to overcome one of his letdowns. London, from which the
crippled Hawkshead boy, contrary to the young Wordsworth’s hopes, returns
crippled as ever, bringing the first disappointment in the “region” of much
expectation, 10 London, which is dominated by faceless crowds and
sophisticated gadgets and mechanic artistry that change or “ape / The
absolute presence of reality,” 11 is left behind. The pastoral vale at the foot of
Helvellyn is conjured up like an oasis in the dreariness. This vision is so
intensely pastoral, that it sweeps some readers into believing that the whole of
Book VIII is written in that mood. For instance, Herbert Lindenberger in his
study, On Wordsworth’s Prelude, reads Book VIII as “devoted to the
affirmation of pastoral values,” in which Wordsworth allegedly presents three
distinct types of pastoral, two of which (“literary pastoral” of a Corin of the
groves and “the shepherd’s life which he had himself observed from the walls
of Goslar”) in the name of sincerity he rejects, and the third, “the harsher
pastoral of his native territory,” the “‘true’ pastoral, as he saw and
experienced it,” he invokes.12
Although Wordsworth claimed to transform and refine the
meaning of pastoral, his conception in one respect repudiates the
very nature of the pastoral ideal. ‘The psychological root of the
pastoral,’ writes Renato Poggioli in his penetrating analysis of the
transformations which the form has undergone, ‘is a double
longing after innocence and happiness, to be recovered not
through conversion or regeneration, but merely through a
retreat.” Wordsworth’s storm-battered shepherds have little
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leisure for retreats; true pastoral, one suspects, must reside
elsewhere within the Wordsworthian world. In writing of
Rousseau’s Reveries, Poggioli distinguishes a new role that
pastoral assumed in the Romantic period:
“As the pastoral poet replaces the labors and troubles of love with
an exclusive concern for the self, he changes into a new Narcissus,
contemplating with passionate interest not his body but his soul.
At this point, he deals only, in Whitman’s words, with ‘the single,
solitary soul,’ and the pastoral becomes the poetic vehicle of
solipsism.... What Rousseau terms ‘rêverie’ is a state of passive
introspection, by which the pastoral psyche reflects its shadow in
nature’s mirror, fondly and blissfully losing its being within the
image of itself.”
By this definition, Wordsworth himself emerges as the shepherd of
his poem; and during those mystic moments
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened,
he finds an inward Arcadia as blissful as, though less heavily
peopled than, that of the older pastoral poets.13
Other critics recognize Wordsworth’s attempt at pastoral criticism. Paul Alpers
in What Is Pastoral, says unequivocally that “in Book VIII of The Prelude,. . .
Wordsworth surveys and, in some sense, dismisses traditional pastoral.”14
Barth also admits of the modification of the pastoral vision in Book VIII:
The people here [below Helvellyn] “move about upon the soft
green turf” (VIII, 58), and “all things serve them:” “them the
morning light / Loves as it glistens on the silent rocks” (VIII, 6364). The poet is still charmed by the myth of pastoral simplicity
(VIII, 173-339), and it colors his view of the simple life of the
countryside. But his view of country life is more realistic, for he
adds to the traditional poetic pastoral myth the “snows and
streams ungovernable” and “terrifying winds” that are part of the
real shepherd’s life (VIII, 219-220). Thus the real-life shepherd can,
in the poet’s imagination, bring together man and Nature, for the
poet has felt the shepherd’s presence “in his own domain / As of a
Lord and Master” (VIII, 257-258). For the poet, man and Nature
were first experienced together (VIII, 312-316), and so are always
thereafter—at least when imagination is active—seen in light of
one another.15
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As I have shown in Chapter One of this dissertation, part of
Wordsworth’s “disappointment -> pastoral consolation -> imaginary vision”
trajectory is the poet’s gradual outgrowing of the enclosed pastoral world and
its fictitiousness. That is why I agree with Alpers and Barth more than with
Lindenberger and David Ferry, who incline to categorize the whole chapter
under the catch-all word “pastoral,”and emphasize the poet’s move beyond
the traditional pastoral rather than his absorption in its other modes. I amend
their thesis, not refute it. And since I am more interested in the fact that
Wordsworth departs from the world of “the gay Corin of the groves,” I will
depart from the term “pastoral” as well. In my reading of Book VIII, the
emphasis is on the qualitative difference between the states of the gay Corin
enjoying his enclosed vale and the sublime shepherd verging on the brink of
infinity, rather than on their mutual pastoral roots. In fact, Wordsworth himself
does not apply the word “pastoral” to his shepherd stationed above all height,
but in the same breath as he pronounces the shepherd’s human form to be
sublime, the poet explicitly inveighs against associating this figure with the
solipsistic Corin:
Or him [a shepherd] have I descried in distant sky,
A solitary object and sublime,
Above all height! like an aerial cross
Stationed alone upon a spiry rock
Of the Chartreuse, for worship. Thus was man
Ennobled outwardly before my sight,
And thus my heart was early introduced
To an unconscious love and reverence
Of human nature; hence the human form
To me became an index of delight,
Of grace and honour, power and worthiness.
Meanwhile this creature—spiritual almost
As those of books, but more exalted far;
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Far more of an imaginative form
Than the gay Corin of the groves, who lives
For his own fancies, or to dance by the hour,
In coronal, with Phyllis in the midst—
Was, for the purposes of kind, a man
With the most common; husband, father; learned,
Could teach, admonish; suffered with the rest
From vice and folly, wretchedness and fear;
Of this I little saw, cared less for it,
But something must have felt.16
Could it be that the sensation of sublimity simply cannot be felt in the
traditional pastoral mode, because sublimity for Wordsworth is usually
associated with the full-fledged imagination (even in the above passage, the
form is “imaginative”), while the pastoral, as he continuously stresses in The
Prelude, is dominated by fancy (or “imagination in embryo,” as Hartman calls
it): “the gay Corin of the grove, who lives / For his own fancies”? 17 Hence,
when the poet’s thought dwells on Corin’s world, human figures populating it
are not exalted enough to be called sublime. When, however, the moment of
transcendence comes, the poet is risen beyond the pastoral mode and beyond
nature.
To achieve the transcendent, the poet has to overcome the objectivized
or mechanical vision of the world (be it Mont Blanc or London) and then to
grow beyond the limited illusory idealization of the pastoral fancy (Vale of
Chamouny or Helvellyn’s Fair). Even though all three visions – objectivized,
subjective, and transcendent – are stages of one and the same process of
growth, they differ qualitatively. The “Crossing of the Alps” episode was
elaborating on the first two stages, as we have already seen, followed by an
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abrupt leap towards the imagination. Book VIII, in vivid detail, treats the move
beyond the subjective.
To see this transcendence of the pastoral more clearly, it is expedient to
briefly review some conventions of the mode. The sense of a place and time is
important to pastoral art, and when the poet alters that sense, the mood of the
whole poem changes. Traditionally, as Andrew Ettin explains,
[T]he pastoral is often thought of as synonymous with the
secluded garden or the Golden Age, with the pure and honest
country life that is so preferable to an artificial and corrupt courtly
or urban society, or with a happier and more innocent past that
has yielded to a decadent and turbulent present.18
In that world, the landscape is protective and emotionally comfortable, and
even when it is set apart from the world, it is not set apart from nature. It is not
only nature’s friendliness that pastoral characters enjoy; their looks are also
compared and placed next to natural objects and phenomena. And so, the
human figures at the foot of Helvellyn are very much defined by the soft green
field they tread; among them are “some ancient wedded pair,” with smiles of a
piece with the sheen of the faint and tranquil changing sun, and a young lass,
sweet and ruddy like the fruits she carries:
But one there is, the loveliest of them all,
Some sweet lass of the valley, looking out
For gains, and who that sees her would not buy?
Fruits of her father’s orchard, are her wares,
And with the ruddy produce, she walks round
Among the crowd, half pleased with, half ashamed
Of her new office, blushing restlessly.19
Young and old, infants and the ancient, populate Grasmere Fair, just as it
should be in the true pastoral world. As Ettin notes,
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there seem to be three seasons of life: childhood, late adolescence,
and old age. There is no middle age. . . . [T]he child’s attitude
toward life seems ideal because it is harmonious with its
environment . . . The young shepherds must be old enough to fall
in love, which they do with heady energy, emotional exuberance,
naiveté, and vulnerability. They lack the complete, selfless unity
with their surroundings which they once enjoyed unconsciously,
though they may feel self-consciously that they share nature’s
moods. Still inexperienced, they are not yet wise.
Beyond this stage lies another span of silence until we meet them
again in old age. The old pastoral characters (like Virgil’s
Tityrus—fortunate senex—or Philemon and Baucis in Ovid’s
Metamorphoses and Goethe’s Faust, or Shakespeare’s Corin)
most clearly exemplify the complacent, philosophic acceptance of
life, as well as the stable, familial, and religious values that
characterize the quiet and sanctity of the pastoral environment.
Usually they want only to be left alone, in peaceful semiretirement.
These stages may be combined in the lamented shepherd of the
pastoral elegy, usually one who, dying in the prime of life, may
pass on to a more sublime understanding of the creative force
within life, in a heavenly pastoral landscape still full of vitality but
now divine and eternal.20
Wordsworth could abide by those age principles when writing in the
pastoral mood. “Michael” is one such example: childhood and old age are in
focus; there is no middle-age maturity: when Luke grows up, he leaves both
his parents’s house and the poem never to return. Likewise, Helvellyn watches
over a whole Grasmere Fair of people, over many families, but the close-ups are
of the young and old, rather than of the middle-aged. This pastoral convention
of depicting people of certain ages gradually subsides when the poet first rests
his eye upon the fairy-tale-like – but in his vision unpeopled – gardens of
Gehol with their unsurpassed “beauty” 21 and then shifts back to homeland
and lets the “fellow-labourer” enter the picture.
But lovelier far than this [Gehol], the paradise
Where I was reared; in Nature’s primitive gifts
Favored no less, and more to every sense
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Delicious, seeing that the sun and sky,
The elements, and seasons as they change,
Do find a worthy fellow-labourer there —
Man free, man working for himself, with choice
Of time, and place, and object; by his wants,
His comforts, native occupations, cares,
Cheerfully led to individual ends
Or social, and still followed by a train
Unwooed, unthought-of even — simplicity,
And beauty, and inevitable grace.22
While these verses present the essence of the middle age, thereby
transgressing the pastoral habit of glossing over that subject, about a hundred
and fifty lines later in the poem, the poet diverts his attention from human age
altogether. Along come human sketches on which nature’s seasons,
youthfulness and eldership left no dent. The fruitful season that humors and
gratifies humanity in a very pastoral way is not conspicuous any more. The
cheeks of shepherds do not pick up the highlights in any “ruddy produce,”
and even their flageolets23 are left alone. That is when the human figure of a
shepherd, first and foremost of a man, a human being, rather than of a youth or
“labourer,” is poised in its timelessness among the nature’s fogs and the
bright radiance of fair weather, which coexist in one and the same sentence.
When up the lonely brooks on rainy days
Angling I went, or trod the trackless hills
By mists bewildered, suddenly mine eyes
Have glanced upon him distant a few steps,
In size a giant, stalking through thick fog,
His sheep like Greenland bears; or, as he stepped
Beyond the boundary line of some hill-shadow,
His form hath flashed upon me, glorified
By the deep radiance of the setting sun.
Or him have I descried in distant sky,
A solitary object and sublime,
Above all height! like an aerial cross
Stationed alone upon a spiry rock
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Of the Chartreuse, for worship. Thus was man
Ennobled outwardly before my sight.24
In this vision, the poet transcends the pastoral and its ficticiousness. The
shepherd stalks through the fog with his sheep; he is visible on the hill-side by
himself; and when he is “on a spiry rock,” not protected by the embracing
glen any longer, “above all height,” alone, where no sheep can be found, he is
distanced not only from the eyes of the poet, but from his natural and pastoral
duties. Indeed, what could have brought him so far away from the flock?
Sheep usually do not scale mountain peaks. Maypoles are not erected there.
Stripped of all utilitarian motives, of the attributes of his profession, even of his
class, there he is, in all his essential humanness. Appropriately, it is not nature’s
ruddy fruits or the radiance of her beams that are associated with his figure
looming “above all height;” it is the aerial cross of Chartreuse. This image is
suggested not by nature (which resigns her leadership at this point), and even
not by the immediate surrounding of the Lake District, but comes from the
poet’s own remote associations, from the recesses of his mind, which marries
different locales, times, associations, and even figures of different shepherds,
muleteers, mountain peasants, monks, and other men in order to extract the
ennobled human form to which all men bear likeness.
What is particularly human about that transformation? Would not the
ennobling of any natural, non-human, form develop along the same lines?
Unlike even Blake’s Tyger, whose fearful symmetry is framed, lightened up,
forged, and hammered out from the outside by its maker’s hand and eye,
shoulder and art, the human figure is not only sharpened into shape by the
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worthy eye of the on-looker; it is bodied forth by the shepherd himself.
Nobody pushed and pulled him to the top of the lofty mountain; he himself
went there, by his own choice, through his own effort. The shepherd aspired
on his own wings to “a spiry rock”; in that he is his own maker. His human
contour, rendered visible far and wide by his own efforts, is indeed a victory
over the blurring fogs and shadows of the earthly environment. Thus, the
poet’s delighted celebration of the ennobled human form implicitly recognizes
the existence, will, effort, and aspiration of the human being who, sometimes
striding through the fog, sometimes balancing on the brink of mountain
shadows, eventually put himself into a position to be thus perceived.
If the poet is delighted, why is he not trusted by some readers who find
his love of humankind to be lacking? Why does the “almost mathematical”
purity of those human figures (to use David Pirie’s phrase25) seem so abstract?
What warrants Jonathan Wordsworth’s assertion that the shepherds of Book
VIII are far “removed from the human normality they are supposed to
exemplify” and that “It is difficult not to think that Wordsworth was trying to
portray in his former self a kind of love that he didn’t feel at the time of
writing”?26 Where does this cold abstractness, carefully pointed out by many
critics come from? In the light of Berdyaev’s existentialism, it is overgeneralization that can produce such a depersonalizing effect. In Book VIII,
Wordsworth aims at universality: he tries to explain that he learned to
recognize the sublime and delightful human form in every real-life human
being, even though the full realization of that vision would come years and
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experiences later. Back at that moment, though, of the reality of that man, he
“little saw, cared less for it, / But something must have felt.” 27 His ability to
feel, however vaguely, the reality of the glorified shepherd, not only overturns
the pastoral sufficiency, but also predates his later realization of love of man.
That vision is yet to come. For now, the poet exclaims,
blessed be the God
Of Nature and of Man that this was so;
That men before my inexperienced eyes
Did first present themselves thus purified,
Removed, and to a distance that was fit.28
For now, the universal is the same as the general and abstract for the young
poet. It will not always be so. By the end of The Prelude, as I will show in the
next chapters, he will be able to see the universal in the personal rather than in
the general, and thus come closer to Berdyaev’s ideal.
In Wordsworth’s age, to uphold that all human beings are essentially
the same, and to describe the real-life shepherd of the Lake District as sublime
was already a revolutionary step. To claim that this very form of the cross-like
shepherd can be recognized by the poet in virtually everybody (and
“everybody” includes the upper classes) thereby, allegedly, making the
shepherd not only an index of and to delight, but also a paragon of human
nobleness, is yet another revolutionary move. Not surprisingly, the poet made
– if not enemies – then opponents, against whom even Coleridge, in
Wordsworth’s defence, had to tilt his sharp pen. Discussing Wordsworth’s
choice of characters in poetry, Coleridge once again makes it clear that his
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friend was interested in the universality of human nature, universality of a
lofty and dignified kind, rather than in ranks or other “artificial advantages.”
Under this head I shall deliver, with no feigned diffidence, the
results of my best reflection on the great point of controversy
between Mr. Wordsworth and his objectors; namely, on the
choice of his characters. I have already declared and, I trust,
justified, my utter dissent from the mode of argument which his
critics have hitherto employed. To their question, Why did you
chuse such a character, or a character from such a rank of life? the
poet might in my opinion fairly retort: why with the conception of
my character did you make wilful choice of mean or ludicrous
associations not furnished by me, but supplied from your own
sickly and fastidious feelings? How was it, indeed, probable, that
such arguments could have any weight with an author, whose
plan, whose guiding principle, and main object it was to attack and
subdue that state of association, which leads us to place the chief
value on those things in which man differs from man, and to forget
or disregard the high dignities, which belong to human nature, the
sense and the feeling, which may be, and ought to be, found in all
ranks? The feelings with which, as Christians, we contemplate a
mixed congregation rising or kneeling before their common
Maker: Mr. Wordsworth would have us entertain at all times, as
men, and as readers; and by the excitement of this lofty, yet
prideless impartiality in poetry, he might hope to have encouraged
its continuance in real life. The praise of good men be his! In real
life, and, I trust, even in my imagination, I honor a virtuous and
wise man, without reference to the presence or absence of artificial
advantages. Whether in the person of an armed baron, a laurel’d
bard, &c., or of an old pedlar, or still older leach-gatherer, the same
qualities of head and heart must claim the same reverence.29
Since rustic people are easier to strip of the vain influences of the social
world to reveal their essentially 30 humane, pure and permanent core,
Wordsworth inclined to resort to their images in his poetry. And so he declares
in the “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads:”
Humble and rustic life was generally chosen, because, in that
condition, the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in
which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and
speak a plainer and more emphatic language; because in that
condition of life our elementary feelings coexist in a state of
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greater simplicity, and, consequently, may be more accurately
contemplated, and more forcibly communicated; because the
manners of rural life germinate from those elementary feelings, and,
from the necessary character of rural occupations, are more easily
comprehended, and are more durable; and, lastly, because in that
condition the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful
and permanent forms of nature. The language, too, of these men
has been adopted (purified indeed from what appears to be its real
defects, from all lasting and rational causes of dislike or disgust)
because such men hourly communicate with the best objects from
which the best part of language is originally derived; and because,
from their rank in society and the sameness and narrow circle of
their intercourse, being less under the influence of social vanity,
they convey their feelings and notions in simple and unelaborated
expressions. Accordingly, such a language, arising out of repeated
experience and regular feelings, is a more permanent, and a far
more philosophical language than that which is frequently
substituted for it by poets, who think that they are conferring
honor upon themselves and their art, in proportion as they
separate themselves from the sympathies of men, and indulge in
arbitrary and capricious habits of expression, in order to furnish
food for fickle tastes, and fickle appetites, of their own creation.31
This paragraph runs parallel to what Berdyaev has to say about human
personality, which, according to him, depends on no rank or property:
personality, as Berdyaev says, is that which is left when all “artificial
advantages,” to key it to Coleridge’s phrase, are cast off:
Burwua opredelqetsq ne tem, çto on estπ, a tem, çto u nego
estπ. Po xtomu kriteri√ on sudit o drugih l√dqh. U burwua
estπ sobstvennostπ, denπgi, bogatstvo, orudiq proizvodstva,
polowenie v obµestve. No xta sobstvennostπ, s kotoroj on tak
srossq, ne sostavlqet ego liçnostπ, to estπ togo, çto on estπ.
Liçnostπ estπ to, çto çelovek estπ, ona ostaetsq, kogda on uwe
niçego ne imeet. (154)

[The bourgeois is defined not by what he is but by what he has.
By this criterion he also forms his judgment of other people. The
bourgeois has property, money, wealth, the means of production, a
position in society. But that property with which he has to such
an extent grown together, does not constitute his personality, that
is, it does not make him what he is. Personality is what a man is,
and that is left remaining when he possesses nothing at all.]32
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Thus, it is Wordsworth’s genuine overreaching towards the universality of
human nature that, in the shepherds’s case, took away from the concreteness
of the people he was describing, making them once again approximate types
rather than red-blooded men, as he conceived them to be. But the mood,
imagery and place of those elevated portraits put them in other than a fanciful
pastoral perspective. And so does the poet’s adoption of other than
pastoral time.
From the vantage point of Berdyaev’s personalistic theory, I see three
major kinds of time operating in The Prelude; two of those, the cyclic and
existential, are strongly manifested in Book VIII. At first, however, we are
aware only of various manifestations of pastoral cycles. W. J. B. Owen, for
instance, does a great job of comparing how the time of the soft pastoral, as
given in Wordsworth’s text, acts as a foil to the time of the hard pastoral of his
Lake District. 33 Owen looks closely at the sequence of three passages of VIII
(the Paradisal Gehol, the mainly English pastoral, and the classical literary
pastoral with Goslar “not far removed from the artificial fancies of the
classics”) and opposes their spacial and temporal remoteness to the immediacy
of the Lake District; he points out:
Gehol’s gardens are in remote China; they are remote with regard
to China itself, being “beyond that mighty Wall” (126). Arcadia,
Galesus, the Adriatic, Clitumnus, Lucretilis, are remote in the
Mediterranean; As You Like It and The Winter’s Tale are set in
France, Sicily (the home of literary pastoral), and a fabulous
maritime Bohemia. The endless plain north of Goslar is remote in
Germany. Or the remoteness can be in time: so in the classical
passages, and the possibly real-life English piece derived from
Spenser is distanced into the past by setting it outside
Wordsworth’s observation though possibly within Spenser’s, two
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centuries before. Against these remotnesses we see all the more
clearly the very present, hard, real-life pastoralism amid which the
poet learned to love Nature and the men who inhabited it.34
Having outlined such temporal contrasts, Owen stops, for in that particular
article his interest lies with the different kinds and ambivalences of the
pastorals Wordsworth offers in VIII. My interest here, however, is in how the
poet manages to move yet one leap further: to the fullness of time, which
combines the remote and the immediate and does not fit within the limitations
of the opening pastorals. The immediacy of the Lake District is, indeed, telling
when Nature leads the poet to his love of shepherds, men “suffering among
awful Powers and Forms” of his native and dearly beloved land. 35 But again,
when the Greenland bears and the cross of the Chartreuse are admitted into
the picture and become amalgated into the depictions of the Lake District
shepherds, it seems to me, other, remote, times and spaces are brought up close.
The words of the “Spiry Rock” passage and what they signify are
charged with highly concentrated associations that propel the thought of any
attentive reader of the poem back and forth across the length of several
Books. While many of the associations evoked by the Grasmere fair at the
foot of Helvellyn, the Gehol and other eminently pastoral lines are intertextual
(the beauty of which is not vitally diminished when the passage is enjoyed
outside of The Prelude’s context), the main force of the imaginative leap of the
“Spiry Rock” vision is intratextual, when but one word can open up a whole
stream of associations with another spot of time within the same personal
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history of growth. It is those generated Preludian associations that enrich the
reader’s appreciation of the fullness of the transcendent visionary moment.
One case in point is the expulsion of the monks from the Grand
Chartreuse addressed in the revised Book VI, 1850 (lines 420-88),36 the
passage that in another form appeared in Wordsworth’s Descriptive
Sketches.37 The addition of that section amplifies resonances both of the Spiry
Rock vision and of the Chapel Island passage (X, 514-603) with its
announcement of Robespierre’s death.38 A freeman of the Lake District, by his
aerial appearance, re-fixes the Alpine cross nearly toppled by the French
soldiers championing the “new-born Liberty” (VI, 442) by violation of the
solitude of the Convent. For the dark memories to be transcended, the poet
needs to re-take that parting of the Chartreuse again: he provides the link to
that cross by explicitly naming it in VIII. As a reader, I’m also re-casting that
parting look and once again envision the following:
Vallombre’s groves
Entering, we fed the soul with darkness; thence
Issued, and with uplifted eyes beheld,
In different quarters of the bending sky,
The cross of Jesus stand erect, as if
Hands of angelic powers had fixed it there,
Memorial reverenced by a thousand storms;
Yet then, from the undiscriminating sweep
And rage of one State-whirlwind, insecure.39
The Nature’s “Alpine throne” (VI, 431) is not shattered into pieces by the Lake
District’s “freeman” (VIII, 253), “lord and master” (VIII, 258) in the name of
Liberty. Yet his independent, gestaltic, and delighting appearance returns
dignity to all “the most common” (VIII, 289).
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When the remote and the present fuse together into one rich perception,
as above, this fusion gives birth to a third kind of time, of a higher order.
Berdyaev calls it “existential,” and Jeffrey Baker describes it as “inner time”
with its capacity eventually to “bring the mind to a visionary moment” (which
is different from Lindenberger’s understanding of the same term). To Baker’s
explanation first:
There is one important point, however, on which I disagree with
Lindenberger. As one reads his chapters, one is constantly aware
of modes of time arranged in pairs: time and eternity, inner and
outer time, the time of the incident and the time of writing, and so
on. I agree with the definitions of, and distinctions between, these
kinds of time; I do not accept that they can be simply paired off.
There is in Wordsworth’s time schemes a distinguishable,
qualitative order. Thus the lowest time is clock time, mechanical in
the narrowest sense, inflexible and uncreative. Next there is
nature’s time, Newtonian, a mathematical continuum, and also
inflexible, but less artificial than clock time and more conductive to
spiritual well-being. Above these two is inner time, felt by the
nerves and brain and lodged, as Woolf put it, “in the queer
element of the human spirit.” This time is liberating and creative.
And there appear to be occasions when inner time obliterates not
merely the two inferior schemes, but itself also, bringing the mind
to a visionary moment, an eternal present where “we see into the
life of things.”40
If Baker’s classification is built upon the “creativity” and liberating
force of the moment, Nicolas Berdyaev, also, accentuates the different ways in
which those kinds of time progress, setting the fullness of an “existential”
moment against the linearity of “historical time” (with its past moments lying
behind and future moments lying ahead of the present moment) and against
the circularity of “cosmic time” (with its daily, seasonal, and planetary rounds).
Berdyaev elaborates:
Govoritπ o vremeni ne znaçitƒ govoritπ obƒ odnomƒ i tomƒ
we. Vremq im∫etƒ razliçnye smysly, i neobhodimo d∫latπ
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razliçen∂q. Estπ tri vremeni — vremq kosmiçeskoe, vremq
istoriçeskoe i vremq xkzistenc∂alπnoe. I kawdyj çelov∫kƒ
wivetƒ vƒ xtihƒ trehƒ formahƒ vremeni. Vremq kosmiçeskoe
simvoliziruetsq krugomƒ. Ono svqzano sƒ dviwen∂emƒ zemli
vokrugƒ solnca, sƒ isçislen∂emƒ dnej, m∫sqcevƒ i godovƒ, sƒ
kalendaremƒ i çasami. Xto krugovoe dviwen∂e, vƒ kotoromƒ
postoqnno proishoditƒ vozvraµen∂e, nastupaetƒ utro i veçerƒ,
vesna i osenπ. Xto estπ vremq prirody i, kakƒ prirodnyq
suµestva, my wivemƒ vƒ xtomƒ vremeni. (214)

[To speak of time, is not always to speak of one and the same
thing. Time has a variety of meanings and it is needful to make
distinctions. There are three times: cosmic time, historical time; and
existential time, and every man lives in these three forms of time.
Cosmic time is symbolized by the circle. It is connected with the
motion of the earth round the sun, with the reckoning of days,
months, and years, with the calendar and the clock. This is a
circular movement in which a return is constantly taking place,
morning comes and evening, spring and autumn. This is nature’s
time, and as natural beings we live in this time.]41
Rotation of seasons and times of day has quite a presence in Book VIII and its
pastoral passages. Shepherds are perfectly aware of their seasonal functions
and festivities, be it at the summer Grasmere Fair, in the countryside of English
fantasy, “along Adria’s myrtle shores,” by “the Hercynian forest” of Goslar.
Even in the severe environment of the Lake District revisited in lines 215-56,
when the poet, thrice, invokes the “awful” and “terrifying” powers of his
native regions,
[H]ail to you
Moors, mountains, headlands, and ye hollow vales,
Ye long deep channels for the Atlantic’s voice,
Powers of my native region! Ye that seize
The heart with firmer grasp! Your snows and streams
Ungovernable, and your terrifying winds,
That howl so dismally for him who treads
Companionless your awful solitudes!,42
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he does not manage to break out of the vicious circle of cosmic time. Despite
the “awfulness” of the landscape (the word signals its sublimity), the pastoral
merry-go-round of human duties still wheels, except it is not so merry any
more. The inner time, the existential moment is not yet achieved, even though
the landscape is already prepared to be experienced as sublime. It is human
beings with their round of tasks who are still not so. Even though, as W. J. B.
Owen in his aforementioned article correctly states, Nature “in its hard reality
ennobles its inhabitants,”43 appearance of sublime human figures in this
sublime region is not instantaneous. While the harshness of the real-life
landscape keeps growing on the readers, the shepherds keep following their
circular habits.
There, ‘tis the shepherd’s task the winter long
To wait upon the storms: of their approach
Sagacious, into sheltering coves he drives
His flock, and thither from the homestead bears
A toilsome burden up the craggy ways,
And deals it out, their regular nourishment
Strewn on the frozen snow. And when the spring
Looks out, and all the pastures dance with lambs,
And when the flock, with warmer weather, climbs
Higher and higher, him his office leads
To watch their goings, whatsoever track
The wanderers choose.44
Wordsworth eyes the shepherds during the less benign of the seasons: winter.
In spring, his eye does not catch a single person weaving wreaths and
crowning his brow with flowers; instead, the shepherd treads on them and his
feet “Crush out a livelier fragrance from the flowers / Of lowly thyme, by
Nature’s skill enwrought / In the wild turf.”45 The pastoral put on its ears, or
rather thrown under the shepherd’s feet, is still a pastoral. The thyme-carpet
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treatment Wordsworth gives to his Lake District freeman looks back to
Helvellyn, by whose friendly foot the soft green turf of the valley was spread
out and the lively bunch of blossoming folk whiled away time. It also looks
forward to the giant shepherd stalking through the fog and eventually ending
up on top of the mountain, as Book VIII unfolds.
That pastoral time is circular, Andrew Ettin agrees. Although, he adds
that pastoral closed circularity often freezes a moment on the timeline of
history.46 He writes:
The notion of making time pause, even stop, or circle back to the
beginning (stretching duration, in other words) is basic to the
pastoral instinct for enclosure. Being absorbed in a moment of
blessed, privileged time means being settled into an emotionally
comfortable experience. Whether attained or not, the desire for
that is at the heart of the pastoral. . . . Time stops in this moment.
And then the moment is over. The frog jumps; someone calls out to
George; he must straighten his Sunday clothes and run back to
town. The natural passage of time and the requirements of a
society that lives according to its own sense of the temporal
proprieties and responsibilities reassert themselves. History returns
with a rush, and with a metaphysical puzzle for the pastoral
dreamer who has imagined the world halted for an instant into an
ideally arranged picture. “The sun did set, and by the time it rose
next morning the Titanic had been sunk. If the world had stopped,
they would not have drowned; I thought about it for days.”47
Frozenness of the pastoral moment – or tiresome dwelling on one and the
same unchangeable pattern – often goes hand in hand with make believe and
escapist wishful thinking. The pastoral often desires to arrest a moment in the
flow of life, much like Keats’s “cold pastoral” captures youth, with its beauty,
music, ever-to-be-plucked kisses and never-to-be-sacrificed heifers, into the
beautiful marble of a Grecian Urn to remain there deathless, “because it is
lifeless,” as Cleanth Brooks once brilliantly noted. 48 Also, when the flow of
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time is frozen, solidified, it can be set in stone, as with the monumental Urn.
That which used to be temporal is turned into a substantial spatial object, and
the materiality of the captured usually increases.49
History can serve as an antidote to pastoralism, when it wakes the
dreamer from the pastoral fixedness back to reality, but it also brings the
awareness of separateness of moments scattered over the linear time, giving
rise to nostalgia and utopian hopes. Berdyaev again is helpful:
Istoriçeskoe vremq porowdeno dviwen∂emƒ i izm∫nen∂emƒ
inymƒ, ç∫mƒ to, çto proishoditƒ vƒ kosmiçeskomƒ
krugovorot∫. Istoriçeskoe vremq simvoliziruetsq ne krugomƒ,
a prqmoj lin∂ej, ustremlennoj vperedƒ. Osobennostπ
istoriçeskago vremeni imenno vƒ xtoj ustremlennosti kƒ
grqduµemu, ono vƒ grqduµemƒ wdetƒ raskryt∂q smysla. [...]
Istoriçeskoe vremq takwe svqzano sƒ proßlymƒ i tradic∂ej,
ustanavliva√µej svqzπ vremenƒ. Bezƒ xtoj pamqti i xtoj
tradic∂i vo vnutrennemƒ smysl∫ slova n∫tƒ istor∂i. [...]
Istoriçeskoe vremq porowdaetƒ ill√z∂i: iskan∂e vƒ proßlomƒ
luçßago, podlinnago, prekrasnago, soverßennago (ill√z∂q
konservatizma), ili iskan∂e vƒ buduµemƒ polnoty
soverßenstva, zaverßen∂q smysla (ill√z∂q progressa). [...] Vƒ
nastoqµemƒ çelov∫kƒ ne çuvstvuetƒ polnoty vremeni, i onƒ
iµetƒ ee vƒ proßlomƒ ili buduµemƒ, osobenno vƒ perehodnye
i muçitelπnye per∂ody istor∂i. (215-16)

[Historical time comes into being through movement and change
of another sort than that which occurs in the cosmic cycle.
Historical time is symbolized not by the circle but by the straight
line stretching out forwards. The special property of historical time
is precisely this stretching out towards what is coming, this
reaching forward to determine. In what is coming it waits for the
disclosure of a meaning . . . Historical time is also connected with
the past and with tradition which establishes a link between
periods of time. Without that memory and that tradition in the
inner sense of the word there is no history. . . . Historical time gives
birth to illusions; the search in the past for what is better, truer,
more beautiful, more perfect (the illusion of the conservative) or
the search in the future for the fullness of achievement and the
perfection of meaning (the illusion of progress) . . . . In the present
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man does not feel the fullness of time, and he seeks it in the past or
in the future, especially in periods of history which are transitional
and full of suffering.]50
Historical time in its most linear, without much comforting circularity of the
pastoral, rules the London sections of Book VII. People’s names, faces, scenes
of life, once met never to be seen again, flow by the poet in an overwhelming
endless stream. The moment is not the happiest in Wordsworth’s life story.
And the poet feels the urge to digress either to mull over his memories or to
anticipate his return to countryside.
In contrast to both historical and cosmic times, with their awareness of
the passage of minutes, days, seasons, years, and centuries, there is yet another
time, which does not need any timepiece that ticks off separate moments. In
this other time, everything comes together, and all experiences, those that are
already under the person’s belt and those that he foreshadows right now,
manifest themselves simultaneously in a person’s life by way of existence. The
acceptance not only of happiness, but also of pain that is in that life warrants
this vision against illusions. On the other hand, pain accepted becomes
mitigated by the joys conjoined with it, for in life there is no pure good or evil,
pain or happiness, as, for instance, Keats’s “Ode on Melancholy” teaches.
Wordsworth too, having fallen out of his illusory, almost pastoral, moment of
forgetfulness in his “Surprised by joy” sonnet, back to the historical present,
tries to come to terms with his pain by accepting it. With his acceptance of the
tragedy of his daughter’s death, he will again be in a communion with her, not
separated from her by his unresponsiveness. And that kind of “sharing”
cannot but revive other happiness they still – and always will – have in
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common, which no separateness of times will be able to shatter. The unity of all
feelings and emotions cannot but veil his melancholy, and the accepted pain
cannot become more painful, and there will remain no repressed grief to
escape. Both the numbness of illusions and the torment of waking up will
cancel each other out. Hence, in his sonnet, by facing his pain, Wordsworth
seeks not Lethe, but existential unity of all times, which can be achieved
inwardly. The same he does when uniting all his visions of shepherds, passes,
and crosses into one full visionary moment, which promises “delight.” That is
the moment, the time, which Berdyaev calls “existential.”
Krom∫ vremeni kosmiçeskago i vremeni istoriçeskago,
obƒektivirovannago i podçinennago çislu, hotq i po raznomu,
estπ eµe vremq xkzistenc∂alπnoe, vremq glubinnoe. Vremq
xkzostenc∂alπnoe nelπzq myslitπ soverßenno izolirovanno otƒ
vremeni kosmiçeskago i vremeni istoriçeskago; estπ proryvƒ
odnogo vremeni vƒ drugoe. Kairos, o kotoromƒ l√bitƒ govoritπ
Tillihƒ, estπ kakƒ by vtorwen∂e v∫çnosti vo vremq,
preryvnostπ vƒ kosmiçeskomƒ i istoriçeskomƒ vremeni,
popolnen∂e i ispolnen∂e vremeni. Sƒ xtimƒ svqzano mess∂anskoprofetiçeskoe soznan∂e, kotoroe izƒ glubiny xkzistenc∂alπnago
vremeni govoritƒ o vremeni istoriçeskomƒ.
Vremq xkzistenc∂alπnoe luçße vsego mowetƒ bytπ
simvolizirovano ne krugomƒ i ne lindej, a toçkoj. Xto kakƒ
razƒ i znaçitƒ, çto vremq xkzistenc∂alπnoe men∫e vsego mowetƒ
bytπ simvolizirovano prostranstvenno. Xto vremq vnutrennee,
ne xkster∂orizirovannoe vƒ prostranstv∫, ne obƒektivirovannoe.
Xto vremq m∂ra subƒektivnosti, a ne obƒektivnosti. Ono ne
sçislqetsq matematiçeski, ne slagaetsq i ne razlagaetsq.
Beskoneçnostπ xkzistenc∂alπnago vremeni estπ bezkoneçnostπ
kaçestvennaq, a ne koliçestvennaq. (216)

[In addition to cosmic time and historical time, which are
objectivized and subordinate to number, though in different ways,
there is also existential time, profound time. Existential time must
not be thought of in complete isolation from cosmic and historical
time, it is a break-through of one time into the other. Kairos, about
which Tillich is fond of speaking, is, as it were, the irruption of
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eternity into time, an interruption in cosmic and historical time, an
addition to and fulfillment of time. With this is connected the
messianic prophetic consciousness which out of the depth of
existential time speaks about historical time.
Existential time may be best symbolized not by the circle nor by
the line but by the point. That is precisely what is meant by saying
that existential time can least of all be symbolized by extension.
This is inward time, not exteriorized in extension, not objectivized.
. . . It is not computed mathematically, it is not summed up nor
divided into parts. The infinity of existential time is a qualitative
infinity, not a quantitative.]51
The fullness of the Spiry Rock moment is suggested not only by fusing
together such remote images from different past experiences as the Greenland
bears and the cross of the Chartreuse, which I mentioned earlier, but also by
sheer absence of fragmented time: different seasons, weather conditions, times
of day are interwoven to produce the unified vision. When the poet finally
observes the aerial shape of the human on an inaccessible mountain top, it can
be dawn or evening, day or dusk, and almost any possible time of year. But
better yet, it is all of the above at once. No categories of cosmic and historic
times can account for that vision, because the cross-like shepherd is not poised
in time, he is outside of the flux of time, the difference convincingly backed by
James Baker in his discussion of the Wordsworthian spots.
The words [“Spots of Time”] suggest moments which have a
perceptible separateness from the general flow of time, a
suggestion strengthened by the quality Wordsworth attributes to
these moments —”distinct pre-eminence” (Prelude, 12: 209). As
David Perkins has pointed out, “freezing” the moment is an
artistic necessity.
Anyone who contemplates his own thoughts and feelings finds
that they are always in process, changing as they recombine with
different elements. Even our past is not settled, but constantly
assumes new shapes and meanings in the shifting lights of the
present. Yet a poem only can exist by solidifying a moment in the
flux of consciousness.
And yet I am not quite happy with the manner in which Perkins
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expresses the idea. “Solidifying a moment in the flux” has certain
unfortunate undertones: if this is what poetry does, and all it does,
it would seem to be a kind of imaginative thrombosis. William F.
Lynch has very effectively attacked the notion that the function
of arts is to freeze some moment of the past.... The real power of
Wordsworth’s moments is not their frozenness or their solidity, but
the immense energy within them, their power to make the reader’s
imagination work backward and forward in an instant. And
indeed, the very phrase “spots of time” and Wordsworth’s
frequent use of the term “moments” suggest that he actually
senses these moments, not as a solidifying of the flux, but as in a
sense not part of the flux at all.52
Pseudo-frozenness of a visionary moment, of which Baker speaks here, seems
to lead right into another question about the spiry rock shepherd: Does the
cross to which the shepherd is likened make him any less human, by virtue of
its being inanimate, utterly frozen? How is this shepherd not demoted to an
object, how is he not “frozen,”“objectivized,” or “monumentalized” through
that comparison? Richard Sha, who wrote on Wordsworth’s resistance to
monumentality, can provide a helpful clue here. The monumentality of an
object, as the examples the critic adduces in his article demonstrate, can be
attenuated through the use of metonymy or – by extension – other kinds of
substitution. 53 And the materiality of the cross is indeed attenuated in the
passage in question. The comparison is not exclusively between the objects as
objects, but between their immaterial gestalten, the shapes and their
positioning, which, as I will show in a few pages discussing the definition of a
human form, is the key difference. That is to say, when in his transcendental
visions Wordsworth employs comparisons between animate and inanimate
objects, he still manages to focus on the less material side of both, the side
emotionally live.
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Interestingly, liberty and freedom in Wordsworth, are never depicted as
a material palpable object, a shrine, a monument. They are never objectivized.
Richard Sha finds this peculiarly Wordsworthian for that age.
Wordsworth’s suspicion of and resistance to monumentality is
most clearly in evidence in his decision to represent liberty against
the tradition of James Thomson’s and William Collins’s liberty
poems. By contrast to his predecessors, Wordsworth refuses to
enshrine liberty in a monument, even though, as Thomson and
Collins recognized, that enshrinement facilitated the permanent
domestication of liberty to British soil. . . . Collins admiringly
details the temple’s monumental characteristics: beautiful
ornaments, Greek and Gothic architectural design, and inscription.
Wordsworth, however, refuses to build a shrine to liberty. Rather
than house liberty in such monumental architecture, and unlike
“oppression build[ing] her thick-ribb’d tow’rs” (Descriptive
Sketches, 795), Wordsworth depicts liberty in true sketchlike
fashion in conflicting but insistently immaterial ways: as the blaze
of a comet (775); as voice and then—even less palpably—an
echo, “on ten thousand hearths his shout rebound” (777); as
flames (781-82); as waves (792); as a spawning ground (783-85);
and as having “Nile-like wings” (805).54
Even though the images of freedom are not monumental, there is a shape and a
form to them, as Sha continues to explain:
If the poet’s choice of images are self-consciously sketchlike, they
are still, however, spatial images. Iconicity works here to lend
materiality and shape, albeit provisionally, to an otherwise all too
amorphous and unattainable freedom. More to the point, that
iconicity allows Wordsworth to contain freedom, if only for the
moment.55
To lift Sha’s conclusions about the form that makes freedom attainable and
containable for a moment (while utter momumentalization destroys this
freedom) into the discussion of the different kinds of time, undertaken earlier in
this chapter, I would say that there are different kinds of frozenness. One is
material and monumental: the frozenness of the pastoral moment that fixes and
turns into an Urn, palpable and embodied. Another kind of frozenness or
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monumentality is the apparent stasis of an existential moment, that may look as
if it is solidified (see Baker above). It may be symbolized by a point (see
Berdyaev above), but in fact, it is only a seeming “thrombosis,” which points
to infinity outside the flux of fragmented and measurable time. That apparent
stasis is the gestalt of the cross-like shepherd, aerial and untouchable. Hence
liberty or freedom in Wordsworth – to tie the threads of Sha’s, Baker’s, and
Berdyaev’s arguments together – usually has the existential, seeming, stasis
about it, while tyranny can take on the impressive monumentality of the
historical towers of the Bastille or the beautiful frozenness of the pastoral and
imperial Gehol.
As we have seen, in Book VIII of The Prelude, the poet starts out
preparing his readers to experience the sublimity he will announce later in the
Book by moving away from the traditional pastoral mood of different pastoral
places and times that he describes until he arrives at the awful and terrible
sublimity of his Lake District. There he continues to show shepherds absorbed
in their cyclic activities, even though those activities are much more toilsome
and occasionally dangerous, as they would be in real life. Nature and her
imagery led as far as they possibly could on the way to sublimity. Now
Wordsworth makes his next move: he gives initiative to man, saying that
human presence can make landscape even more powerful and sublime:
A rambling school-boy, thus
I felt his presence in his own domain,
As of a lord and master, or a power,
Or genius, under Nature, under God,
Presiding; and severest solitude
Had more commanding looks when he was there.56
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Thus the “powers” of the poet’s native region (218), its “awful solitudes”
and the grandiose and steady mountain forms, which, unlike the soft fanciful
pastoral of Book VIII’s beginning, used to “seize / The heart with firmer
grasp” (218-19), now yield center stage to man. Here, it is man, whose
presence is felt, and it is he who is a “power” and to whose sublime and
steady form the readers are about to be introduced.
Form and power are two of the three major characteristics of the
sublime as Wordsworth specifies it in his fragmental essay on “The Sublime
and the Beautiful.” The third component is duration.
And if this is analyzed [the grand impression the mountains make],
the body of this sensation [of sublimity] would be found to
resolve itself into three component parts: a sense of individual
form or forms; a sense of duration; and a sense of power. The
whole complex impression is made up of these elementary parts, &
the effect depends upon their co-existence. For, if any one of them
were abstracted, the others would be deprived of their power to
affect.
I first enumerated individuality of form; this individual form was
then invested with qualities and powers, ending with duration.
Duration is evidently an element of the sublime; but think of it
without reference to individual form, and we shall perceive that it
has no power to affect the mind. Cast your eye, for example, upon
any commonplace ridge or eminence that cannot be separated,
without some effort of the mind, from the general mass of the
planet; you may be persuaded, nay, convinced, that it has borne
that shape as long as or longer that Cader Idris, or Snowdon, or
the Pikes of Langdale that are before us; and the mind is wholly
unmoved by the thought.... Prominent individual form must,
therefore, be conjoined with duration, in order that Objects of this
kind may impress a sense of sublimity; and, in the works of Man,
this conjunction is, for obvious reasons, of itself sufficient for the
purpose. But in works of Nature it is not so: with these must be
combined impressions of power, to a sympathy with & a
participation of which the mind must be elevated — or to a dread
and awe of which, as existing out of itself, it must be subdued.57
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Wordsworth is not explicit about the specifics of human sublimity in this
essay: he dwells primarily on the natural sublime, and mentions in passing the
works of men. We have it on the textual evidence of The Prelude, that when
the poet speaks of the human sublime in Book VIII, he endows it with all three
component counterparts of the natural sublime: power, form, and duration.
Power is that of the lord and master presiding over a severe landscape, who, is
free and unconquered by all natural climatic vicissitudes.
Duration is also brought into play as the book unfolds. Duration is not
chronological here; it is an existential moment that, though it seems to be
frozen and punctual, actually opens up into infinity of the spirit and of inner
time. As the poet declares,
The human nature unto which I felt
That I belonged, and reverenced with love,
Was not a punctual presence, but a spirit
Diffused through time and space.58
Presence, an act of being and existing, should not be downplayed in the spiry
rock vision as long as we keep in mind how much stock Wordsworth put into
the small word “was” when describing his leech-gatherer. “‘A lonely place, a
Pond’ ‘by which an old man was, far from all house or home’— not stood, not
set, but ‘was’— the figure presented in the most naked simplicity possible,”
emphasizes Wordsworth in his 1802 comment on “Resolution and
Independence.”59 Likewise, his independent shepherd, “stationed alone upon
a spiry rock,” is there. The word “stationed” is more indicative of being
positioned, poised, existing, without any emphases on how the muscles of the
body flex, and whether the shepherd is sitting, stretching, or striding.
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Jeffrey Baker makes an interesting observation about what he calls the
“muscular energy” and its direct connection to lower kinds of time, noting
that when Wordsworth draws attention to muscular energy, he works in the
mode of “the body’s physiological clock,” 60 which is much lower than
inner time.
[T]he boys came to the Lady Holme and the Furness Abbey ruins
by rowing or riding, means involving great muscular effort.
Furthermore, both activities involve strict physical control, bodily
equilibrium, and nervous and physiological alertness of a high
order. Disaster can come in an instant if the mental tension is
relaxed. Yet when the boys reach the ruins, they can throw off the
burden of taking care of themselves, relax utterly, and merely
absorb what the environment has to offer.61
Further on, the critic opposes this body’s physiological clock to relaxation and
what he calls “deliberate holiday” with its independence from social shackles
and imposed obligations of any kind. What is interesting, during the moments
of relaxation in Wordsworth, as J. Baker parenthetically mentions, the outlines
of the figures often become better defined.
This is how emotion is recollected in tranquility—from the
generalized store of softly contoured images, a few precise and
vivid impressions present themselves with clear outlines.62
Here, much like liberty and freedom in Sha’s discussion of monumentality, the
more independent the poet is the further his portraits are removed from the
bodily muscularity, while the emotion itself becomes clearly outlined.
Distancing his vision of the shepherd from the materiality of the flesh by
avoiding any mention of muscular energy, the poet frees himself from the grip
of objectivization and corruptibility of the lower kinds of time, yet once again
achieves the mode of duration. And this link between duration and
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nonmateriality, existential duration and the spirit’s infinity, is specifically
human: I do not remember any mountain in Wordsworth that, by itself, existed
in that kind of time. Mountains are usually impressive by being ancient in the
linear mode of time, like Mont Blanc.
Though all three components of the human sublime conjointly
contribute to the sensation, form is especially important for the poet’s vision of
the sublime shepherds. In his fragment he advocates the possibility that only
one of the three components will predominate:
It is to be remembered that I have been speaking of a visible
object; & it might seem that when I required duration to be
combined with individual form, more was required than was
necessary; for a native of a mountainous country, looking back
upon his childhood, will remember how frequently he has been
impressed by a sensation of sublimity from a precipice, in which
awe or personal apprehension were the predominant feelings of
his mind, & from which the milder influence of duration seemed to
be excluded. And it is true that the relative proportions in which
we are affected by the qualities of these objects are different at
different periods of our lives; yet there cannot be a doubt that
upon all ages they act conjointly.63
Wordsworth does not give a crisp definition of form, especially of
human form, in his essay, but it is possible to look closely at his careful wording
in The Prelude and to try to gather from the text the notion of what form is
and is not. First, it is expedient to understand what concepts are relative to
form, and under what umbrella term they all can be categorized. As I showed in
Chapter One of this dissertation, Wordsworth is often bent on giving shape to
human existence. Whether he meets a peasant or makes the Pedlar revive
Margaret’s image, in his progression toward the imaginative and transcendent,
the poet strives to render the invisible visible, to single out visible elements in
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order to shape them into a gestalt. He barely notes the appearance of the
Alpine peasant, but that is already a step ahead from the indifferent blindness
of all previous episodes of the crossing. The gestalt is poor, not very well
defined, but it is already a gestalt, because it is opposed to the chaotic,
imageless, shadowed lack of appearance that precedes it. Lawrence J. Lujan,
when defining gestalt, highlights the idea that configurative, gestaltic, unity
can have various degrees of perfection.
A gestalt, like a living organism, is a system whose parts are
dynamically connected in such a way that an alteration of one
part changes the whole, and an alteration of the whole modifies all
the parts. A gestalt is thus contrasted with an aggregate or sum,
which can be created by putting together pieces one after the
other without effecting a change in the qualities of any one of
them. Between the summative aggregate and the homogeneous
whole, there are various degrees of configurative unity; a “good
gestalt has greater unity than a “poor” gestalt.64
“Gestalten,” from poor to perfect, is what I accept as the umbrella term for all
human forms, partly visible figures, shapes, bodies and body parts which can
be grasped by the inner eye in any of Wordsworth’s poem as opposed to the
amorphousness of the background with all its unshaped shadows and
fragments.
Then, to define form, it is necessary to clarify how it is different from all
other gestalten. Especially pertinent to my discussion of the pastoral
frozenness, as opposed to the existential apparent stasis, is the body’s relation
to form. Both body and form are organized structures, the former being more
corporeal than the latter. But are they at the opposite ends of the gestaltic
spectrum? Are they diametrically opposed? Neither Sha, nor Baker address this
question: it is not the purpose of their studies. Berdyaev, fortunately, provides
95

an answer in the context of his personalistic philosophy, considering both to
be different stages of one and the same process of vision. Elsewhere he
maintains that body “belongs to the human person and from it there cannot be
abstracted the ‘spiritual’ in man. ‘Body’ is already form, signifying the victory
of spirit over formless matter;” Berdyaev links body and form in that they are
shaped, gestaltic. In his Slavery and Freedom, he gives more space to his
consideration of the differences between form and body:
Forma t∫la sovs∫mƒ ne estπ mater∂q, sovs∫mƒ ne estπ qvlen∂e
fiziçeskago m∂ra, forma t∫la ne tolπko dußevna, no i duhovna.
[...] Vƒ soznan∂i l√dej XIX v∫ka forma t∫la byla vƒ
nebrewen∂i. Byla fiz∂olog∂q t∫la, no ne forma t∫la, kotoru√
hot∫li ostavlqtπ skrytoj. Vƒ xtomƒ vse eµe skazyvalosπ
hrist∂anskoe asketiçeskoe otnoßen∂e kƒ t∫lu, no oçenπ
neposl∫dovatelπnoe, takƒ kakƒ funkc∂i t∫la sovs∫mƒ ne
otricalisπ. No vƒ to vremq, kakƒ funkc∂i t∫la fiz∂ologiçny
i svqzany sƒ çelov∫komƒ, kakƒ sƒ suµestvomƒ prinadlewaµimƒ
kƒ wivotnomu b∂ologiçeskomu m∂ru, forma t∫la svqzana sƒ
xstetikoj. Formu t∫la, kakƒ qvlen∂e xstetiçeskoe znala Grec∂q,
i xto vhodilo vo vs√ eq kulπturu. Sejçasƒ proishoditƒ
çastiçnyj vozvratƒ kƒ greçeskomu otnoßen∂√ kƒ t∫lu i forma
t∫la vstupaetƒ vƒ svoi prava. Xto predpolagaetƒ izm∫nen∂e
hrist∂anskago soznan∂q i preodol∫n∂e otvleçennago spiritualizma, protivopolaga√µago duhƒ t∫lu i vidqµago vƒ t∫l∫
vrawdebnoe duhu naçalo. Duhƒ vkl√çaetƒ vƒ sebq i t∫lo, onƒ
oduhotvorqetƒ t∫lo, soobµaetƒ emu inoe kaçestvo. (28-29)

[The form of the body is certainly not matter, it is certainly not a
phenomenon of the physical world. The form of the body is not
only of the soul, it is spiritual. . . . The form of the body was
neglected in the consciousness of the people of the nineteenth
century. There was a physiology of the body, but not a form of the
body; they wished to let the form remain concealed. In this the
Christian ascetic attitude to the body appeared all over again. But
it was very inconsistent, since the functions of the body were by
no means denied. But at that time, the functions of the body being
physiological and bound up with the conception of man as a
creature who belonged to the animal biological world, the form
of the body was linked on <sic.> to aesthetics. Greece was aware
of the form of the body as an aesthetic phenomenon, and this
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awareness ran through the whole of its culture. In these days a
partial return to the Greek attitude to the body is taking place, and
the form of the body is coming into its rights. This presupposes a
modification of Christian consciousness and the overcoming of
abstract spirituality, which places spirit and body in opposition
and sees in the body a principle which is hostile to the spirit. The
spirit includes the body also in itself, it spiritualizes the body, and
communicates another quality to it.]65
Body in Berdyaev is more than flesh. And the more the bodily members are
unified to create the homogeneous whole instead of thinking about
physiological functions of separate parts and their aggregate or sum, the better
its form is manifested. In other words, forms are much more perfect gestalten
than bodies. The emphasis is in the eye of the beholder: if he uses his bodily
eye mostly, he will focus on the physiology and corporeality of the viewed;
while the worthy eye, observing the very same subject and being aware of its
substantiality (or unsubstantiality, for that matter), will tend to observe the
viewed in its wholeness, informed not only by anatomy, but also by the
feelings, emotions, aspirations of the subject, which shape him as much.
In the course of Book VIII Wordsworth seems to shift from a more
bodily perspective to the “worthy” one. He starts out with his sensuous
description of a blooming maiden of the Grasmere Fair:
But one there is, the loveliest of them all,
Some sweet lass of the valley, looking out
For gains, and who that sees her would not buy?
Fruits of her father’s orchard, are her wares,
And with the ruddy produce, she walks round
Among the crowd, half pleased with, half ashamed
Of her new office, blushing restlessly.”66
This sketch is erotically suggestive, in sharp contrast to the almost ascetic
figure of the cross-like shepherd. Contrasting as they are, these two images are

97

linked by an elaborately wrought chain of gradual gestaltic transformation,
which in Book VIII happens right before the reader’s inner eye, thereby
preparing him for the experience of the upcoming human sublimity. The last
links of this chain intricately illustrate a very fine difference between several
nearly perfect gestalten, which, nonetheless, keep getting more and more
focused till the image sharpens into “an index of delight.”
Before I address the shepherds of those lines, a more detailed definition
of “gestalt” is in order. As I mentioned earlier, “gestalt” is a configuration,
pattern, structure, which, as a segregated whole, stands out from its
background. A gestalt usually has parts, which mutually determine each
other’s characteristics and are dynamically connected with each other, so that
when one element of the structure is altered, the whole gestalt is modified. 67
There are also different degrees of configurative unity depending on how
“perfect” the given gestalt is. And there are factors which contribute to the
experience of a “good” gestalt, which hold it together as a unified whole;
among the most important and well-documented by Lujan are “proximity,
similarity, closure, simplicity, and common movement or destiny.” 68 Proximity
and similarity are two of the classic principles in associationism, as practiced by
Hartley, a mode of thought that influenced the young Wordsworth and
Coleridge.69 Those terms are rather self-explanatory: when elements are closest
to each other, they tend to form groups – this is the principle of proximity. And
the principle of similarity explains grouping among different elements; the ones
that are similar (be it in size, shape, color, etc.) tend to be, perceptively, singled
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out together. Among the examples of closure offered by Lujan is “a line
which encloses a surface [and] tends to be seen as a unit. The more continuous
the line, the more stable the unit. But not only are boundary lines perceived as
wholes, the areas bound in by these lines are also seen as wholes.”70 Simplicity
is a principle formulated by Max Wertheimer in 1923, and it is that objects tend
to be grouped together when the resulting group forms a simple pattern. “The
fewer elements there are in a form, the greater its simplicity,” Lujan goes on to
explain, “Elements which are uniform, regular, or symmetrical also contribute
to the impression of simplicity.”71 And later on:
[O]ne element essential in every case of simplicity is that a simple
form is comparatively easy to explain . . . in terms of the number of
steps involved, the number of mental operations involved, even
the number of words involved.72
And finally, the principle of common movement, also formulated by Max
Wertheimer, states that when elements move simultaneously and in a similar
manner, they, again, tend to be perceived as a group.73
Now let us take a look at the series of the shepherds’ sketches that
Wordsworth adduces in order to present the human being as a sublime object
perfect in form. How “good” are these three gestalten of a shepherd?
A rambling school-boy, thus
I felt his presence in his own domain,
As of a lord and master, or a power,
Or genius, under Nature, under God,
Presiding; and severest solitude
Had more commanding looks when he was there.
When up the lonely brooks on rainy days
Angling I went, or trod the trackless hills
By mists bewildered, suddenly mine eyes
Have glanced upon him distant a few steps,
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In size a giant, stalking through thick fog,
His sheep like Greenland bears; or as he stepped
Beyond the boundary line of some hill-shadow,
His form hath flashed upon me, glorified
By the deep radiance of the setting sun:
Or him have I descried in distant sky,
A solitary object and sublime,
Above all height! like an aerial cross
Stationed alone upon a spiry rock
Of the Chartreuse, for worship. Thus was man
Ennobled outwardly before my sight,
And thus my heart was early introduced
To an unconscious love and reverence
Of human nature; hence the human form
To me became an index of delight,
Of grace and honour, power and worthiness.74
Obviously, the last image of a shepherd, which is so delightful for Wordsworth,
comprises the best gestalt of all three. It is very simple, indeed, the quality
indicative of a good gestalt: “If the structure has all the qualities of a good
gestalt, it is also the simplest structure possible under the circumstances.”75
The image of the cross, a very simple, symmetrical, and unified geometric figure,
can hardly fall apart into disconnected elements. The principle of closure is also
at work in this comparison with the cross. This well cut-out shape, in all its
apparent stasis and spatiality, also stands out against the background of
firmament, since it is discernable so far away. The description of the vision is
clear, concise, and straightforward: only three lines of simple syntax capture
the vision itself: “Above all height! like an aerial cross / Stationed alone upon a
spiry rock / Of the Chartreuse, for worship.”
The gestalt of the sun-lit shepherd, which precedes the cross-like form, is
less perfect. Even though the principle of closure is evidently at work in that
vision, because the figure of the shepherd “flashed” upon the poet’s eye is
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perceived as bounded by the sun’s radiance, the principle of simplicity is less
evident. The form of that shepherd is less geometrically simplified. It could
even be asymmetrical: nothing in the text gives the figure order. And the
words and syntax describing that perception are more complicated than the
three crisp lines sketching the spiry rock shepherd.
or as he stepped
Beyond the boundary line of some hill-shadow,
His form hath flashed upon me, glorified
By the deep radiance of the setting sun.
The shepherd’s form and the observing poet confront each other in one and
the same line; the background seems to have two figures all at once. The
separation of observer and observed form is not complete; hence, the
shepherd’s shape does not comprise a perfectly segregated, gestaltic, whole.
The shepherd stalking through the fog is the least perfect gestalt of this
final series of human sketches. Five uneven lines of elaborate syntax take
away from the image’s simplicity:
Angling I went, or trod the trackless hills
By mists bewildered, suddenly mine eyes
Have glanced upon him distant a few steps,
In size a giant, stalking through thick fog,
His sheep like Greenland bears.
The figures of the shepherd and the boy are in such close proximity that there
is a chance of grouping them together. The group can also include the sheep
that are “like Greenland bears.” Neither principle of simplicity or of closure is
at work here. And since there is no monolithic unity in this gestalt, we are
brought to notice a number of different elements that can be grouped in
different ways. If the principle of proximity helps to group the young
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Wordsworth together with the shepherd and his sheep, the principle of
similarity, based on the gigantic size of the latter two, makes a smaller group,
which eliminates the watching and not so huge poet. Yet another, smaller,
group can be recognized as separate in this imperfect gestalt if the principle of
common movement is applied. The shepherd is “stalking through thick fog.”
How does he move? How do his sheep move? Are their movements the same?
For the principle of common movement, that simultaneity and similarity are of
consequence. Lujan gives a good example to demonstrate how this principle
can work:
If we are shown ten dots on a screen, and then two of the dots
begin to move, they will tend to be grouped together, regardless of
the size, shape, color, or position of the dots or the speed or
direction of their movement; the others, staying at rest, will
function as a background to the moving figure they constitute. If
two of the dots move in one direction and eight of the dots move
in another direction, we will see them as two opposing forces; the
screen itself will now become a background to their interaction.76
Since in Wordsworth’s text, literally, the giant shepherd is stalking, while the
sheep are just mentioned without any similar way of describing their
movement, it is possible to group them separately.
That the stalking giant’s gestalt is not perfect by comparison with the
aerial-cross shepherd’s is quite clear. Is it a gestalt at all, then? Is there any kind
of unity to this shepherd’s image which would make him gestaltic? I see the
fog as providing a certain degree of closure which swaddles the group into a
bundle. The poet does not really belong with the shepherd and his flock
simply because he is described as treading through “mists,” not “fog;” a
different word results in a different impression, which forms a different, though
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similar and close, structure. The fog also serves as the background in which the
shepherd is embedded, and from which he suddenly, but not completely,
separates himself. His image is gestaltic.
Thus, throughout Book VIII human images gradually become more
clearly shaped: from the pastoral embodiment of lasses and shepherds whose
images are made explicit only as fragments – either by highlighting the color of
the girl’s cheek, by telling what she carries, or by mentioning that the shepherd
“breakfasts with his dog”77 – to the more perfect gestalten of the shepherds
whose whole human forms are contoured. This development takes to the next
level the pattern that we already saw working itself out in the Alpine Crossing
book: the visibility of human beings increases as the poem progresses from the
objectivized and fanciful toward the imaginative and transcendent. The human
sublimity – which is epitomized in perfect human gestalt, in man’s power of
feeling himself “In those vast regions where his service lies, / A freeman,”78
and in existential duration – is finally revealed by the poet to the reader, whom
he kept preparing for experiencing this sublimity by repeating certain patterns
of thought and description in the course of several books.
We have, so far, traced how the poet prepares the “well-disposed
reader” of The Prelude to be affected by the sublimity of the human form by
way of repeating his patterns of undermining the pastoral and increasing his
vivid interest in the human form. Next, we can inquire how the human form,
which is shaped by the infinite and points to it, can be translated into the
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limited dimension of the material canvas, pigment, or printed word so that it is
qualified to “impart sublime impressions.”
The problem of incarnating the transcendent, no matter what medium an
artist chooses, is addressed by Berdyaev in general philosophic terms when he
writes of Romanticism. It should be noted, though, that the Romanticism he
describes here is akin to the continental understanding of the term of the first
decades of the twentieth century, which is more likely to reflect — among
English poets — upon the rebellious and atheistic sides of Byron and P. B.
Shelley rather than upon Wordsworth, because of the popularity of their
works in the Berdyaev circle. On the one hand, Berdyaev notes, the infinite,
the transcendent, cannot find its full and adequate expression in the limited,
objectivized. On the other hand, Berdyaev adds, an artist cannot but
continually attempt to express the spiritual and infinite through whatever
means he has.
Romantizmƒ ne v∫ritƒ vƒ vozmownostπ dostiwen∂q
soverßenstva tvorçeskago produkta vƒ obƒektivirovannom m∂re,
onƒ ustremlenƒ kƒ bezkoneçnosti i hoçetƒ xto vyrazitπ, onƒ
pogruwenƒ vƒ m∂rƒ subƒektivnosti i bol∫e dorowitƒ samimƒ
xkzistenc∂alπnymƒ, tvorçeskimƒ podƒemomƒ, tvorçeskimƒ
vdohnoven∂emƒ, ç∫mƒ obƒektivnymƒ produktomƒ. [...] Vƒ
romantizm∫ estπ mnogo durnogo i bezsilπnago, no v∫çnaq pravda
romantizma — vƒ xtoj ranennosti nepravdoj obƒektivac∂i, vƒ
soznan∂i nesootv∫tstv∂q mewdu tvorçeskimƒ vdohnoven∂emƒ i
tvorçeskimƒ produktomƒ. [...]
Tvorç. [sic.] akt estπ ne tolπko dviwen∂e vverhƒ, no i dviwen∂e
kƒ drugomu, kƒ m∂ru, kƒ l√dqmƒ. Filosofƒ ne mowetƒ ne
vyrawatπ sebq vƒ knigahƒ, uçenyj vƒ opublikovannyh
izsl∫dovan∂qhƒ, poxtƒ vƒ stihahƒ, muzykantƒ vƒ simfon∂qhƒ,
hudownikƒ vƒ kartinahƒ, soc∂alπnyj reformatorƒ vƒ
soc∂alπnyhƒ reformahƒ. [...]
Borπba protivƒ rabstva u obƒektivirovannago m∂ra, protivƒ
ohlawden∂q tvorçeskago ognq vƒ produktahƒ tvorçestva
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zakl√çaetsq sovs∫mƒ ne vƒ tomƒ, çto tvorecƒ perestaetƒ
vyrawatπ sebq i realizovatπ sebq vƒ svoihƒ tvoren∂qhƒ, xto
bylo by nel∫poe trebovan∂e — borπba xta zakl√çaetsq vƒ
maksimalπnomƒ proryv∫ zamknutago kruga obƒektivac∂i çerezƒ
tvorçesk∂j aktƒ, vƒ maksimalπnoj xkzistenc∂alπnosti tvoren∂j
tvorca, vo vtorwen∂i maksimalπnoj subƒektnosti vƒ
obƒektnostπ m∂ra. (107-08)

[Romanticism does not believe in the possibility of attaining to the
perfection of the creative product in the objectivized world. It
<Romanticism> is bent upon infinity and desires to express it. It is
immersed in the world of subjectivity and values the existential
and creative impulse itself, the creative inspiration, more than the
objective product. . . . In Romanticism there is much that is bad
and weak, but the eternal truth of romanticism lies in the blow it
deals to the falsity and wrong of objectivization, in its awareness
of the lack of correspondence between the creative inspiration
and the creative product.
It is necessary to understand more clearly what the objectivization
of creativeness in the values of culture means, and in what sense it
is necessary to rebel against it. . . . The creative act is not only a
movement upwards but also a movement towards an other,
towards the world and towards men. The philosopher cannot but
express himself in his books, the scholar in his published
investigations, the poet in his verse, the musician in symphonies,
the artist in pictures, the social reformer in social reforms. The
creative act cannot be stifled within the creator and find no outlet
for itself. But it is absolutely untrue to identify the realization of
the creative act with objectivization. . . . The struggle against
slavery to the objectivized world, against the quenching of the
creative fire in the products of creativeness, by no means consists
in the fact that the creator ceases to express himself and to realize
himself in his creations. That would be an absurd requirement. The
conflict consists in the maximum break-through by the creative
act, out of the closed circle of objectivization, in the maximum
existentiality of the creator’s creations, in the irruption of the
maximum of subjectivity into the objectivized world. The meaning
of creativeness is to be found in the anticipation of the
transfiguration of the world, not in the fixation of this world in
objective perfection.]79
This discrepancy between the live thought and the limitations of the
expressive medium is lacerating to Wordsworth even more than man’s
sufferings, of which he himself had his share. The music of humanity often
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remains unrecorded, unrecognized, or recorded inadequately, and that is sad.
He laments in The Prelude:
I sometimes grieve for thee, O Man,
Earth’s paramount Creature! not so much for woes
That thou endurest; heavy though that weight be,
Cloud-like it mounts, or touched with light divine
Doth melt away; but for those palms achieved,
Through length of time, by patient exercise
Of study and hard thought; there, there, it is
That sadness finds its fuel. Hitherto,
In progress through this work, my mind hath looked
Upon the speaking face of earth and heaven
As her prime teacher, intercourse with man
Established by the sovereign Intellect,
Who through that bodily image hath diffused,
As might appear to the eye of fleeting time,
A deathless spirit. Thou also, man! hast wrought,
For commerce of thy nature with herself,
Things that aspire to unconquerable life;
And yet we feel — we cannot choose but feel —
That they must perish. Tremblings of the heart
It gives, to think that our immortal being
No more shall need such garments; and yet man,
As long as he shall be the child of earth,
Might almost ‘weep to have’ what he may lose,
Nor be himself, extinguished, but survive,
Abject, depressed, forlorn, disconsolate.80
And since the poet cannot stop creating, no matter how imperfect and
perishable his product is, Wordsworth cannot but exclaim:
Oh! why hath not the Mind
Some element to stamp her image on
In nature somewhat nearer to her own?
Why, gifted with such powers to send abroad
Her spirit, must it lodge in shrines so frail?81
Frail shrines for the mighty spirit of great poets that remain are their extant
manuscripts and volumes, as Wordsworth calls them, “Poor earthly casket of
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immortal verse, / Shakespeare, or Milton, labourers divine!”82 The verse is
sovereign, but the spirit of those bards was even more so.
Wordsworth never relies on fixed, direct, quotations to convey any
quickening imaginative experience. So, the Alpine peasant’s speech is not
quoted by the poet; Wordsworth describes only the overall meaning and eyeopening effect of the shocking news. Likewise, the threshold of the White
Lion Inn at Bowness, which Wordsworth frequented during his Hawkshead
years and which is associated with joy and creativity, does not retain its
inscription or any attempt to spell it out in the poem. The inn’s sign-board also
is uncited. Instead, the poet describes the golden letters he was able to make
out and the feeling which still lives in his heart, and which cannot be calcified
by any direct quotation of the inscription.
But — though the rhymes were gone that once inscribed
The threshold, and large golden characters,
Spread o’er the spangled sign-board, had dislodged
The old Lion and usurped his place, in slight
And mockery of the rustic painter’s hand —
Yet, to this hour, the spot to me is dear
With all its foolish pomp.83
In stark contrast to such fluid unquoted phrases, which are linked with
the moments of spiritual infinity (be it delight, imagination, or revelation), there
stand fixed direct quotations linked with rigor mortis. “Sleep no more!” (X,
87) quotes Wordsworth at the revolutionary Carrousel square, viewing the
dead “upon the dying heaped” (X, 57). And in the very same despondent
Book X, he remembers the funeral of his teacher, thirty-two-year-old William
Taylor, quoting his parting resounding of Gray’s line, “My head will soon lie

107

low” (X, 539) in order to resort to direct speech yet once again in the same
Chapel Island episode, “Robespierre is dead!” (X, 573). Such citations stiffen
the described into utter objectivization. Shelley’s materialization and mockery
in “My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: / Look on my works, ye Mighty,
and despair!,” is quite similar to Wordsworth’s dismissal of direct quotations as
emblems of mortality.
When the poet does not want to become deadened, he resists direct
quotation with all his effort. We see this resistance in the gibbet episode, when
the five- or six-year-old Wordsworth accidentally parts from his grown-up
guide and friend in the hills of Penrith.84
I remember well,
That once, while yet my inexperienced hand
Could scarcely hold a bridle, with proud hopes
I mounted, and we journeyed towards the hills:
An ancient servant of my father’s house
Was with me, my encourager and guide:
We had not travelled long, ere some mischance
Disjoined me from my comrade; and, through fear
Dismounting, down the rough and stony moor
I led my horse, and, stumbling on, at length
Came to a bottom, where in former times
A murderer had been hung in iron chains.
The gibbet-mast had mouldered down, the bones
And iron case were gone; but on the turf,
Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought,
Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name.
The monumental letters were inscribed
In times long past; but still, from year to year,
By superstition of the neighbourhood,
The grass is cleared away, and to that hour
The characters were fresh and visible:
A casual glance had shown them, and I fled.85
Having reached literarily the dead end of the road, the boy reads the
abbreviation carved in the turf at the foot of the Penrith gibbet-mast (1850,
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Book XII), at which, after a stony descent, sunk in spirits, he lands. Much as
the empty “iron chains” of the gibbet cannot retain the breath of the longexpired and turned-to-dust criminal, the grassless contours of the carved letters
below elude the sound of his name. The boy never utters it. In fear, he recalls,
“I fled, / Faltering and faint, and ignorant of the road” (246-47). He flees
objectivization. Unuttered, to him, the words avoid definition; they become
more meaningful, stretching to include his own overwhelming loss, fear, and
struggle to find the way. And no sensible, no articulate word of common
vocabulary is capable of containing this complex feeling. The inadequacy here
is not in the concept, as Jim S. Borck explains, but in the expressive medium.
[T]he Romantics’ failure is not so much a conceptual lacking—as
some of our contemporary critics will have it—but is, perhaps, a
failure of their expressive medium, a failure exhibited in their
nostalgic longings and in their method of composition. It can be
for this reason that the usual nature of their revisions for their
longer poems involves a form of addition to the text; Keats’s
Hyperion fragments, Byron’s Don Juan, Shelley’s The Triumph of
Life all show a curious inability to conclude. And Wordsworth, in
effect, adds an extra book to the 1850 Prelude, though this extra
book is essentially created by his dividing Book Ten to make
Books Ten and Eleven. In The Prelude, then, and in T h e
Excursion and The Recluse, Wordsworth, removed from his “first
childhood,” feels compelled to define and redefine. But his
definitions as given in the language of his poetry are failures
because his words cannot create the original inseparable whole he
knew as a child. Instead, his words are somehow non-ideographic,
non-representational. The source of his poetry, and its visionary
articulation, is like the name graven at the foot of the gallows. It
cannot be semantically presented; it can only be periodically
cleansed.86
The cleansing of the inscription, outlining the word without limiting it to a
certain reading, resembles watching the horizon, beyond which the vastness
lies. Thus, the unuttered inscription becomes an aperture into the infinite and
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transcendent. As James B. Twitchell points out, speaking about the sublime
entrances to the caves, “We do not know what lies beyond the aperture; we
know only what we can imagine.” 87 Twitchell sees the Romantic sublime as
the distinct margin, beyond which the transcendent experience lies. And even
though his study takes for its subject the landscape horizon and the cave
entrances, rather than outlines of the carved words or of human sun-lit figures,
his insight very much informs my investigation as to how the bounding line
contributes to the visible sublime. Outlining the words, Wordsworth, indeed,
shows that the sublime is “tethered to language”; however, the poet, straining
at the transcendent, breaks this tether, as the Penrith gibbet inscription
demonstrates.
Essentially, sublimity describes a level of consciousness
Wordsworth achieved by momentarily understanding the unity of
inner and outer. This perception took him up to the threshold of
transcendence but did not provide release. The sublime
consciousness is still tethered to language; the self is not lost, but
momentarily merged. As James Scoggins has argued in
Imagination and Fancy, the sublime is only “the grounds for
visionary experience,” not the experience itself.88
The similar sublimation is brought about by the White Lion inn’s threshold
inscription, if we are to apply the following to the episode:
The sublime, we must remember, only goes to the edge of release,
to the limit of language, to the horizon; it is still very much bound
to the here and now, to the senses. It is a state of awareness, a
state of elevated consciousness that is momentarily stopped at the
threshold of something supraconscious.89
Or, to turn to Wordsworth’s poetic expression of the same idea,
the sight
Hath wrought on my imagination since the morn
Of childhood, when a disappearing line,
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One daily present to my eyes, that crossed
The naked summit of a far-off hill
Beyond the limits that my feet had trod,
Was like an invitation into space
Boundless, or guide into eternity.90
The Romantic sublime is often visual. 91 It is more easily recognized by the eye
than by the ear, even though in Wordsworth there are sublime sounds of
torrents or of the minstrel’s music. This visual quality of the poetic sublime
affords comparison with the artistic sublime, the focus, especially in regard to
the human figure of William Blake.
Blake is a poet and an artist who was very much interested in the
human form and its divinity. And, according to Anne Kostelanetz Mellor, he
ran into paradoxes linked with the depiction of human figures: on the one
hand, the human form makes visible the divine and spiritual; on the other hand,
as the critic says, Blake thought that the bounding line is extremely limiting
rather than freeing. In her introduction to the study in question, Mellor writes:
I hope to show that in 1795, Blake was simultaneously rejecting as
a Urizenic tyranny the outline or “bound or outward
circumference” which reason and the human body impose upon
man’s potential divinity and at the same time creating a visual art
that relied almost exclusively upon outline and tectonic means.
This contradiction, which calls into question the nature and value
of form, and specifically of the human form, became for Blake a
profound philosophical issue, the dilemma of personal salvation
itself. How can the individual achieve the divinity of which Blake
believed he was capable while bound within a finite, mortal body?
Contrarily, how can the divine artistic imagination survive and
manifest itself in the mortal world, if not in bounded, perceptible
forms?92
Mellor formulates Blake’s problem, saying that the human form in his
illustrations is anatomically conditioned: “An artist as obsessed with the
human form as Blake was is necessarily limited to an anatomically permissible
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vocabulary of gestures (although Blake used every available stylistic device of
contortion and elongation to expand this vocabulary to its utmost).”9 3
However, the critic does not draw a line between the anatomically informed
body and the spiritualised one, more perfectly gestaltic, in which the infinite
gleams through; she evokes the words “body” and “form” as identical
equivalents, as the following passage on Blake makes evident:94
In 1795, he depicted the material world and the mortal human
body as the domain of Urizen, the tyrant reason. Blake’s poetic
denunciation of both the physical human body and of the
bounding line or enclosed form as the work of an oppressive
reason thus conflicted directly with his artistic reliance upon
strong outlines and the human figure. Despite his philosophical
questionings, Blake remained artistically committed to the
conventions of romantic classicism, as the Tate Gallery color prints
and the famous designs of the Ancient of Days and Albion Rose
show. The conflict between his philosophical theory and artistic
practice, between his philosophical rejection of the human body
and his aesthetic glorification of the human figure, posed a
profound problem for Blake.95
Blake is interested in human anatomy, there is no argument about that,
especially when one compares his illustrations with Wordsworth’s poetic
sketches of human figures, which in the severe climate of the Lake District
(and the poet frequently draws the reader’s attention to this severity) could
not but be thoroughly clothed. And even though Blake’s paintings, if
compared with Wordsworth’s verbal sketch of the cross-like shepherd, is
equally well outlined and gestaltic, his interest in human anatomy brings out
more distracting details in the human image, which, on the one hand, take
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away from the simplicity and unity of the gestalt, and on the other hand, draw
the viewer’s attention to the physiological functions of the corporeal.
Among other artists of the Romantic period, who were interested in the
human figures, are Joseph Wright (1734-1797) and William Hogarth (16971764), who practiced genre painting, Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792), who,
unlike Blake, believed in fidelity to external reality and painted conversation
pieces, Benjamin Robert Haydon (1786-1846), who in depicting the heroes of
the past produced gigantic canvases concentrating on the largeness of human
figures in them rather than on their bounding lines.96 Such different artists as
portraitists Sir Thomas Lawrence and James Granger, a physiognomist Johann
Kaspar Lavater, caricaturists James Gillray, Thomas Rowlandson, George
Cruikshank, and many others, also contributed to the blossoming art of
painting in which human figures loomed large. Wordsworth, who not only saw
many of those paintings,97 but also sat for his numerous portraits and was
depicted by Haydon among the crowd in the panoramic Christ’s Entry into
Jerusalem, nonetheless, in modern criticism is usually placed by the side of
such landscape artists as Turner and Constable. William Turner, who in sharp
contrast to Blake, valued color and light more than precision of form, even in
such paintings as his The Angel, Standing in the Sun (1846. Oil on canvas.
Tate Gallery, London, UK), blurs the geometry of the figure, letting the bright,
dynamic, colorful clouds absorb parts of it. Like Wordsworth’s shepherd,
striding through the fog, Turner’s Angel does not completely stands out of his
veiling background. Sketching the cross-like shepherd, however,
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Wordsworth’s technique differs markedly from Turner’s hazy human figures,
reaching over into Blake’s regions peopled with the gestaltic Milton and the
Spirit of Plato (Il Penseroso, Pierpont Morgan Library).
John Constable, who, also, occasionally was not loth to finish his
landscapes with a human-shaped stroke, to enforce what he called “human
association” in his paintings, was too objective in his presentation, if compared
with Wordsworth. As Marilyn Gaull aptly sums up, Constable’s
paintings, however precise and original a response to the external
world, exhibit little of the reflectiveness and spirituality of
Wordsworth. If Wordsworth’s clouds, as he said in the Intimations
Ode, “took a sober colouring from an eye / That hath kept watch
o’er man’s mortality,” Constable’s reflect the weather, the wind,
his reading in contemporary meteorology, his training as a miller,
and his talent as a naturalist.98
And yet, the landscape painters’s treatment of the sublime, their
attention to the horizon or cave apertures, provides a clue to Wordsworth’s
use of analogous visual techniques. James Twitchell, besides characterizing the
romantic sublime as the sense of a distinct margin or threshold to be crossed,
pays particular attention to how the painters of the romantic period changed
perspective and vantage points in order to present that margin in a marked
way. He says:
Although this may be overstating the case, the shift in sensibilities
that characterizes modernism began with the romantic painter’s
movement away from a middle ground prospect, complete with
requisite coulisse, deflected vistas, sky dado, secondary vantage
points, and silhouettes, to the “landscape sublime,” with its
intense concentration on the magnetic area of the horizon.99
One of such shifts in perspective is exemplifyed by a set of cavern paintings, in
which the artists depict their subject from inside:
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For the first time we start seeing through the cave in paintings as
in, say, Loutherbourg’s The Inside of the Cavern at Castleton,
1778, as well as John Robert Cozens’s Alpine Ravine, 1776, or
Robert Freebairn’s Neptune’s Grotto, 1807. This perspective of
seeing from inside out soon developed into the cavescapes of
John Martin, Francis Danby, and J. M. W. Turner where it took on
allegorical and symbolic meanings.
What happened is that the enclosed space of the cave, complete
with the startling shift in light at the aperture, became an image of
sublimity.100
Joseph Wright of Derby was especially interested in cave painting, and
it is his A Cavern: Evening, 1774. (Smith College Museum of Art,
Northampton, Massachusetts) that Twitchell places next to Wordsworth’s Yew
Trees to illustrate what constitutes a fit object of the sublime when speaking of
landscapes. The blinding light flashing on the beholder from beyond the
margin is one of the noteworthy techniques of the visible sublime. Thus,
He [Wright] always painted the cave from the inside looking out,
and he always made the light outside too bright to see through.
This creates an aura effect, making us blink as if we, accustomed to
the cave darkness, now have to pause, momentarily stunned by the
iridescence and whiteness, before we can proceed.101
And further on:
[T]he cave image depends on our ability to perceive ourselves
within that tight space. . . . The fascination with enclosed space
and the sense of looking out through a hole into blinding light
contain the same lighting as the blast furnace pictures now
combined with the high gothic theme of a picture like The Old
Man and Death: we are stopped, stymied, and strangely
frightened.102
What is infinite, the vastness of the outside natural world visible through the
cave opening, is made here visually enclosed by the well-defined aperture.
Infinity can be contoured and haloed — as the painters’s experiments show —
without forcing the whole of it into a limited space. By extension, the infinity
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of the human spirit also can be contoured without limiting it to the frame of the
material body. If we understand the human form as an aperture to the infinite,
the horizon of the transcendent, we can recognize that the human form is not
oppressively limiting. On the contrary, the human form is but a clearly outlined
entrance to the transcendent. And conversely, a blurred human shape with a
faded outline does not work as an aperture, because it camouflages the
opening to something which is beyond the here and now. An anatomically
detailed body does not work as an aperture to the transcendent, either: the
body’s corporeal here and now blocks the light of the infinite.
The groundwork for depicting gestaltically the spiritual in human
beings was established already in Byzantium. The same culture that produced
Longinus put in much thought and practice into figuring out how to translate
the human elevated, spiritual, and infinite into a painted icon. As early as in
years 691-92, the Trullan Council (also known as the Sixth Ecumenical
Council, the Third of Constantinople) laid down the dogmatic basis for icon
painting by ordaining to represent Christ not as a Lamb, but as a human being,
and by explaining in what the symbolism of the icon consists.
This 82nd rule of the Trullan Council says: “Certain holy icons
have the image of a lamb, at which is pointing the finger of the
Forerunner. This lamb is taken as the image of grace, representing
the true Lamb, Christ our God, Whom the law foreshowed. Thus
accepting with love the ancient images and shadows as
prefigurations and symbols of truth transmitted to the Church, we
prefer grace and truth, receiving it as the fulfillment of the law.
Thus, in order to make plain this fulfillment for all eyes to see, if
only by means of pictures, we ordain that from henceforth icons
should represent, instead of the lamb of old, the human image of
the Lamb, Who has taken upon Himself the sins of the world,
Christ our God, so that through this we may perceive the height of
the abasement of God the Word and be led to remember His life in
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the flesh, His Passion and death for our salvation and the ensuing
redemption of the world.”103
Since the divine became representable in the human image, there was a need
to address the methods of representation, and so the Trullan Council did.
Leonid Ouspensky comments:
The abasement of God the Word is shown in such a manner that in
looking at it we see and contemplate His divine glory in His
human image; and we come thus to know that His death means
Salvation and Redemption of the world. The latter part of the
82nd rule indicates wherein the symbolism of the icon consists.
The symbol is not in the iconography, not in what is represented,
but in the method of representing, in how it is represented. In
other words, the teaching of the Church is transmitted not only by
the theme, but also by the mode of expression. . . . Essentially this
rule lays down the foundation of the iconographic Canon, that is,
a certain criterion for judging whether an image is liturgical, just as
in the domain of words and music the Canon determines whether
a text or a hymn is liturgical. It establishes the principle of
correspondence of the icon with the Holy Scriptures and defines
in what this correspondence consists: the historical reality and the
kind of symbolism which truly reflects the coming Kingdom of
God.104
The ordinance of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, 787, further
explained and established the veneration of icons along with other
manifestations of the Church that “bear the seal of their transcendental
nature.” 105 These directions and principles were put to use by different
schools of icon painters. Wordsworth, who travelled to Europe several times
and visited museums, churches, monasteries, and private galleries, knew many
paintings created in the Early Christian tradition, including those painted by
Greek and Italian masters. The poet, however, usually did not record his having
seen various famous paintings and he never commented on them in writing,
except in a few poems. That is why it is almost impossible to come up with a
117

list of paintings he knew and admired. It is Mary’s and Dorothy’s journals and
letters that provide this kind of information. Thus, in 1820 the poet tours the
Continent once again in order to show his wife and sister some places and
scenes he enjoyed in his youth during the memorable trip with Robert Jones.
Martha Shackford, in her book, Wordsworth’s Interest in Painters and
Pictures, mentions many churches and cathedrals the Wordsworths used to
visit, both in Britain and on the Continent, where they enjoyed masterpieces of
great artists. Wordsworth’s interest in Christian art, and in visual art in general,
accounts, in some measure, for his masterful sketching of the spiritual portraits
of the shepherds. Even though these portraits are not liturgical, in that they are
not really icons which can be venerated in the Church, his cross-like shepherd
is in a position to be seen as stationed on the spiry rock “for worship.” The
poet was able to appropriate some of the techniques of the iconographic
tradition, by verbally sketching the clear outline of the human figure, by using
the inverted perspective, multiplicity of viewing positions, a relative immobility
of the human shape, etc. 106 By turning to the old tradition of symbolic
pictorialism, the poet solved, to a certain degree, the problem of inadequacy of
his expressive medium. And Wordsworth’s sadness for Man gets lifted and his
exclamation of Book V,
Oh! why hath not the Mind
Some element to stamp her image on
In nature somewhat nearer to her own?
Why, gifted with such powers to send abroad
Her spirit, must it lodge in shrines so frail?107,
gives way to delight when he manages to sketch, in Book VIII,
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A solitary object and sublime,
Above all height! like an aerial cross
Stationed alone upon a spiry rock
Of the Chartreuse, for worship.108
The recognition of the sublime human form is liberating, because it points to
the transcendent in human nature.
The thesis Wordsworth announced in Book VIII (69-80) and reiterated
several times throughout the Book,
My present theme
Is to retrace the way that led me on
Through Nature to the love of human-kind,109
is sustained. 110 The poet demonstrated how Nature led him to the love of
humankind by ennobling the human form before his eyes. First, Nature
ennobled the human beings who live in the severe regions of the Lake District
by strengthening their will and purifying their character. Then, Nature literally
showed the well-outlined sublime human shape to the poet by flashing it on
his eye and by distancing it. Only then did the poet internalize this ability to
perceive, independent of the frames provided by the weather; he learns to
recognize the human form when no fog or sunshine assist him. The poet, also
following in Nature’s steps, prepares the readers to recognize the sublimity he
sees, verbally educing the human gestalten from the background of fog and
sunshine. Finally, it is the natural sublime, with its three components —
individual form, power, and duration — that, in Book VIII, contributes to
understanding the human sublime.
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CHAPTER 4: “UNCOUTH SHAPES” AND THEIR PROGRESS
FROM TRANSGRESSION TO TRANSCENDENCE
So far I have used the terms “the sublime” and “the transcendent” in
conjunction, highlighting the similarity of those Wordsworthian concepts in
that they both signal the unity of vision, which spans the abyss between inner
and outer, subject and object; both are linked with the elevation of the mind,
and both approximate infinity. Sublimation, as transcending, is usually a
struggle to get free, to get to the threshold. 1 Now, I would like to be more
specific about those terms’ difference from Wordsworth’s concept of freedom.
In Berdyaev, “freedom” (“svoboda”) is a catch-all word for liberty,
liberation, independence, self-determination, and everything that is opposed to
tyranny or any kind of pressure or determinism from without. Achieving
freedom, in Berdyaev’s existential personalism, is the same as achieving
transcendence. On the one hand, the person has to overcome the limitations of
the unfeeling, purely intellectual involvement with the otherness of the
observed, that is the objectivized perception. On the other hand, the subjective
and escapist uninvolvement with the other, also limits rather than liberates.
Zam∫çatelπno, çto rabstvo çelov∫ka odinakovo mowetƒ bytπ
rezulπtatomƒ togo, çto çelov∫kƒ iskl√çitelπno pogloµenƒ
svoimƒ «q» i sosredotoçenƒ na svoihƒ sostoqn∂qhƒ, ne zam∫çaq
m∂ra i l√dej, i t∫mƒ, çto çelov∫kƒ vybroßenƒ iskl√çitelπno
vo vn∫, vƒ obƒektivnostπ m∂ra i terqetƒ soznan∂e svoego «q».
I to i drugoe estπ rezulπtatƒ razryva mewdu subƒektivnymƒ
i obƒektivnymƒ. «Obƒektivnoe» ili c∫likomƒ pogloµaetƒ i
poraboµaetƒ çelov∫çesku√ subƒektivnostπ ili vyzyvaetƒ
ottalkivan∂e i otvraµen∂e, izoliruq i zamykaq vƒ seb∫
çelov∫çesku√ subƒektivnostπ. No takoe otçuwden∂e,
xkster∂iorizac∂q obƒekta vƒ otnoßen∂i kƒ subƒektu i estπ to,
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çto q nazyva√ obƒektivac∂ej. Pogloµennyj iskl√çitelπno
svoimƒ «q» subƒekt estπ rabƒ, kakƒ rabƒ subƒektƒ c∫likomƒ
vybroßennyj vƒ obƒektƒ. I vƒ tomƒ i vƒ drugomƒ sluça∫
liçnostπ razlagaetsq ili ona eµe ne formirovalasπ. (str. 116)

[It is worthy of note that the slavery of a man may be the result
alike of his being exclusively engulfed by his own ego and
concentrated upon his own condition without taking note of the
world and other people; and of his being ejected exclusively into
the external, into the objectivity of the world and losing the
consciousness of his own ego. Both the one and the other are the
result of a breach between the subjective and the objective. The
‘objective’ either entirely engulfs and enslaves human subjectivity
or it arouses repulsion and disgust and so isolates human
subjectivity and shuts it up in itself. But such estrangement and
exteriorization of the object in relation to the subject is again what
I call objectivization. Engulfed entirely by his own ego the subject
is a slave, just as a subject which is wholly ejected into an object is
a slave. Both in the one case and in the other personality is
disintegrated or else it has not yet taken shape.]2
Transcendence is the opposite of both objectivization and subjectivization: it
unites feeling with knowledge and releases the observing person from the
shackles of “otherness.” Transcendence is freedom. And conversely, tyranny,
enslavement, bondage (“rabstvo” translated as “slavery” by R. French) are
equivalents of objectivization and illusory self-absorption, the opposites of
transcendence. 3 In this chapter, I will trace how the notion of freedom
approaches that of transcendence in The Prelude.
Such a progression from the illusory and unfeeling to the transcendent
works itself out in Wordsworth’s The Prelude. This progression is nothing else
but a description of how imagination reveals itself. “Wordsworth combines
feeling and thought to produce a higher kind of thinking, what he calls the
‘imagination’ for lack of a better word,” affirms Allan Chavkin. 4 “It is
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imagination,” writes Newton Stallknecht, “that reconciles the trio, emotion,
intelligence, and volition, and frees the soul from conflict.” 5 When the soul is
thus freed, as Stallknecht shows in his chapter “‘The One Life Within Us and
Abroad,’” the most intense moment of consciousness is achieved and
transcendence is experienced. And John T. Ogden similarly maintains that the
imaginative act, the structure of which is embodied in all The Prelude’s spots
of time, “though in various ways and degrees of completeness and
complexity,”
proceeds through three different stages — from expectation
through an interruption that is called in one instance relaxation, in
another “abandonment of hope,” to an interpenetration of mind
and object. A fourth stage, manifested in the very act of
explanation, displays the poet’s recognition of what has
happened and satisfaction in that occurance.6
Ogden, using this structure, also probes into the relationship between the
observer and the observed. It is noteworthy how Ogden’s outlining of
Wordsworth’s paradigm is similar to Berdyaev’s theory, in which he opposes
the illusory unity with the world to the real, transcendent one.
The structure of imaginative experience may also be described
with regard to the fluxional relationship between the observing
poet and the scene he observes. The relationship begins in
engagement, falls into separation, then reveals a synthesis, and
finally resolves into a mutual interdependence. The first and third
stages are similar in that both of them involve the poet with the
scene, but the difference between the two is striking. In the first
stage the poet voluntarily engages himself with the scene; in the
third stage he is unintentionally brought into a synthesis with it.
At first he is distinct from the scene, but in the later stage he seems
to melt or blend into it, as it melts or blends into him. At first the
scene presents him with the known and the familiar; or, if it is
strange, he still can perceive it in terms that are familiar to him. In
the later stage the scene presents him with the unexpected and the
unknown; even though he may have seen it many times before, he
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how [sic.] sees it in a new way and with a new recognition. That
new way is through imagination.7
In the final and well-developed the Ascent of Snowdon spot of time in The
Prelude, Wordsworth has one of his most imaginary and transcendent
experiences when he “[beholds] the emblem of a mind that feeds upon
infinity,”
a mind sustained
By recognition of transcendent power,
In sense conducting to ideal form,
In soul of more than mortal privilege.8
The poet calls this vision, this “communion raised / From earth to heaven”
(117-18), a “freedom in himself,” a “genuine liberty” (131-32), thereby
explicitly equating freedom and transcendence.
Not all spots of time elaborate transcendental experience: some of them
act out the earlier stages of the imaginative process. 9 The word “sublime,”
however, occasionally does appear even in the passages, in which
transcendence is not completely achieved. Thus, in the Discharged Soldier
episode of Book IV (369-468), on the night road, the poet stumbles into a
shadowed “uncouth shape” (386), which turns out to be an old military man
on his way back from the West Indies. In this encounter with the stranger
Wordsworth does not describe himself as holding a deep emotional
communion with the man: the poet, as some critics note, treats the veteran
dubiously: both with kindness and condescension;10 in other words, the poet
does not achieve the perfect unity of vision, which is transcendence. Still, his
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mention of the word “sublime” in connection with the soldier, however
downplayed this use is, is noteworthy:
solemn and sublime
He might have seemed, but that in all he said
There was a strange half-absence, as of one
Knowing too well the importance of his theme,
But feeling it no longer.11
The old veteran “seemed” to be sublime, but was not completely so in the
eyes of the young Wordsworth. He does not experience transcendence here
because, according to Book IV, the tired soldier resists “feeling,” as the poet,
curious to know about the battles, discovers, to his disappointment. The
“bond of brotherhood” does not form between the two, and the silence that
sets in is uneasy: it is not a communion but estrangement. The reader learns
about that estrangement from the description of the landscape: in a very
romantic way, nature seems to reflect the emotions of the humans within it; the
wood seems to take on the gloominess and unnatural stillness of the fellowtravellers.
Our discourse
Soon ended, and together on we passed
In silence through a wood gloomy and still.12
Only when the poet commends the old man to a cottage-dweller, thereby
finding for the former a place to rest at night and thereby proving his concern
for the tired traveller, the soldier, for a fleeting moment, slightly revives and
reveals a trace of emotion:
The cottage door was speedily unbarred,
And now the soldier touched his hat once more
With his lean hand, and in a faltering voice,
Whose tone bespake reviving interest
Till then unfelt, he thanked me; I returned
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The farewell blessing of the patient man,
And so we parted. Back I cast a look,
And lingered near the door a little space,
Then sought with quiet heart my distant home.13
The poet’s short date with that never-to-be-discovered human microcosm has
ended. Transcendent union with the world does not happen this time. The
threshold and the re-barred door to the aperture separates the poet from the
veteran’s life story and potential imaginary experience. The uncouth shape of
this human being has never become “couth” or known. Interestingly, in the
poem, this shape never becomes perfectly gestaltic, never separates itself from
the background. The soldier always contrives to stay half-absorbed: first by
the “shade of a thick hawthorn” (388-89), then by the ghastliness of the
moonlight and the supporting mile-stone (395-96), then by “a strange halfabsence,” and finally, by the sheltering cottage.
The question is then, why when the sublime seems to appear in
Wordsworth’s descriptions, the transcendent does not always figure? James B.
Twitchell, who studied the Aspects of the Sublime in English Poetry and
Painting, 1770-1850, reserves for sublimity a marginal role. The sublime, from
his informed perspective, is but a threshold of transcendence and, by
extension, a threshold of “genuine liberty” or, as he says below, of “release”
(see Chapter Three of this dissertation). The sublime can serve as a threshold to
transcendent experience, as it happens in the cross-like shepherd vision: the
poet’s viewing of the spiritualized perfect human gestalt takes him into an
existential moment. However, the threshold is not always passed: occasionally
the sublimity of the human form is just hinted at. So, in the Discharged Soldier
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episode of Book IV, the poet never mentions transcending into the
supraconscious. He stops and lingers right on the threshold, both literally and
figuratively speaking, without crossing over. He casts a backward look, one of
his favorite moves in The Prelude for reflecting on the past, and again espies
the tired man hidden in shadows by the curb of the muddy country-road. In
the poem’s present, this man is sheltered. Simply by comparing those two
distinct moments of linear time, the boy finds satisfaction and peace, and he
can, with a quiet heart, continue on his way home. It feels elevating to have
been a good samaritan, but the moment is not transcendental yet: the blurred
threshold separates the poet himself from the soldier and all his stories that
could have ignited the poet’s imagination and could have lead him to the
supraconscious and mystical. Thus, the “uncouth shape,” that is an imperfect
gestalt, is a poor threshold to transcendence: it does not give access there;
therefore, the “genuine liberty” is not achieved.
The notion of sublime changes in the course of the poem. In the
opening books of 1805 (as well as of 1850), the sublime is very much Burkean,
with its coupling of fear and love. However, as Eve Stoddard shows in her
article “Flashes of the Invisible World,”
the poet both subsumes and outgrows Burke’s sensationist model
of the sublime, through close reflection on his own experiences of
sublimity. This view is supported by Wordsworth’s fragmentary
prose treatise “The Sublime and the Beautiful.” In “The Sublime
and the Beautiful,” Wordsworth distinguishes between a cultured
and a primitive (or childlike) reaction to the sublime: “The relative
proportions in which we are affected by the qualities of these
objects are different at different periods of our lives.” The
“personal fear & surprise or wonder” which tend to affect the
child are closer to Burke’s sublime than the “comprehensive
awe” or “religious admiration” that take their place (PrW 353).
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This treatise, written approximately seven years after the 1805
Prelude, suggests that the poet had an earlier, naive view of
sublimity, which was later superseded by a view closer to the
Kantian.14
Obviously, the Burkean sublime is a threshold of a different order than the
Kantian one. The kind of release, or “liberty,” linked with that threshold is also
different. If the “genuine liberty” of the final book spells transcendence, the
licentious transgression in the first spots of time results in another kind of
release, which is a freedom bordering on wilfulness which is accompanied by
an acute sense of fear. Thus, if we follow this logic, we see that the term
“liberty”also evolves during the course of the poem.
John Beer, in “Nature and Liberty: the Linking of Unstable Concepts,”
draws a crisp line between the romantic concepts of independence / liberty /
freedom — especially after the 1790s — and details the evolution of
Wordsworth’s use of the term “liberty” up to his “genuine” and transcendent
understanding. His careful distinctions merit quoting at length.15
In English there had always been three words to describe the
opposite of bondage. The first was “independence,” which in
many ways remained the most favourable word since it stressed
the right of the individual, or the country, to stand up for itself, to
have its own view of things and to organize its own business
without being dependent on another. It was the word much used
in England at the time of the Civil War. “Liberty,” on the other
hand, originally neutral, had acquired a strong political overtone as
a result of the American and French Revolutions: those who used
it might be suspected of having wide political aims and of wishing
to overthrow the constitution of the state. In between was the
word “freedom,” which could be seen as pointing either way, but
which also gained something from its larger use to suggest ease of
movement of one kind or another. In some ways the three words
were interchangeable, but at times one or more was used with
rhetorical overtones corresponding to the usages just mentioned.
And when it came to the relationship with nature, different kinds
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of imagery might be thought to fit each: independence might
suggest a solitary, freestanding object, such as a tree or a
mountain; while freedom and liberty might suggest birds soaring
aloft, animals running wild, or unconstrained movements of the
human body. These were by no means fixed connections, of
course. One of the most striking images from previous literature,
which stayed to haunt the English Romantics, was Milton’s line in
“L’Allegro,” “The mountain-nymph, sweet Liberty.” Here the
symbolism of the mountain was transferred from the status of a
firm object to the function of offering protection for those who
wished to live in freedom.16
“But if the ideal of personal independence remained a constant for
Wordsworth,” John Beer continues, “‘liberty’ was another matter.”17 The
poet’s early fascination with the almost physical understanding of the term,
when the liberated person almost literally casts off the shackles of slavery, is
reflected in Wordsworth’s unpublished letter to the Bishop of Llandaff, with
the evocative comparison of the freed people with “the animal just released
from its stall.” The young poet, who wrote that letter, genuinely believed that
the released animal would soon return to itself and would stop its violent
kicks. The disappointment following upon the bloody aftermath of the French
revolution brought about a change in the poet’s formulation of the term. In his
writings of 1802, the poet starts channeling the free powers of the raving
nature — be it waves or winds — bringing into play “moral courage” and
“images of purity and clarity” such as the single star or “the brook in the
open sunshine.” 18 By 1806-1807, Wordsworth’s understanding of liberty
undergoes further changes: in many ways it starts to approximate personal
independence of an elevated order.
The point which Wordsworth was dwelling on more and more, in
other words, was that liberty as an institutionalized social ideal
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was a will-o’-the wisp: it was as illusory to imagine that one could
ever establish such a total state of liberty as it was to imagine that
there was any necessary link between the power of liberty and the
powers of nature. Liberty was primarily to be thought of in terms
of the human mind, which needed to feed on certain elements in
nature, but which was most likely to be established by cultivating
a braced independence of spirit. The free human being has learned
to live alone; but one learns to live alone, in Wordsworth’s view,
by knowing how to attune one’s ears to the notes of true
sublimity in nature.19
Attuning one’s eyes to the forms of the true sublimity in human beings also
fosters a sense of liberty, and this is the subject of the present chapter. James B.
Twitchell once expressed a hope that “Someday critics will finally chart that
movement up to, and then briefly at, the horizon which is the structure of The
Prelude.” 20 John Beer, hinging his discussion on images of nature in The
Prelude, has traced “the gradual definition of the idea of liberty in
Wordsworth’s mind during his boyhood and youth.” 21 Berdyaev, in no direct
connection with Wordsworth’s writings, advocated the link between freedom
and the human form. Here, I will weave all these, but especially Berdyaev’s
and Wordsworth’s texts, together into a complementary dialogue to argue that
the sublime human form, which is gestaltic, with a distinct outline that serves as
the “horizon” or a threshold to the transcendent, is gradually perfected in the
poem in connection with the developing notion of freedom.
In what follows, I focus on several spots of time and other passages,
taken from The Prelude in the 1850 order. I follow the traditional division of
the poem into two movements: Books I through VIII comprise the first
movement; and Books IX through XIV comprise the second one. Harold
Bloom explains this division thus:
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The first eight books form a single movement, summed up in the
title of Book VIII, Retrospect — Love of Nature Leading to Love
of Mankind. Books IX, X, and XI carry this Love of Mankind into
its natural consequence, Wordsworth’s Residence in France, and
his involvement with the Revolution. Books XII and XIII deal
with the subsequent crisis of Wordsworth’s Imagination, How
Impaired and Restored. The Conclusion, Book XIV, is the climax
of Wordsworth’s imaginative life and takes the reader back, in a
full cycle, to the very opening of the poem. The Conclusion
presents Wordsworth and Coleridge as “Prophets of Nature,”
joint laborers in the work of man’s redemption.22
I see these two movements of the poem differently. In Books I-VIII, the
growing poet led by Nature learns to discern the human form in the human
flesh; these books, leading up to the poet’s delight in the sublime human form,
exemplify his gradual transcending of the determinism of matter, what I,
following the widely-accepted formulation of Geoffrey Hartman, recognize as
“Via Naturaliter Negativa.” Books IX-XIV show how the poet transcends the
determinism of powerful ideas: the growing mind learns to conjure up distinct
human forms from the abysm of history, be it his long-missed teacher, the girl
with a pitcher, the druids, or somebody else. This second movement of the
poem, to me, is “Via Socialiter Negativa.”
The opening books of the poem are dominated by Wordsworth’s first
sublime experiences of powerful love and fear, which are connected with his
exercises in freedom of muscular movement of the young body, with his
“boyish sports,” his boyish wilfulness. It is the human aspect of the sublime
that is continually redefined in the course of The Prelude, rather than the
natural sublime with its impressive mountains and ennobling severity of the
Lake District winter, both of which set the tone of the poem right from the
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beginning. The very first spot of time relates the poet’s frosty night
wanderings “from snare to snare” among “the solitary hills”:
Ere I had told
Ten birth-days, when among the mountain slopes
Frost, and the breath of frosty wind, had snapped
The last autumnal crocus, ‘twas my joy
With store of springes o’er my shoulder hung
To range the open heights where woodcocks ran
Along the smooth green turf. Through half the night,
Scudding away from snare to snare, I plied
That anxious visitation;—moon and stars
Were shining o’er my head. I was alone,
And seemed to be a trouble to the peace
That dwelt among them. Sometimes it befel
In these night wanderings, that a strong desire
O’erpowered my better reason, and the bird
Which was the captive of another’s toil
Became my prey; and when the deed was done
I heard among the solitary hills
Low breathings coming after me, and sounds
Of undistinguishable motion, steps
Almost as silent as the turf they trod.23
Everything but the boy himself is sublime here, in its natural way: the boy’s
presence is not in harmony with the grand open heights, the vastness of the
night sky with moon and stars shining over his head. He is troubling to their
peace rather than in unity with it. Accordingly, instead of imagination, his
“strong desire” to get as many woodcocks as he can — even if they are stolen
from other people’s snares — usurps the moment. The boy is transgressing
rather than transcending. And the boundary that he crosses here is that of
ownership, which is embodied not in the open mountain slopes, but in the bird
snares. As soon as a freely running woodcock gets caught in one of those
traps, it passes from the sublime world of Nature to the territorially divided
world of commerce: it turns into someone’s property. And the boy,
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recognizing the bird as such, and recognizing the territorial division as well,
licentiously poaches: “the captive of another’s toil / Became my prey,” he
says. These words are not from freedom’s vocabulary. And the boy, becoming
a plunderer, simultaneously becomes a prey himself. Like a woodcock, he feels
trapped, chased, haunted. Like a captive woodcock, the boy is afraid. The
sublime nature seems to turn on him, from which point on, even the smooth
green turf that used to seem a perfect ground for freely running woodcocks
and wondering Wordsworth, now seems to produce ominous sounds of
pursuing steps and “breathings coming after” him. Those sounds, breathings,
and motions in this description are as “undistinguishable” as the boy’s human
form, which is not depicted as a perfect gestalt.
The same preyer-turning-into-prey motif with the same tendency to
transgress rather than to transcend unfolds further in the following raven’s
nest and boat-stealing spots of time. The portraiture in the episodes is, again,
bodily, focused on muscular effort. But the emphasis is no longer on property,
but on the sublimity of mighty natural powers (“the blast that blew amain”
among the Yew Dale Crags) and on forms (the towering and pursuing “grim
shape” of Black Crag in the boat-stealing passage). And this face-to-face
meeting with the natural sublime becomes the “not ignoble end” that the poet
praises. Here is how Wordsworth recalls his hanging over the nest of the bird
of prey:
Nor less when spring had warmed the cultured Vale,
Roved we as plunderers where the mother bird
Had in high places built her lodge; though mean
Our object and inglorious, yet the end
Was not ignoble. Oh! when I have hung
138

Above the raven’s nest, by knots of grass
And half-inch fissures in the slippery rock
But ill-sustained, and almost (so it seemed)
Suspended by the blast that blew amain,
Shouldering the naked crag, oh, at that time
While on the perilous ridge I hung alone,
With what strange utterance did the loud dry wind
Blow through my ear! the sky seemed not a sky
Of earth — and with what motion moved the clouds!
Dust as we are, the immortal spirit grows
Like harmony in music; there is a dark
Inscrutable workmanship that reconciles
Discordant elements, makes them cling together
In one society. How strange that all
The terrors, pains, and early miseries,
Regrets, vexations, lassitudes interfused
Within my mind, should e’er have borne a part,
And that a needful part, in making up
The calm existence that is mine when I
Am worthy of myself! Praise to the end!
Thanks to the means which Nature deigned to employ;
Whether her fearless visitings, or those
That came with soft alarm, like hurtless light
Opening the peaceful clouds; or she may use
Severer interventions, ministry
More palpable, as best might suit her aim.24
As a result of Nature’s interventions, the boy moves closer to another kind of
threshold: not the one that delimits private property — be it the snares, nests,
or the boat’s mooring cave — but the one that points to the entrance to the
supraconscious. Beyond that latter threshold, he feels, the unity of all exists:
the same wind moves the clouds and supports the hill climbers; the same
“huge and mighty forms” haunt the mountain regions and his mind. After
returning the boat to the cave, overwhelmed by his newly discovered
supraconscious, he goes home:
And through the meadows homeward went, in grave
And serious mood; but after I had seen
That spectacle, for many days, my brain
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Worked with a dim and undetermined sense
Of unknown modes of being; o’er my thoughts
There hung a darkness, call it solitude
Or blank desertion. No familiar shapes
Remained, no pleasant images of trees,
Of sea or sky, no clouds of green fields;
But huge and mighty forms, that do not live
Like living men, moved slowly through the mind
By day, and were a trouble to my dreams.25
Those shapes, interestingly, “do not live like living men,” such men as the
Lake District shepherds of Book VIII; those shapes are “unknown” that is, in
a way, “uncouth.” They bring no joy, no delight. But they purify the human
thought through fear and pain, urging the boy to measure himself not against a
short-lived human memory, but against the eternity of nature: mountains, or
yew trees, which have existed for centuries and which witness and judge his
doings. Their sublimity speaks to the poet by way of their gestalten. At the
same time, the terror they inspire in their sublimity alienates rather than invites
communion. To access transcendental unity, another, a more welcome,
threshold should be found. In his search, instinctively, the boy feels a need to
“build up our human soul.”
Wisdom and Spirit of the universe!
Thou Soul that art the eternity of thought,
That gives to forms and images a breath
And everlasting motion, not in vain
By day or star-light thus from my first dawn
Of childhood didst though intwine for me
The passions that build up our human soul;
Not with the mean and vulgar works of man,
But with high objects, with enduring things —
With life and nature, purifying thus
The elements of feeling and of thought,
And sanctifying, by such discipline,
Both pain and fear, until we recognise
A grandeur in the beatings of the heart.26
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Wordsworth starts attending to the beatings of his own heart, to the
visions of his own eye, and he begins to explore another kind of bodily
freedom, linked not with licentious stealth but with joy, not with the
appropriating of the external, but with the exploring of the inward. “Hissing
along the polished ice,” he eyes the skyline with both the setting sun and the
rising moon, with blinking stars above him, and with their icy reflections under
him. He does not chase the bodily objects any more: what’s the use of
following the elusive star, which ever flees? Unlike Tennyson’s Ulysses, the
boy Wordsworth manages to reach such a star by cutting across its starry
“reflex.” Likewise, he learns, that it is not necessary to move his own body all
the time to attain certain visionary experiences of movement.
Not seldom from the uproar I retired
Into a silent bay, or sportively
Glanced sideway, leaving the tumultuous throng,
To cut across the reflex of a star
That fled, and, flying still before me, gleamed
Upon the glassy plain; and oftentimes,
When we had given our bodies to the wind,
And all the shadowy banks on either side
Came sweeping through the darkness, spinning still
The rapid line of motion, then at once
Have I, reclining back upon my heels,
Stopped short; yet still the solitary cliffs
Wheeled by me — even as if the earth had rolled
With visible motion her diurnal round!27
This whirling experience of movement is far from being fanciful: Wordsworth
truly feels what he describes. The abrupt suspension of motion when speeding
can cause vertigo.28 Hence, for a short while, the boy acutely experiences a
sensation which is not externally-based. He learns that even the freedom of
movement can triumph inwardly. What he still has to learn is that there are
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other kinds of human freedom, independent of human physiology, of blood
pressure, of giddiness; there are other kinds of shapes than those of inanimate
objects. For now, the boy is absorbed in his own sensations of physical pull;
his index to delight, or rather a “courser,” which points beyond the literal
clouds, is the kite:
Unfading recollections! at this hour
The heart is almost mine with which I felt,
From some hill-top on sunny afternoons,
The paper kite high among fleecy clouds
Pull at her rein like an impetuous courser;
Or, from the meadows sent on gusty days,
Beheld her breast the wind, then suddenly
Dashed headlong, and rejected by the storm.29
Liberty, as well, is likened to the literal breeze, blowing, significantly, on his
body:
Dear Liberty! Yet what would it avail
But for a gift that consecrates the joy?
For I, methought, while the sweet breath of heaven
Was blowing on my body, felt within
A correspondent breeze, that gently moved
With quickening virtue, but is now become
A tempest, a redundant energy,
Vexing its own creation.30
The correspondent breeze did not blow in vain, either. Nearing the end of
Book I, the poet announces straightforwardly that the subject of this book is
not only external influences of Nature, and that he had other “pure motions of
the sense,” of calm delight and intellectual charm, which, he says,
if I err not, surely must belong
To those first-born affinities that fit
Our new existence to existing things,
And, in our dawn of being, constitute
The bond of union between life and joy.31
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The transcendent wholeness of his early contemplative moments (such
as I, 567-80) brings refreshment to him and intimates his later, mature
understanding of the nature of such visions. But Book I pivots on the
wilfulness of Wordsworth’s formative years when he, free in his bodily
movements, explores licentiousness. This is not a “genuine liberty,” of course.
This is an illusion of individualism, to use Berdyaev’s terminology. Being
separate in his body from the outside world, the boy, by association, is aware
of physical boundaries of different kinds. He thinks in the terms of the outer
world: he ventures to transgress physically, but gains no joy or wholeness
through that; boundaries and hedges are not destroyed by way of trespassing.
This tendency to think in fragmented categories of me vs. not me, mine vs.
theirs, means vs. ends, my body vs. exterior world, are symptomatic of the
objectivization of consciousness. The just desire to overcome such
separateness might mislead one to evoke another desire, to take possession of
what is on the other side of the fence. The illusion that capturing objects can
result in a unity with them is exactly what Berdyaev calls “slavery to the
objective world:”
[Ç]elov∫k estπ rabƒ u samogo sebq. Onƒ popadaetƒ vƒ rabstvo
u obƒektnago m∂ra, no xto estπ rabstvo u sobstvennyhƒ
xkster∂orizac∂j.... Çelov∫k vsegda qvlqetsq rabom togo, çto
nahoditsq kakƒ by vn∫ ego, çto otçuwdeno otƒ nego, no
istoçnik∫ rabstva vnutrenn∂j. Borπba svobody i rabstva
razygryvaetsq vo vn∫ßnemƒ, obƒektivirovannomƒ,
xkster∂orizirovannomƒ m∂r∫. No sƒ xkzistenc∂alπnoj toçki
zr∫n∂q xto estπ vnutrennqq duhovnaq borπba. (110)

[Man is a slave to himself. He falls into slavery to the objective
world, but this is slavery to his own exteriorizations....Man is
always a slave of that which lies, as it were, outside himself, which
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is estranged from him, but which is an inward source of slavery.
The struggle between freedom and slavery is carried on in the
outer, objectivized, exteriorized world. But from the existential
point of view it is an inward and spiritual struggle.]32
So, the ten-year-old boy exteriorizes his inner struggle for the union with the
desired: he tries to steal the skiff. Then, externally, he is pursued by the crag,
and then, internally, by the thoughts about that crag. These stealing episodes,
the first spots of time in The Prelude are an expression of individualism in the
boy, because,
[I]ndividualizmƒ estπ uwe obƒektivac∂q i svqzanƒ sƒ
xkster∂orizac∂ej çelov∫çeskago suµestvovan∂q. Xto oçenπ
prikryto i ne srazu vidno. Individuumƒ estπ çastπ obµestva,
çastπ roda, çastπ m∂ra. Individualizmƒ estπ izolqciq çasti
otƒ c∫lago ili vozstan∂e çasti protivƒ c∫lago. No bytπ
çastπ√ kakogo-libo c∫lago, hotq by vozstavƒ protiv xtogo
c∫lago, znaçitƒ uwe bytπ xkster∂orizirovannymƒ. Lißπ vƒ
m∂r∫ obƒektivac∂i, t.-e. vƒ m∂r∫ otçuwdennosti, bezliçnosti i
determinizma, suµestvuetƒ to otnoßen∂e çasti i c∫lago,
kotoroe obnaruwivaetsq vƒ individualizm∫. (114)

[Individualism is objectivization and is connected with the
exteriorization of human existence. This fact is to a large extent
screened from view and is not immediately evident. The individual
is a part of society, a part of the race, a part of the world.
Individualism is the isolation of the part from the whole, or the
revolt of the part against the whole. But to be a part of any kind
of whole, even if it be in revolt against that whole means to be
exteriorized already. Only in a world of objectivization, that is to
say a world of alienation, impersonality and determinism, does that
relation of part to whole exist which is disclosed in
individualism.]33
This individualism lets the boy see Nature as a separate entity as well, which
makes it possible to make Nature an object worthy of being “sought / For her
own sake.”34
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Book Two plays out how the poet outgrows licentiousness.
Transgression gives way to transport. He gains liberty to serve in Nature’s
temple (cf. II, 462-63). What he depicts in the spots of time in Book II, is a
series of boating races. But the mentality of the contenders is not possessivelyaggressive or jealous any longer: it is not the victory, but participation that
matters. They race each other till the winner reaches one of the appointed
islands of Windermere. Among those, was an isle with the ruins of Our Lady’s
shrine, where the boys rested. And everyone who has come and feels the
beauties of the islands — the musical birds, the leafy oak towering above
fragrant lilies of the valley, the chants of the shrine — and thus becomes a
winner.
When summer came,
Our pastime was, on bright half-holidays,
To sweep along the plain of Windermere
With rival oars; and the selected bourne
Was now an Island musical with birds
That sang and ceased not; now a Sister Isle
Beneath the oak’s umbrageous covert, sown
With lilies of the valley like a field;
And now a third small Island, where survived
In solitude the ruins of a shrine
Once to Our Lady dedicate, and served
Daily with chaunted rites. In such a race
So ended, disappointment could be none,
Uneasiness, or pain, or jealousy:
We rested in the shade, all pleased alike,
Conquered and conqueror. Thus the pride of strength,
And the vain-glory of superior skill,
Were tempered; thus was gradually produced
A quiet independence of the heart;
And to my Friend who knows me I may add,
Fearless of blame, that hence for future days
Ensued a diffidence and modesty,
And I was taught to feel, perhaps too much,
The self-sufficing power of Solitude.35
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Instead of stealing something, taking it away from the wholeness of the
beautiful landscape, the boys add their own creative touch to nature: when
darkness comes, when birds fall silent, and the religious chants stop, the
schoolboys leave their own harmonious gift, their performing flutist, Robert
Greenwood, on one of the islands and, rowing away to a distance, hear him
making melodious music:
[E]re night-fall,
When in our pinnace we returned at leisure
Over the shadowy lake, and to the beach
Of some small island steered our course with one,
The Minstrel of the Troop, and left him there,
And rowed off gently, while he blew his flute
Alone upon the rock — oh, then, the calm
And dead still water lay upon my mind
Even with a weight of pleasure, and the sky,
Never before so beautiful, sank down
Into my heart, and held me like a dream!36
In this human portrait, it is the sound that dominates the vision: the Minstrel is
music itself; he is not a human shape here. As for Wordsworth himself, his selfportraits are sketchy and as corporeal and muscular as they are in Book One.
He paints himself plying the oars, participating in epicurean “rustic dinners”
(89). His refreshment is not that of the renovating virtue of the spots of time,
but quite substantial: “Nor did we want / Refreshment, strawberries and
mellow cream” (II, 159-60), he good-naturedly boasts. “The blood-red wine”
(II, 144) seems to flow everywhere: it brims the decanters and glasses at the
White Lion Inn; it almost runs in the juvenile poet’s veins: “my blood
appeared to flow,” says the poet, “For its own pleasure, and I breathed with
joy” (II, 187-88). Other human forms, by contrast, seem marmoreal and frozen:
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they are monuments, whom the remarkably “uncouth” horse-riders leave
behind:
Our steeds remounted and the summons given,
With whip and spur we through the chauntry flew
In uncouth race, and left the cross-legged knight,
And the stone-abbot, and that single wren
Which one day sang so sweetly in the nave
Of the old church, that — though from recent showers
The earth was comfortless, and touched by faint
Internal breezes, sobbings of the place
And respirations from the roofless walls
The shuddering ivy dripped large drops — yet still
So sweetly ’mid the gloom the invisible bird
Sang to herself, that there I could have made
My dwelling-place, and lived for ever there
To hear such music.37
During his outings, the poet learns another kind of solitude: not the one that
alienates, but the solitude of a creator:
Hence life, and change, and beauty, solitude
More active even than ‘best society’ —
Society made sweet as solitude
By inward concords, silent, inobtrusive
And gentle agitations of the mind
From manifold distinctions, difference
Perceived in things, where, to the unwatchful eye,
No difference is, and hence, from the same source,
Sublimer joy; for I would walk alone,
Under the quiet stars, and at that time
Have felt whate’er there is of power in sound
To breathe an elevated mood, by form
Or image unprofaned.38
Berdyaev explains this creative solitude that strives for unity with the outer
world, contrasting it to the estranged, individualistic one:
Zam∫çatelπno, çto velik∂e tvorçesk∂e l√di vƒ suµnosti nikogda
ne byli individualistami. Oni byvali odinokimi i ne
priznannymi, byvali vƒ ostromƒ konflikt∫ sƒ okruwa√µej
sredoj, sƒ ustanovlennymi kollektivnymi mn∫n∂qmi i
suwden∂qmi. No oni vsegda soznavali svo√ prizvannostπ kƒ
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sluwen∂√, oni im∫li universalπnu√ miss∂√. N∫tƒ niçego bol∫e
lownago, ç∫mƒ soznan∂e svogo [sic.] dara, svoego gen∂q, kakƒ
privileg∂i i kakƒ opravdan∂q individualistiçeskoj izolqc∂i.
Estπ dva raznyhƒ tipa odinoçestva — odinoçestvo tvorçeskoj
liçnosti, perewiva√µej konfliktƒ vnutrennqgo universalizma
sƒ obƒektivirovannymƒ universalizmomƒ, i odinoçestvo
individualista, protivopolaga√µago xtomu obƒektivirovannomu
universalizmu, kƒ kotoromu onƒ vƒ suµnosti prinadlewitƒ,
svo√ opustoßennostπ i bezsil∂e. Estπ odinoçestvo vnutrennej
polnoty i odinoçestvo vnutrennej pustoty. Estπ odinoçestvo
geroizma i odinoçestvo porawennosti, odinoçestvo, kakƒ sila, i
odinoçestvo, kakƒ bezsilie. (115)

[It is remarkable that great creative men have in fact never been
individualists. They have been solitary and unrecognized, they
have been in sharp conflict with their environment, with
established collective opinions and judgments. But they have
always thought of themselves as called to service, they have had a
universal mission. There is nothing more false than to regard one’s
gifts and one’s genius as a privilege and as a justification of
individualistic isolation.
There are two different types of solitariness <solitude> — the
solitariness of creative personality which experiences the conflict
of inward universalism with objectivized universalism, and the
solitariness of the individualist who sets his desolation and
impotence in opposition to that objectivized universalism to which
he in fact belongs. There is a solitariness of inward plenitude and a
solitariness of inward emptiness. There is a solitariness of heroism
and a solitariness of defeatism, a solitariness which is strength and
a solitariness which is weakness.]39
Finally, Wordsworth overcomes his separatist individualism of the
stealing episodes and achieves his longed for feeling of unity with nature. The
poet was seventeen years old at the time, as his intellectual biography, The
Prelude, says. In his union with the outside world of Nature, he endows
natural objects, “where no brotherhood exists / To passive minds” (II, 385-86),
with life. Or, as he puts it, “To unorganic natures were transferred / My own
enjoyments” (II, 391-92). No human figure appears in the view. The poet
becomes a priest exclusively to Nature:
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From Nature overflowing on my soul,
I had received so much, that every thought
Was steeped in feeling; I was only then
Contented, when with bliss ineffable
I felt the sentiment of Being spread
O’er all that moves and all that seemeth still;
O’er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
And human knowledge, to the human eye
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart;
O’er all that leaps and runs, and shouts and sings,
Or beats the gladsome air; o’er all that glides
Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself,
And mighty depth of waters. Wonder not
If high the transport, great the joy I felt,
Communing in this sort through earth and heaven
With every form of creature, as it looked
Towards the Uncreated with a countenance
Of adoration, with an eye of love.
One song they sang, and it was audible,
Most audible, then, when the fleshly ear,
O’ercome by humblest prelude of that strain,
Forgot her functions, and slept undisturbed.40
Why is this “transport” (II, 376) not a genuine liberty, then? The union is
achieved, but even though, on the one hand, he is liberated from a narrow
understanding of freedom as transgression and, consequently, from fear, on the
other hand, he loses himself in nature, merges in union with her to his selfforgetfulness, which does not preserve the person. There is a very difficult
balance to maintain between the extremes of alienating individualism and the
all-absorbing outer world. The medium is a personality, that is when a person
recognizes himself as an autonomous being capable of development, growth,
and emotional union with the universe, and at the same time, he is not utterly
defaced by that union. To retain “the consciousness of Whom we are” while
holding communion with everything around, is, according to Wordsworth, a
truly divine quality. The poet will articulate this realization much later in The
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Prelude. For now, I evoke this thought just to show how the poet’s
understanding of transcendent unity in Book XIV will surpass that of the
transport of Book II:
Such minds are truly from the Deity,
For they are Powers; and hence the highest bliss
That flesh can know is theirs — the consciousness
Of Whom they are, habitually infused
Through every image and through every thought
And all affections, by communion raised
From earth to heaven, from human to divine.41
Meanwhile, the teenage Wordsworth of Book II merges ecstatically with the
universe, and Berdyaev can illuminate his experience. Berdyaev does not take
this kind of union for genuine liberty, either. Rather, he considers such a
transport to be an enslaving lure of false union with the universe or, as he
names it, the cosmos.
To, çto q nazyva√ kosmiçeskimƒ prelπµen∂emƒ, estπ
xkstatiçesk∂j vyhodƒ za pred∫ly liçnago suµestvovan∂q vƒ
kosmiçesku√ stih∂√, nadewda na pr∂obµen∂e kƒ xtoj
pervostih∂i. Na xtomƒ byli osnovany vs∫ org∂astiçesk∂e
kulπty. No xto vsegda bylo ne stolπko vyhodomƒ izƒ
zamknutago suµestvovan∂q liçnosti kƒ m∂rovomu obµeni√,
skolπko snqt∂em samoj formy liçnosti i eq rastvoren∂em.
(Berdqevƒ, str. 86)

[What I call the lure of the cosmos is an ecstatic emergence
beyond the boundaries of personal existence into the cosmic
element, it is the hope of entering into communion with this
primary element. All orgiastic cults have been founded upon this.
But it has always been not so much an emergence from the closed
existence of personality into a world of communion, as the
depriving of personality of its very form, and its dissolution.]42
In Book III of The Prelude, the balance tips the other way yet again:
the poet enters the university. And the whole book explores another kind of
relationship — not with Nature this time — but with the civilized world of
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high literacy and science. This book, traditionally, is seen in criticism as not
specifically marked with any developed spots of time. Not utterly dismissed,
but “Imagination slept,” as the poet himself regrets while he was at
Cambridge. He suffers from the remotness of that elite education from Nature,
and calls this ivory tower unfree. Berdyaev’s thoughts on the enslavement
caused by civilization estranged from Nature is not a far cry from
Wordsworth’s ruminations about Cambridge in Book III.
Upotreblq√ sejçasƒ slovo civilizac∂q vƒ rasprostranennomƒ
smysl∫, kotoryj svqzyvaetƒ ee sƒ processomƒ soc∂alizac∂i
çelov∫ka. O c∫nnostqhƒ kulπtury r∫çπ budetƒ potomƒ.
Civilizac∂q sozdana çelov∫komƒ, çtoby osvoboditπsq otƒ
vlasti stih∂jnyhƒ silƒ prirody. Çelov∫kƒ vydumalƒ orud∂q,
kotoryq postavilƒ mewdu soboj i prirodoj, i potomƒ
bezkoneçno soverßenstvovalƒ xti orud∂q. Intellekƒ bylƒ
veliçajßimƒ orud∂emƒ çelov∫ka i vƒ nemƒ dostigƒ çelov∫kƒ
ogromnoj izoµrennosti. No xto soprovowdalosπ oslablen∂emƒ
instinktovƒ, organizmƒ çelov∫ka naçalƒ degradirovatπ, takƒ
kakƒ vƒ borπb∫ orud∂q organiçesk∂q naçali zam∫nqtπsq orud∂qmi
tehniçeskimi. Çelov∫ka civilizac∂i vƒ raznyq xpohi
presl∫dovala myslπ, çto, otojdq otƒ prirody, onƒ poterqlƒ
svo√ c∫lostnostπ i pervonaçalπnu√ silu, onƒ stalƒ
razdroblennymƒ. (99-100)

[I now use the word ‘civilization’ in the broad and widely
diffused sense which connects it with the process of the
socialization of man. I shall speak about cultural values later on.
Civilization is created by man in order to free himself from the
power of the elemental forces of nature. Man has invented tools,
which he has placed between himself and nature, and has gone on
endlessly perfecting these tools. His intellect has been the greatest
of man’s implements and in the sphere of the intellect man has
reached a very high degree of cultivation and inventiveness. But
this has been accompanied by a weakening of the instincts, man’s
organism has begun to decline, for in the struggle organic
implements have begun to be replaced by technical implements. At
various epochs civilized man has been harassed by the thought
that in getting away from nature he was losing his completeness
and primary inherent strength, that he was becoming
disintegrated.]43
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The fragmenting rather than unifying power of the civilized intellect, the
human dependency on objects, instruments, artificiality, equally sickens
Wordsworth: the poet is stifled by the utter unfreedom of Cambridge’s
curriculum, as he describes it. Instead of communing with and learning directly
from nature, Wordsworth likens being at Cambridge to roaming through a
museum and perusing artifacts, objects, and implements of all educative kinds.
Carelessly I roamed
As through a wide museum from whose stores
A casual rarity is singled out
And has its brief perusal, then gives way
To others, all supplanted in their turn;
Till ’mid this crowded neighbourhood of things
That are by nature most unneighbourly,
The head turns round and cannot right itself;
And though an aching and a barren sense
Of gay confusion still be uppermost,
With few wise longings and but little love,
Yet to the memory something cleaves at last,
Whence profit may be drawn in times to come.44
Such an artificial way to learn burdens the young mind, to giddiness, with a
dead freight of “most unneighbourly” things. The mood is that of nearly
suffocating within the four walls of the confinement. Instead of a free stroll in
his native hills, the boy is channelled into swallowing museum’s dust. In Book
V, the poet epitomizes this way of learning in two figures, comparing himself to
“a stalled ox debarred / From touch of growing grass” (V, 242-43), and to a
locomotive, saying: “to the very road / Which they have fashioned would
confine us down, / Like engines” (V, 356-58). The sense of utter
objectivization and bondage colors his lines. He again seems to feel like a
trapped woodcock.
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I, bred up ’mid Nature’s luxuries,
was a spoiled child, and rambling like the wind,
As I had done in daily intercourse
With those crystalline rivers, solemn heights,
And mountains; ranging like a fowl of the air,
I was ill-tutored for captivity,
To quit my pleasure, and, from month to month,
Take up a station calmly on the perch
Of sedentary peace.45
The poet’s sense of captivity is represented through objectivized
portraiture. The human figures the young Wordsworth meets on campus and in
the neighbourhood look as “o’ertasked by Time” and “covetous of exercise
and air” as the museum artifacts themselves. The student “clothed in gown
and tasselled cap” whom the boy’s carriage passes by on the road (III, 7-12)
wears the same garb Wordsworth will be wearing a few verses later in the
poem, after he pays a number of visits both “To Tutor or to Tailor, as befel”
(28). And the “spiritual men” of the college are also, to some extent, reduced
to the same common cap-and-gown denominator, which is yet further
objectivized by literally translating their uniforms to material canvasses.
Imagination slept,
and yet not utterly. I could not print
Ground where the grass had yielded to your steps
Ye generations of illustrious men,
Unmoved. I could not always lightly pass
Through the same gateways, sleep where ye had slept,
Wake where ye waked, range that inclosure old,
That garden of great intellects, undisturbed.
Place also by the side of this dark sense
Of nobler feeling, that those spiritual men,
Even the great Newton’s own etherial self,
Seemed humbled in these precincts, thence to be
The more endeared. Their several memories here
(Even like their persons in their portraits clothed
With the accustomed garb of daily life)
Put on a lowly and a touching grace
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Of more distinct humanity, that left
All genuine admiration unimpaired.46
Berdyaev also links objectivization with equipment, such as uniforms.
Uniforms or any status clothes can be de-facing, and in that sense,
objectivizing, abstracting, enslaving:
Suµestvuetƒ civilizovannoe varvarstvo, za kotorymƒ
çuvstvuetsq ne «priroda», a maßina, mehanizmƒ. Industr∂alπnaq
tehniçeskaq civilizac∂q qvlqet soboj vse vozrasta√µee
civilizovannoe varvarstvo, padenie kaçestva. No vƒ xtomƒ
civilizovannomƒ varvarstv∫ n∫tƒ nikakogo vozvrata kƒ
«prirode». Vƒ çelov∫k∫ civilizac∂i per∂odiçeski probuwdaetsq
zv∫rπ i dikarπ, no vƒ izm∫nennomƒ civilizac∂ej form∫, t.-e.
vƒ uhudßennoj form∫. Civilizovan∂e çelov∫ka estπ processƒ
ne iduµ∂j osobenno gluboko i oçenπ legko sƒ çelov∫ka
sdira√tsq pokrovy civilizac∂i. Pri xtomƒ çelov∫kƒ
prodolwaetƒ polπzovatπsq vs∫mi orud∂qmi civilizac∂i. U
Karlejlq byli oçenπ glubok∂q idei obƒ odewd∫ (Sartor
Resartus). Xto estπ problema otnoßen∂q mewdu vidimostπ√ i
podlinnostπ√. (102)

[There is a civilized barbarism which is much worse than primitive
barbarism, barbarism at the back of which is to be sensed not
‘nature’ but the machine, and mechanism. Industrial technical
civilization is showing itself an ever growing civilized barbarism, a
decline in quality. But in this civilized barbarism there is no sort of
return to ‘nature’. In the man of civilization the beast and the
savage are from time to time awakened, but in a form which is
changed by civilization, that is to say in a deteriorated form. The
civilizing of man is a process which does not go particularly deep
and the trappings of civilization are very easily stripped from him.
Meanwhile he continues to make use of all the equipment of
civilization. In Carlyle there are some very profound ideas about
clothes (Sartor Resartus). It is a problem of the relation between
appearance and reality.]47
In Book III of The Prelude, the poet often presents himself as gownconscious to a fault. Objects associated with the lives of great poets of the past
impress the young students who walk the same streets the poets tread, wear
the same scholarly dress the poets wore, sleep and carouse in the same rooms
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where the poets lived. The leitmotif of the giddying blood-red wine and the
youthful assemblies recurs again.
Yea, our blind Poet, who in his later day,
Stood almost single; uttering odious truth —
Darkness before, and danger’s voice behind,
Soul awful — if the earth hath ever lodged
An awful soul — I seemed to see him here
Familiarly, and in his scholar’s dress
Bounding before me, yet a stripling youth —
A boy, no better, with his rosy cheeks
Angelical, keen eye, courageous look,
And conscious step of purity and pride.
Among the band of my compeers was one
Whom chance had stationed in the very room
Honoured by Milton’s name. O temperate Bard!
Be it confest that, for the first time, seated
Within thy innocent lodge and oratory,
One of a festive circle, I poured out
Libations, to thy memory drank, till pride
And gratitude grew dizzy in a brain
Never excited by the fumes of wine
Before that hour, or since. Forth I ran
From the assembly; through a length of streets,
Ran, ostrich-like, to reach our chapel door
In not a desperate or opprobrious time,
Albeit long after the importunate bell
Had stopped, with wearisome Cassandra voice
No longer haunting the dark winter night.
Call back, O Friend! a moment to thy mind
The place itself, and fashion of the rites.
With careless ostentation shouldering up
My surplice, through the inferior throng I clove
Of the plain Burghers, who in audience stood
On the last skirts of their permitted ground,
Under the pealing organ. Empty thoughts!
I am ashamed of them: and that great Bard,
And thou, O Friend! who in thy ample mind
Hast placed me high above my best deserts,
Ye will forgive the weakness of that hour,
In some of its unworthy vanities,
Brother to many more.48
Interestingly, that with the sense of belonging to an academic club, there
comes unceremonious familiarity, when the very garb that distinguishes the
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students from the “town” can be treated with relative disrespect: it can be
carelessly tossed, tucked, hitched up “ostrich-like” to accommodate the
scampering boy, who by his own boyish nature cannot but occasionally run
late and cannot possibly strut with pomp and circumstance all the time. Instead
of being properly pressed and dressed, Wordsworth rushes into the chapel like
a wind with his “surplice” — a uniform white linen robe required for that
occasion every morning — dangling over his shoulders. So, he moves as the
boy naturally does. But he speaks a very unnatural vocabulary and thinks
with quite unnatural vanity, especially if we take into consideration
Wordsworth’s own renunciations of pompous language in his Preface to
Lyrical Ballads. The turned phrases like “In not a desperate or opprobrious
time,” “the importunate bell / . . . with wearisome Cassandra voice,” invite a
gently ironic smile from the mature Wordsworth; while his youthful slighting of
“the plain Burghers,” people of different “skirts” in all senses of this word,
elicits his blushing sigh. In other words, at Cambridge, Wordsworth is tested by
the lure of belonging to an intellectual elite, by yet another kind of
determinism, that of academic stripe. Berdyaev again is in unison:
Kulπtura osnovana na aristokratiçeskomƒ princip∫, na
princip∫ kaçestvennago otbora. Tvorçestvo kulπtury vo vs∫hƒ
sferahƒ stremitsq kƒ soverßenstvu, kƒ dostiwen∂√ vysßago
kaçestva. Takƒ vƒ poznan∂i, takƒ vƒ iskusstv∫, takƒ vƒ
vyrabotk∫ dußevnago blagorodstva i kulπtur∫ çelov∫çeskihƒ
çuvstvƒ.... Istina aristokratiçna vƒ tomƒ smysl∫, çto ona
estπ dostiwen∂e kaçestva i soverßenstva vƒ poznan∂i,
nezavisimo otƒ koliçestva, otƒ mnƒn∂q i trebovan∂q
çelov∫çeskihƒ koliçestvƒ. No xto sovs∫mπ ne znaçitƒ, çto
istina suµestvuetƒ dlq izbrannago menπßinstva, dlq
aristokratiçeskoj gruppy, istina suµestvuetƒ dlq vsego
çelov∫çestva i vs∫ l√di prizvany bytπ pr∂obµennymi kƒ nej.
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N∫tƒ niçego protivn∫e gordosti i prezritelπnosti zamknutoj
xlity. (105)

[Culture is founded upon the aristocratic principle, upon the
principle of qualitative selection. The creativeness of culture in all
spheres struggles towards perfection, towards the attainment of
the highest quality. It is so in knowledge, it is so in art, it is so in
the working out of nobility of soul, and in the culture of human
feelings.... Truth is aristocratic in the sense that it is the attainment
of quality and perfection in knowledge, independently of
quantity, opinion and the demands of human majorities. But this in
no way means that truth exists for the select few, for the
aristocratic group. Truth exists for the whole of mankind and all
men are called to enter into communion with it. There is nothing
more repellent than the pride and contempt of a closed élite.]49
With false understanding of one’s elite chosenness there comes unwholesome
isolation, as Berdyaev explains:
Odinoçestvo poçita√µihƒ sebq prinadlewaµimi kƒ kulπturnoj
xlit∫ estπ lownoe odinoçestvo, xto estπ vse-taki stadnoe
odinoçestvo, hotq by stado bylo maloj gruppoj, xto ne estπ
odinoçestvo prorokovƒ i gen∂evƒ. Gen∂j blizokƒ kƒ
pervorealπnosti, kƒ podlinnomu suµestvovan∂√, kulπturnaq we
xlita podçinena zakonam obƒektivac∂i i soc∂alizac∂i. Xto vƒ
nej vyrabatyvaetsq kulπturopoklonstvo, kotoroe estπ odna izƒ
formƒ idolopoklonstva i rabstva çelov∫ka. Podlinnyj
duhovnyj aristokratizmƒ svqzanƒ sƒ soznan∂emƒ sluwen∂q, a ne
sƒ soznan∂emƒ svoej privilegirovannosti. (105)

[The isolation of people who venerate themselves as those who
belong to a cultured élite, is a wrong isolation. It is the isolation of
a herd of animals, even though the herd may be a small group. It is
not the solitariness of the prophets and the geniuses. The genius
lives near to primary reality and to real existence, whereas the
cultured élite is subject to the laws of objectivization and
socialization. The worship of culture is elaborated within it and
that is one of the forms which idolatry and human slavery assume.
True spiritual aristocracy is connected with a sense of service, not
with the consciousness of one’s own privileged position.]50
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Wordsworth, fortunately, eschews the shackles of the elite isolation, because
he is not a stranger to other kinds of solitude, more creative and close to
Nature. Such moments occasionally visit him:
Though I had learnt betimes to stand unpropped,
And independent musings pleased me so
That spells seemed on me when I was alone,
Yet could I only cleave to solitude
In lonely places; if a throng was near
That way I leaned by nature; for my heart
Was social, and loved idleness and joy. (III, 230-36)
Holding up the foil of free and loving thirst for learning to the routine of
scholastic studies, the poet arrives at an inevitable conclusion:
I did not love,
Judging not ill perhaps, the timid course
Of our scholastic studies; could have wished
To see the river flow with ampler range
And freer pace; but more, far more, I grieved
To see displayed among an eager few,
Who in the field of contest persevered,
Passions unworthy of youth’s generous heart
And mounting spirit, pitiably repaid,
When so disturbed, whatever palms are won.51
“Was ever known / The witless shepherd who persists to drive / A flock that
thirsts not to a pool disliked?” reasons Wordsworth (408-10), once again
remembering his favorite shepherds. On the authority of their example, he
questions freedom and liberty of education as it was at that English citadel of
knowledge. He looks around for the human sublime, and finding no live and
lofty gestalten of Milton, Spenser, Newton, the boy rests his eye on the human
statue. It is the most glorious human form rendered describable in all Book III:
Newton’s statue. It’s noteworthy that the poet uses the same word “index” in
connection with this vision, as he employs in the cross-like shepherd spot of
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time. This index, however, is not to delight yet, but “of a mind,” potent and
creatively solitary.
And from my pillow, looking forth by light
Of moon or favouring stars, I could behold
The antechapel where the statue stood
Of Newton with his prism and silent face,
The marble index of a mind for ever
Voyaging through strange seas of Thought, alone.52
From Wordsworth’s Cambridge perspective, the human being is put firmly and
monumentally on the pedestal in the antechapel, which is but an outer part of
the temple of the human heart, which, when opened, raises the eyes to the
spires, where the aery human gestalt is stationed like a crowning cross.
Wordsworth’s summer vacation takes him back to his beloved
Hawkshead, where he gets a break from the confining conventions of the
university curriculum and elite. He also views with a new eye the neighborly
folk and especially Ann Tyson, his old Dame, who was a second mother to him
during his Hawkshead years. The contrast between the two ways of life, that
of Cambridge and that of Hawkshead, is precise; but the contrast is not
between the natural man and the civilized one. Wordsworth opposes to the
mundane superficiality of Cambridge the unpretentious spirituality of the Lake
District, which is especially conspicuous in his following loving lines:
Yes, I had something of a subtler sense,
And often looking round was moved to smiles
Such as a delicate work of humour breeds;
I read, without design, the opinions, thoughts,
Of those plain-living people now observed
With clearer knowledge; with another eye
I saw the quiet woodman in the woods,
The shepherd roam the hills. With new delight,
This chiefly, did I note my grey-haired Dame;
Saw her go forth to church or other work
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Of state, equipped in monumental trim;
Short velvet cloak (her bonnet of the like),
A mantle such as Spanish Cavaliers
Wore in old time. Her smooth domestic life,
Affectionate without disquietude,
Her talk, her business, pleased me; and no less
Her clear though shallow stream of piety
That ran on Sabbath days a fresher course;
With thoughts unfelt till now I saw her read
Her Bible on hot Sunday afternoons,
And loved the book, when she had dropped asleep
And made of it a pillow for her head.53
Ann is so comfortable with her Bible, that she can fall asleep holding it. Her
affections, her “smooth domestic life,” harmonize with those Sunday naps.
And the whole vision, even with her Cavalier cloak, never reaches the
ridiculousness of the ostrich-like student claiming a privileged place at service.
Ann seems to be much more spiritual, if not pious, by contrast. Berdyaev
would have agreed:
Problema stoitƒ sovs∫mƒ ne takƒ, çto civilizac∂i sl∫duetƒ
protivopostavlqtπ kakoe-to zdorovoe i blawennoe varvarstvo,
kakogo-to prirodnago çelov∫ka ili dobrago po prirod∫ dikarq.
Xto soverßenno naturalistiçeskaq postanovka problemy,
nastolπko ustar∫vßaq, çto o nej ne stoitƒ i govoritπ. Zlu i
rabstvu civilizac∂i nevozmowno protivopostavlqtπ dobro i
svobodu prirody. Sudƒ nadƒ civilizac∂ej ne mowetƒ soverßatπ
priroda, ego mowetƒ soverßatπ tolπko duhƒ. Çeloveku
civilizac∂i so vs∫mi ego nedostatkami protivostoitƒ ne
prirodnyj çelov∫kƒ, a duhovnyj çelov∫kƒ. (100)

[The problem is not by any means to be put like this, that it would
be a good thing to set up in opposition to civilization some sort of
healthy and happy barbarism, some kind of natural man, or savage
who is good by nature. This is an absolutely naturalistic way of
stating the problem, and it is so much out of date that it is not
worth while to discuss it. It is impossible to place the evil and
slavery of civilization in antithesis with the good and freedom of
nature, and nature cannot pass judgment upon civilization. Only
spirit can pass such judgment.
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In opposition to civilized man with all his deficiencies there stands
not the natural man but the spiritual man.]54
It is only after perceiving lovingly the devotional side of his old Dame,
that Wordsworth tells in The Prelude about his Godlike hour, the spot of time
when one magnificent morning he comes to realize his vocation. Significantly,
the youth does not specify “Poetry is my vocation,” for that is a too narrow,
compartmentilized, even elite way to put it. Instead, Wordsworth on the spur
of the visionary moment, formulates his feeling more holistically: he feels, with
all his being that he should be “a dedicated spirit.”
Magnificent
The morning rose, in memorable pomp,
Glorious as e’er I had beheld — in front,
The sea lay laughing at a distance; near
The solid mountains shone, bright as the clouds,
Grain-tinctured, drenched in empyrean light;
And in the meadows and the lower grounds
Was all the sweetness of a common dawn —
Dews, vapours, and the melody of birds,
And labourers going forth to till the fields.
Ah! need I say, dear Friend! that to the brim
My heart was full; I made no vows, but vows
Were then made for me; bond unknown to me
Was given, that I should be, else sinning greatly,
A dedicated Spirit. On I walked
In thankful blessedness, which yet survives.55
The dedicated man walks on, liberated from the uncertainties, vanities, and
unhappiness of the previous book of his life. He still does not say that he is to
be a Poet. For now, he simply chooses to look more closely at the real spiritual
people he meets on his way, such as the discharged soldier (whom he does not
slight as he used to slight the Burghers at the chapel), to meditate upon “an
appropriate human center”:
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When from our better selves we have too long
Been parted by the hurrying world, and droop,
Sick of its business, of its pleasures tired,
How gracious, how benign, is Solitude;
How potent a mere image of her sway;
Most potent when impressed upon the mind
With an appropriate human centre — hermit,
Deep in the bosom of the wilderness;
Votary (in vast cathedral, where no foot
Is treading, where no other face is seen)
Kneeling at prayers; or watchman on the top
Of lighthouse, beaten by Atlantic waves;
Or as the soul of that great Power is met
Sometimes embodied on a public road,
When for the night deserted, it assumes
A character of quiet more profound
Than pathless wastes.56
Wordsworth’s initial vision of the human forms he “impresses upon the
mind” is not yet sublime but “uncouth,” the word Wordsworth uses again
and again. Such uncouth shapes are not limited to the discharged soldier.
While Wordsworth develops his feel for creativity, he gets to meet more
humans whose inner worlds remain locked to him, even though each time the
poet manages to perfect his insight; namely, he has a dream about the
“uncouth” (V, 75) Arab-Quixote, whose image is far from being definite. Like
a two-faced Janus, this human shape is in continual metamorphosis; it never
becomes a perfect gestalt 57: “and now,” notes the poet, “ He, to my fancy, had
become the knight / Whose tale Cervantes tells; yet not the knight, / But was
an Arab of the desert too” (V, 121-24). Likewise, the boy of Winander is not
really known to the poet; he remains a mystery to contemplate and elegize
when standing at a local country church-yard (V, 392). Even less “couth” is a
heap of garments spotted by the boy Wordsworth near Esthwaite Water, in
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1779, during his first year at Hawkshead. The drowned man, whose stiffened
body is found on the next day by the searchers, is ghastly and has no
expressive form, because, being dead, he has no existent emotions and feelings
to inform his countenance. He is frozen as an object into death, and he
represents the corporeal in its most objectivized. Not only the drowned body,
but also its clothes remain a shapeless heap; the dead man’s story remains
unknown.
Meanwhile, the poet derives his strength not from the civilization of
Cambridge, but from the culture of books he is fond of reading. He is no more
frightened by the corpse of the dead stranger than he is by artistic marbles or
urns. He associates the dead body with fairy-tales, the Arabian Nights (V, 462)
and Greek art. Thanks to these cultural, aesthetic associations, fear is mitigated
and the scene becomes almost a pastoral elegy:
At last, the dead man, ’mid that beauteous scene
Of trees and hills and water, bolt upright
Rose, with his ghastly face, a spectre shape
Of terror; yet no soul-debasing fear,
Young as I was, a child not nine years old,
Possessed me, for my inner eye had seen
Such sights before, among the shining streams
Of faëry land, the forests of romance.
Their spirit hallowed the sad spectacle
With decoration of ideal grace;
A dignity, a smoothness, like the works
Of Grecian art, and purest poesy.58
Unlike the drowned man, whose marmoreal image invites comparison
with the refined artistic products of distant civilizations and societies, the boy
of Winander appears as an untamed creator of his own individual culture. In
distinguishing between “civilization” and “culture,” I follow Berdyaev, who
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continued the discussion of the terms begun by many thinkers, including
Spengler, Dostoyevsky, K. Leontiev. Berdyaev, among other things, says that
“Civilization” is more socially-based, while “culture” is more individual.
Civilizac∂ej nuwno oboznaçatπ bol∫e soc∂alπno-kollektivnyj
processƒ, kulπturoj we processƒ bol∫e individualπnyj i
iduµ∂j vglubπ. My, naprim∫rƒ, govorimƒ, çto u xtogo çelov∫ka
estπ vysokaq kulπtura, no ne mowemƒ skazatπ, çto u xtogo
çelov∫ka oçenπ vysokaq civilizac∂q. My govorim duhovnaq
kulπtura, no ne govorimƒ duhovnaq civilizac∂q. Civilizac∂q
oznaçaetƒ bolπßu√ stepenπ obƒektivac∂i i soc∂alizac∂i,
kulπtura we bol∫e svqzana sƒ liçnostπ√ i duhomƒ. (103-04)

[By civilization must be meant a process which is more social and
collective, by culture, a process which is more individual and one
which goes deeper. We say, for instance, that such and such
person is a man of the highest culture, but we cannot say that such
and such a person is a man of very high civilization. We speak of
spiritual culture, but we do not speak of spiritual civilization.
Civilization indicates a higher degree of objectivization and
socialization, whereas culture is more closely linked with
personality and spirit.]59
It follows from the above that culture presupposes more free creativity on the
part of a creator.
Kulπtura oznaçaetƒ obrabotku mater∂ala aktomƒ duha, pob∫dy
formy nadƒ materiej. Ona bolee svqzana sƒ tvorçeskimƒ
aktomƒ çelov∫ka. (104)

[Culture indicates the fashioning of material by the action of spirit,
the victory of form over matter. It is more closely connected with
the creative act of man, although the difference here is relative, as
are all differences which arise from classification.]60
In contrast to the smooth Grecian “spectre” of the drowned man, to the
elegant shapes of the shell and the stone of the Arab-Quixote, to the
civilization of Cambridge, with the average bands of gowned students, and
with the like “fruits” of this “modern system” of education (V, 293-364),
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Wordsworth offers a story of a creative child, reared by Nature: the boy of
Winander. This boy is also mimicking what he sees and hears, but there is an
element of wildness, of imaginative freedom to his education, which
Wordsworth prizes highly. Berdyaev’s personalistic philosophy will help to
understand the Winander spot of time, because it articulates the connection
between the creativeness and the creator’s being untamed by the
objectivizing society.
Suµestvu√t gen∂alπnye tvorcy kulπtury. No kulπturnaq sreda,
kulπturnaq tradic∂q, kulπturnaq atmosfera takwe osnovana na
podrawatelπnosti, kakƒ i civilizac∂q. Oçenπ kulπturnyj
çelov∫kπ izv∫stnago stilq obyçno vyskazyvaetƒ obo vsemƒ
mn∫n∂q podrawatelπnyq, sredn∂q, gruppovyq, hotq by xta
podrawatelπnostπ slowilasπ vƒ kulπturnoj xlit∫, vƒ oçenπ
podobrannoj grupp∫. Kulπturnyj stilπ vsegda zakl√çaetƒ vƒ
seb∫ podrawatelπnostπ, usvoen∂e tradic∂i, onƒ mowetƒ bytπ
soc∂alπno originalπnymƒ vƒ svoemƒ poqvlen∂i, no onƒ
individualπno ne originalenƒ. Gen∂j nikogda ne mogƒ vpoln∫
vm∫stitπsq vƒ kulπturu i kulπtura vsegda stremilasπ
prevratitπ gen∂q izƒ dikago wivotnago vƒ wivotnoe domaßnee.
Soc∂alizac∂i podlewitƒ ne tolπko varvarƒ, no i tvorçesk∂j
gen∂j. Tvorçesk∂j aktƒ, vƒ kotoromƒ estπ dikostπ i varvarstvo,
obƒektiviruetsq i prevraµaetsq vƒ kulπturu. (104)

[There are creative geniuses of culture; but the cultured milieu,
cultured tradition and cultured atmosphere are based also upon
imitation, just as civilization is too. The highly cultured man of a
certain style usually expresses imitative opinions upon every
subject: they are average opinions, they belong to a group, though
it may well be that this imitativeness belongs to a cultured élite
and to a highly select group. A cultured style always includes
imitativeness, and assimilation to tradition. It may be that socially it
is original in appearance, but individually it is not original. Genius
has never been completely able to find a place for itself <himself>
in culture, and culture has always striven to turn genius from a
wild animal into a domestic animal. It is not only the barbarian
who is subject to socialization; the creative genius is also. The
creative act, into which there enters an element of savagery and
barbarism, is objectivized and changed into culture.]61
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The boy of Winander is one such creative genius. His classroom,
fortunately for him, is not a museum-like room, but the hills, lake, forest; his
teachers are real owls, whom the boy catechizes; his freedom (V, 520) is that of
imagination; the pealing is of the “responsive calls” rather than of
Cambridge’s organ (III, 57). Like the “Minstrel” Robert Greenwood, who
made his tuneful music in the boat-racing days on Windermere, the boy of
Winander plays with melodious sounds. Only now, Wordsworth does describe
his human shape, making it visible:
many a time
At evening, when the earliest stars began
To move along the edges of the hills,
Rising or setting, would he stand alone
Beneath the trees or by the glimmering lake,
And there, with fingers interwoven, both hands
Pressed closely palm to palm, and to his mouth
Uplifted, he, as through an instrument,
Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls,
That they might answer him; and they would shout
Across the watery vale, and shout again,
Responsive to his call, with quivering peals,
And long halloos and screams, and echoes loud,
Redoubled and redoubled, concourse wild
Of jocund din; and, when a lengthened pause
Of silence came and baffled his best skill,
Then sometimes, in that silence while he hung
Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise
Has carried far into his heart the voice
Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
Would enter unawares into his mind,
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, received
Into the bosom of the steady lake.
This Boy was taken from his mates, and died
In childhood, ere he was full twelve years old.
Fair is the spot, most beautiful the vale
Where he was born; the grassy churchyard hangs
Upon a slope above the village school,
And through that churchyard when my way has led
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On summer evenings, I believe that there
A long half hour together I have stood
Mute, looking at the grave in which he lies!62
The boy of Winander is a master of communication. And he needs no
additional artificial tools to facilitate his rapport with the world: no flute, no
Claude Lorrain glass, no surplice. He is a natural. But he is closer to the
“Pagan suckled in a creed outworn” and to the “old Triton” blowing “his
wreathed horn” of the famous Wordsworthian sonnet than to the cross-like
shepherd of The Prelude. This boy communicates primarily with natural
creatures, and when he is “taken from his mates,” one wonders whether those
mates are owls rather than human boys and girls. For the human Wordsworth,
anyway, this boy is inaccessible: between them there is a threshold of a grave;
and for now, this threshold is uncrossable. The poet is urged to seek freedom
elsewhere.
In search of the truth, Wordsworth, very predictably, has a fling with
mathematics. He does not go into deep analysis of his choice, except saying
that he was charmed by the “clear synthesis” that mathematics deals with.
Berdyaev, again, without any connection to Wordsworth, keeps relating his
own experience, which turns out to be very similar.
Paradoksƒ vƒ tomƒ, çto naibol∫e obµeobqzatelπnyj harakterƒ
im∫etƒ poznan∂e vƒ naukahƒ matematiçeskihƒ i fiziçeskihƒ.
Tutƒ poznan∂e men∫e zavisitƒ otƒ duhovnago sostoqn∂q i
duhovnoj obµnosti l√dej, ono im∫etƒ odinakovye rezulπtaty
dlq l√dej raznyhƒ relig∂oznyhƒ v∫rovan∂j, raznyhƒ
nac∂onalπnostej i raznyhƒ klassovƒ. Naoborotƒ poznan∂e vƒ
naukahƒ istoriçeskihƒ i soc∂alπnyhƒ i vƒ naukahƒ o duh∫ i o
c∫nnostqhƒ,
t.-e.
vƒ
filosof∂i,
nositƒ
men∫e
obµeobqzatelπnyj harakterƒ imenno potomu, çto predpolagaetƒ
bolπßu√ duhovnu√ obµnostπ l√dej. Naimenπßej
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obµeobqzatelπnostπ√ otliça√tsq istiny relig∂oznago
haraktera, takƒ kakƒ predpolaga√tƒ maksimalπnu√ duhovnu√
obµnostπ. Vnutri relig∂oznoj obµiny xti istiny
predstavlq√tsq naibol∫e obµeobqzatelπnymi, naibol∫e «obƒektivnymi», naibol∫e «subƒektivnymi». Vse xto svid∫telπstvuetƒ
o tomƒ, çto avtonom∂q sfery poznan∂q otnositelπna, çto ono
ne mowetƒ bytπ otd∫leno otƒ c∫lostnago suµestva çelov∫ka,
otƒ ego duhovnoj wizni, t.-e. otƒ çelov∫ka integralπnago.
Poznan∂e zavisitƒ otƒ togo, kakovƒ çelov∫kƒ i kakovo
otnoßen∂e çelov∫ka kƒ çelov∫ku. (98)

[The paradox lies in the fact that the universally binding character
of cognition is to be found in its highest degree in mathematics
and the physical sciences. Here cognition depends less upon
spiritual conditions and the spiritual community which people
share. It produces the same results for men of different religious
beliefs, different nationalities and different classes. On the other
hand, knowledge in the historical and social sciences and in
sciences of the spirit and of values, that is to say in philosophy, has
a lower degree of universally binding character just because it
presupposes a greater spiritual community in which people share.
Least of all universally binding are truths of a religious character,
because they presuppose the maximum of spiritual community.
Within the religious body these truths are accepted as the most
universally binding, but outside it they appear as the least
universally binding, as the least ‘objective’ and the most
‘subjective.’
All this is evidence of the fact that the autonomy of the sphere of
knowledge is relative and that it cannot be separated from the
whole being of man, from his spiritual life, that is to say from the
integral man. Cognition and the acquisition of knowledge depend
upon this: what is man like and what sort of relations exist
between man and man.]63
The mathematical castaway, who is also a lonely creator, when
shipwrecked — of whom Wordsworth sings in VI — prefers the company of
his treatise on Geometry to the “fellow-sufferers.” He would not,
Although of food and clothing destitute,
And beyond common wretchedness depressed,
To part from company and take this book
(Then first a self-taught pupil in its truths)
To spots remote, and draw his diagrams
With a long staff upon the sand, and thus
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Did oft beguile his sorrow, and almost
Forget his feeling: so (if like effect
From the same cause produced, ’mid outward things
So different, may rightly be compared),
So was it then with me, and so will be
With Poets ever. Mighty is the charm
Of those abstractions to a mind beset
With images, and haunted by herself,
And specially delightful unto me
Was that clear synthesis built up aloft
So gracefully; even then when it appeared
Not more than a mere plaything, or a toy
To sense embodied: not the thing it is
In verity, an independent world,
Created out of pure intelligence.64
The way Wordsworth paints the castaway’s figure is very abstracted as well:
he specifies no name or locale in his description. His overall description is
neither the man’s face nor his posture or silhouette, but the geometrical
diagrams drawn on the sand by the man’s staff.
Like the mathematical castaway, who makes a choice between his
fellow-sufferers (with whom he does not have much intellectual interest in
common anyway) and his vocation, Wordsworth also makes his choice of
profession, which lies not within Cambridge’s walls.
[M]any books
were skimmed, devoured, or studiously perused,
But with no settled plan. I was detached
Internally from academic cares;
Yet independent study seemed a course
Of hardy disobedience toward friends
And kindred, proud rebellion and unkind.
This spurious virtue, rather let it bear
A name it more deserves, this cowardice,
Gave treacherous sanction to that over-love
Of freedom which encouraged me to turn
As from restraints and bonds.65
As a result,
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These were the days
Which also first emboldened me to trust
With firmness, hitherto but lightly touched
By such a daring thought, that I might leave
Some monument behind me which pure hearts
Should reverence. The instinctive humbleness,
Maintained even by the very name and thought
Of printed books and authorship, began
To melt away; and further, the dread awe
Of mighty names was softened down and seemed
Approachable, admitting fellowship
Of modest sympathy. Such aspect now,
Though not familiarly, my mind put on,
Content to observe, to admire, and to enjoy.66
This is the first act of freedom in the whole Prelude, when Wordsworth reveals
his unique, fledgling personality. He separates his interests – in a very gestaltic
way – from the background of his environment with its determinism of
dominating opinion. Wordsworth makes truly his own, definite decision.
Likewise, Berdyaev classifies making a choice and recognizing a vocation as
“freedom” rather than a “lure”:
Silπnaq liçnostπ estπ vyrawennyj harakterƒ. Harakterƒ estπ
pob∫da duhovnago naçala vƒ çelov∫k∫, no pob∫da vƒ konkretnoindividualπnoj form∫, svqzannoj sƒ dußevno-t∫lesnymƒ sostavomƒ çelov∫ka. Harakterƒ estπ ovlad∫n∂e soboj, pob∫da nadƒ
rabstvomƒ samomu seb∫, kotoraq d∫laetƒ vozmownymƒ i pob∫du
nadƒ rabstvomƒ okruwa√µemu m∂ru. Harakterƒ obnaruwivaetsq
prewde vsego vƒ otnoßen∂i kƒ okruwa√µej sred∫. Temperamentƒ estπ prirodnaq dannostπ, harakterƒ estπ zavoevan∂e i
dostiwen∂e, onƒ predpolagaetƒ svobodu.... Harakterƒ liçnosti,
kotoryj vsegda oznaçaetƒ nezavisimostπ, estπ eq sosredotoçennostπ i eq obr∫tennaq forma svobody. Liçnostπ, harakterƒ
liçnosti oznaçaetƒ, çto çelov∫kƒ sd∫lalƒ vyborƒ, soverßil
razliçen∂e, çto onƒ ne bezrazliçenƒ, ne sm∫ßivaetƒ. (41-42)

[A strong personality is an expressed character. Character is the
victory of the spiritual principle in man, but victory in a concretely
individual form, which is bound up with the soul-body
constitution of man. Character is the possession of power over
oneself, it is the victory over slavery to oneself, a triumph which
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makes possible victory over slavery to the surrounding world also.
Character is revealed above all in relation to environment.
Temperament is a natural gift; character is conquest and
attainment; it presupposes freedom. . . . The character of
personality, which always denotes independence, is its
concentration and its freedom which has already found some
expression. Personality, the character of personality, indicates that
a man has made a choice, that he has established differences, that
he is not indifferent, and that he makes distinctions.]67
And further on:
Liçnostπ svqzana sƒ soznan∂emƒ prizvan∂q. Kawdyj çelov∫kƒ
dolwenƒ soznatπ xto prizvan∂e, nezavisimo otƒ razm∫ra
darovan∂j. Xto estπ prizvan∂e vƒ individualπno nepovtorimoj
form∫ datπ otv∫tƒ na Bow∂j prizyvƒ i tvorçeski
ispolπzovatπ svoi dary. Soznavßaq sebq liçnostπ slußaetƒ
vnutrenn∂j golosƒ i povinuetsq lißπ emu, ona ne pokorstvuetƒ
vn∫ßnimƒ golosam. (42)

[Personality is bound up with the consciousness of vocation.
Every man ought to be conscious of that vocation, which is
independent of the extent of his gifts. It is a vocation in an
individually unrepeatable form to give an answer to the call of
God and to put one’s gifts to creative use. Personality which is
conscious of itself listens to the inward voice and obeys that only.
It is not submissive to outward voices.]68
In this way Wordsworth prepares for his Alpine experience. He scales the
mountains as a free man learning to speak to men in their own language again.
He becomes a communicator surpassing the boy of Winander: he mimics more
than the invisible owls’ hootings: he mimics the peasant’s speech acts, that
also bring a “shock of mild surprise” and allow the imagination to soar.
Interaction between the real human beings and the poet is initiated. By
approaching man, the poet comes to learn that it is possible to get access to
transcendent vision. He also comes to learn that the human form itself can be
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perceived as sublime — a realization which, eventually, leads to the spiry rock
vision of the real-life Lake District shepherd.
Enough of humble arguments; recal,
My Song! those high emotions which thy voice
Has heretofore made known; that bursting forth
Of sympathy, inspiring and inspired,
When everywhere a vital pulse was felt,
And all the several frames of things, like stars,
Through every magnitude distinguishable,
Shone mutually indebted, or half lost
Each in the other’s blaze, a galaxy
Of life and glory. In the midst stood Man,
Outwardly, inwardly contemplated,
As, of all visible natures, crown, though born
Of dust, and kindred to the worm, a Being,
Both in perception and discernment, first
In every capability of rapture,
Through the divine effect of power and love;
As, more than anything we know, instinct
With godhead, and, by reason and by will,
Acknowledging dependency sublime.
Ere long, the lonely mountains left, I moved,
Begirt, from day to day, with temporal shapes
Of vice and folly thrust upon my view,
Objects of sport, and ridicule, and scorn,
Manners and characters discriminate,
And little bustling passions that eclipsed,
As well they might, the impersonated thought,
The idea, or abstraction of the kind.69
With the above, the first movement of The Prelude rounds off. The poet has
come a long way from the wilfulness and bodily freedom of his first chapters of
life to the spiritual vision of the sublimity of any human being in his or her
gestaltic form, which points to infinity. The inner richness of all human beings,
with whom the poet comes into contact by now, has made him appreciate and
admire man in general. That man should be free in his noble aspirations is the
logical conclusion the poet comes to. And since some unfair social regimes
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deprive men of the most essential humanness, they should be reformed, if not
peacefully, then by force: liberté, fraternité, egalité!
Berdyaev, who lived through another just but bloody revolution, and
who used to entertain exactly the same ideas about general justice and socially
determined freedom, who also experienced first-hand the effects of such a fair
revolution, writes years later:
No takƒ slowna çelov∫çeskaq priroda i takƒ zaputano ego
suµestvovan∂e, çto izƒ odnogo rabstva onƒ mowetƒ vpastπ vƒ
drugoe,
vpastπ
vƒ
abstraktnu√
duhovnostπ,
vƒ
determiniru√µu√ vlastπ obµej idei....
Osnovnoj voprosƒ realizac∂i liçnosti ne estπ voprosƒ o
pob∫d∫ nadƒ determinac∂ej mater∂i. Takova lißπ odna storona.
Osnovnoj voprosƒ estπ voprosƒ o c∫lostnoj pob∫d∫ nadƒ
rabstvomƒ.... Duhovnaq pob∫da estπ ne tolπko pob∫da nadƒ
xlementarnoj zavisimostπ√ çelov∫ka otƒ mater∂i. Eµe bol∫e
trudna pob∫da nadƒ obmannymi ill√z∂qmi, vverga√µimi
çelov∫ka vƒ rabstvo, naimen∫e soznavaemoe. (206)

[But so complex is human nature and so entangled man’s
existence, that he may fall out of one form of slavery into another,
he may fall into abstract spirituality, into the determining power of
a common idea. . . .
The fundamental question of the realization of personality is not a
question of victory over the determinism of matter, that is one side
of the subject only. The fundamental question is the question of
an entire victory over slavery. . . . The spiritual victory is not only
victory over the elementary dependence of man upon matter. Still
more difficult is the victory over deceptive illusions which
precipitate man into slavery in its least recognizable form.]70
How abstract were the young Wordsworth’s notions of justice and
liberté? The poet does not conceal his sincere but over-generalized attitude:
“My heart was all given to people,” says he (IX, 124). He praises “The
faculties of men” in general (240). And he sounds baffled when, for some
reason, he is at risk of appearing to be unfeeling. Why in the world, he seems to
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wonder, even when he physically touches the ruins of the Bastille and pockets
one of those stones (much as in childhood he was eager to make off with a
boat), is the emotion missing?
Where silent zephyrs sported with the dust
Of the Bastile, I sate in the open sun,
And from the rubbish gathered up a stone,
And pocketed the relic, in the guise
Of an enthusiast; yet, in honest truth,
I looked for something that I could not find,
Affecting more emotion than I felt.71
Emotions triggered by a concrete human being prove much more touching
than those of the general man or of the general nation. The poet, then
unawares, makes the same observation:
For ’tis most certain, that these various sights,
However potent their first shock, with me
Appeared to recompense the traveller’s pains
Less than the painted Magdalene of Le Brun,
A beauty exquisitely wrought, with hair
Dishevelled, gleaming eyes, and rueful cheek
Pale and bedropped with everflowing tears.72
The revolutionary Book IX reads as elegiac, because Wordsworth
narrates either the stories of people he knew and loved, as about Michel
Beaupuy (whose “sword was haunted by his touch / Continually, like an
uneasy place / In his own body” (IX, 159-61)) or the romances of Vaudracour
and Julia (the 1805 text only), of residents of Chambord (IX, 480-95) and
others. All of those people perished; and the “chivalrous delight” linked with
the revolutionary chapter of Wordsworth’s life is tempered. This Book does
not have any developed spots of time, either. And none of the sketches of the
human beings there, if given at all, are gestaltic. The “shapeless eagerness” (IX,
19) of the poet is literally shapeless. The materiality of the muscles’ movement
174

dominates Wordsworth’s memories once again. But now, these portraits
represent the pain and suffering of other human beings, rather than the poet’s
own movement. And now, it is against that suffering that Beaupuy intends to
fight:
And when we chanced
One day to meet a hunger-bitten girl,
Who crept along fitting her languid gait
Unto a heifer’s motion, by a cord
Tied to her arm, and picking thus from the lane
Its sustenance, while the girl with pallid hands
Was busy knitting in a heartless mood
Of solitude, and at the sight my friend
In agitation said, ‘’Tis against that
That we are fighting.’73
Objectivization here assumes yet another guise: it is not now, as before, the
separateness of the spoil from the jealous boy, who wants to steal it. The
separateness now, more than ever, is that of a means from the end, of the
present from the future. In the future, the revolutionaries were hoping for the
“better days / To all mankind” (531-32).
Revol√c∂i presl∫du√tƒ velik∂q c∫li osvobowden∂q çelov∫ka
otƒ ugneten∂q i poraboµen∂q. T∫, kotorye gotovili revol√c∂√,
byli geroiçeskimi l√dπmi, sposobnymi na wertvy i otdaçu
svoej wizni ide∫. No vƒ xpohu svoego torwestva revol√c∂i
istreblq√tƒ svobodu bezƒ ostatka, dopuska√tƒ ee gorazdo
menπße, ç∫mƒ xpohi dorevol√c∂onnyq, i d∫qteli revol√c∂i
stavß∂e u vlasti, byva√tƒ svir∫pymi, westokimi i
zapqtnyva√tƒ sebq çelov∫çeskoj krovπ√. Odinƒ i totƒ we
revol√c∂onerƒ do revol√c∂i i vƒ razgarƒ revol√c∂i —
soverßenno raznye l√di, dawe lico m∫nqetsq, nelπzq uznatπ
lica... Rokovaq oßibka d∫qtelej revol√c∂i svqzana sƒ
otnoßen∂emƒ kƒ vremeni. Nastoqµee razsmatrivaetsq
iskl√çitelπno, kakƒ sredtvo, buduµee we kakƒ c∫lπ. Poxtomu
dlq nastoqµago utverwdaetsq nasil∂e i poraboµen∂e, westokostπ
i ub∂jstvo, dlq buduµago we svoboda i çelov∫çnostπ, dlq
nastoqµago koßmarnaq wiznπ, dlq buduµago rajskaq wiznπ. No
velikaq tajna skryta vƒ tomƒ, çto sredstvo vawn∫e c∫li.
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Imenno sredstva, putπ svid∫telπstvu√tƒ o duh∫, kotorymƒ
proniknuty l√di. Po çistot∫ sredstv, po çistot∫ putej
uznaete, kakogo l√di duha. (162)

[Revolutions pursue the great end of liberating man from
oppression and slavery. The men who have prepared the way for
revolution have been heroic people, who were capable of sacrifice
and of giving their lives for an idea. But at the period of their
triumph revolutions entirely obliterate every trace of freedom.
They tolerate it to a much smaller extent than the period which
preceded the revolution, and the makers of the revolution when
they have power in their hands become ferocious and cruel, and
stain themselves with human blood. One and the same
revolutionary is an entirely different man before the revolution
and in the flaming outburst of it. He is two quite distinct persons.
Even his face is altered. You cannot recognize his face. The horror
which is associated with revolution certainly does not belong to
the ends which it usually pursues; these ends are commonly
freedom, justice, equality, brotherhood, and the like exalted values.
The horror is associated with the means it employs. Revolution
seeks triumph at all costs and whatever may happen. Triumph is
achieved by force. This force inevitably turns into violence. There
is a fateful mistake of the makers of revolution which is connected
with their relation to time. The present is regarded exclusively as a
means, the future as an end, and on this account violence and
enslavement, cruelty and murder are affirmed for the present, but
for the future, freedom and humanity. For the present, life is a
nightmare, in the future, life is paradise.
But there is a great mystery concealed in the fact that the means
are more important than the end. It is precisely the means they
employ, the way they take, which bear witness to the spirit by
which people are imbued.]74
The London of Book VII is nothing by comparison with the hellish Great
Terror of Book X. The “Oh, happy time of youthful lovers”! (553) of Book IX
ends up being “an imbecile mind” (IX, 585). Fear and objectivization rule the
day. The only human shapes caught by the eye are the heaps — not simply of
garments this time — but of dead bodies. The word “liberty” no longer makes
sense:
Amid the depth
Of those enormities, even thinking minds
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Forgot, at seasons, whence they had their being;
Forgot that such a sound was ever heard
As Liberty upon earth: yet all beneath
Her innocent authority was wrought,
Nor could have been, without her blessed name.
The illustrious wife of Roland, in the hour
Of her composure, felt that agony,
And gave it vent in her last words. O Friend!
It was a lamentable time for man,
Whether a hope had e’er been his or not;
A woful time for them whose hopes survived
The shock; most woful for those few who still
Were flattered, and had trust in human kind:
They had the deepest feeling of the grief.75
Only in Book XII does the poet refuse to fragment happiness and
liberty into a means to an end. He looks at his wife, Mary, and learns from her
to appreciate and better the here and now: “She welcomed what was given,
and craved no more” (XII, 158), admiringly says the poet. Following her
example, the poet approaches the topic of the spots of time, those refreshing,
renovating moments that mitigate suffering and lead towards the sublime, and
then to transcendent. One such spot was occasioned by his father’s death at
Christmas. However grievous the event, the poet manages to find peace and
quiet when meditating on it:
Yet in the deepest passion, I bowed low
To God, Who thus corrected my desires;
And, afterwards, the wind and sleety rain,
And all the business of the elements,
The single sheep, and the one blasted tree,
And the bleak music of that old stone wall,
The noise of wood and water, and the mist
That on the line of each of those two roads
Advanced in such indisputable shapes;
All these were kindred spectacles and sounds
To which I oft repaired, and thence would drink,
As at a fountain.76
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“Perfect love,” that the poet manages to achieve here, “casteth out
fear.” With the same attentive, or “worthy” eye, the poet looks at the human
being again and values him not in an abstract general way. A concrete man
who is nearer ourselves now outweighs “that idol proudly named / ‘The
Wealth of Nations’” by Adam Smith and other theories (76-78, XIII). Now
Wordsworth gains
A more judicious knowledge of the worth
And dignity of individual man,
No composition of the brain, but man
Of whom we read, the man whom we behold
With our own eyes.77
Likewise, the poet now repudiates the general and refuses to “level down the
truth / To certain general notions” (XIII, 212-13), be it a universal book in a
form of the shell, which stands for all poetry, but speaks no concrete familiar
language, or be it a perfect cross-like human form, which has no concrete dear
face. As Berdyaev, Wordsworth starts differentiating between the general and
the concrete, siding with the latter.
Otnoßen∂e liçnosti kƒ universalπnomu sovs∫mƒ ne estπ
otnoßen∂e kƒ rodovomu, obµemu. Tutƒ my podhodimƒ kƒ samoj
trudnoj problem∫ personalistiçeskoj filosof∂i i trudnostπ
tutƒ svqzana sƒ navykami mysli, porowdennymi lownoj
postanovkoj problemy nominalizma i realizma. Kakovo
otnoßen∂e liçnosti kƒ obµnostqmƒ i kƒ obƒektnomu m∂ru?
V∫rno, çto universalia nahodqtsq ne ante rem (platonovsk∂j
realizmƒ, onƒ we idealizmƒ) i ne post rem (xmpiriçesk∂j
nominalizmƒ), a in rebus. Dlq interesu√µej nasƒ problemy xto
znaçitƒ, çto universalπnoe nahoditsq vƒ individualπnomƒ, t.-e.
vƒ liçnosti, ne kakƒ proizvodnoe otƒ koliçestvennago opyta, a
kakƒ iznaçalπnoe kaçestvo.[...] Universalπnoe ne estπ obµee,
universalπnoe ne abstraktnoe, a konkretnoe, t.-e. estπ polnota.
Universalπnoe i t∫mƒ men∫e obµee ne estπ samostoqtelπnoe
suµestvo, ono nahoditsq vƒ ediniçnyhƒ suµestvahƒ, in rebus po
staroj terminolog∂i. Individualπnoe sovs∫mƒ ne estπ çastπ
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universalπnago.[...] Universalπnoe, voploµennoe vƒ individualπnomƒ, preodol∫vaetƒ protivopolownostπ mewdu universalπnymƒ i individualπnymƒ. Universalπnoe estπ opytƒ vƒ
subƒekt∫, a ne realπnostπ vƒ obƒekt∫. (33-34)

[The relation of personality to the universal is certainly not a
relation to the species and the common. Here we approach the
most difficult problem of personalist philosophy, and the difficulty
is connected with habits of thought which arise from a false way
of stating the problem of nominalism and realism. What is the
relation of personality to communities and to the world of objects?
It is true that universalia are not ante rem (platonic realism, which
is the same as idealism) and not post rem (empirical nominalism)
but in rebus. For the problem which concerns us now this means
that the universal is to be found in what is individual, I.e. In
personality, not as derived from quantitative experience, but as a
primary quality. . . . The universal is not the common <the
general>; it is not abstract, but concrete, I.e. It is plentitude
<wholeness, fullness>. The universal is all the less common in that
it is not independent being, it is to be found in single beings, in
rebus, according to the old terminology. The individual is by no
means a part of the universal. . . . The universal, embodied in the
individual, overcomes the antithesis between the universal and the
individual. The universal is an essay, an attempt, <experience> on
the part of the subject, not a reality in the object.]78
Interestingly, having chosen the concrete over the general, an existentialist
does not need to repudiate the universal. That is, by recognizing the distant
cross-like shepherd as an abstraction and too general a vision, the poet still
can see the cross-like human gestalt in people who are close to him; he can
recognize the universal in the concrete and singular.
Ostaetsq logiçeskoe protivopolowen∂e obµago i ediniçnago,
universalπnago i individualπnago. No xto protivopolowen∂e
estπ porowden∂e obƒektiviru√µej mysli. Vnutri suµestvovan∂q
ediniçnoe, individualπnoe universalπno, konkretno-universalπno
i nikakogo universalπnago, kakƒ obµago, ne suµestvuetƒ.
«Loßadi voobµe» i «çelov∫ka voobµe» ne suµestvuetƒ i n∫tƒ
edinstva vs∫hƒ otd∫lπnyhƒ loßadej i l√dej, kakƒ «obµago»,
no vƒ otd∫lπnoj loßadi i vƒ otd∫lπnomƒ çelov∫k∫
suµestvuetƒ universalπnostπ (ne obµnostπ) loßadinago i
çelov∫çeskago suµestvovan∂q. Edinstvo vƒ realπnosti ne
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pohodit∂ na edinstvo vƒ mysli. Universalπnostπ otd∫lπnago
çelov∫ka my postigaemƒ ne çerezƒ otvleçen∂e obµihƒ namƒ
çelov∫çeskihƒ svojstvƒ, a çerezπ pogruwen∂e vƒ ego
ediniçnostπ. (64)

[There remains the logical antithesis of the common and the
unique and particular, of the universal and the individual; but this
antithesis is brought into being by objectivizing thought. Within
existence the one, the individual, is universal, concretely universal,
and no universal as common exists. “Horse in general” and “man
in general” do not exist. There is no unity of all separate horses
and men as “common.” But in the separate horse and in the
separate man exists the universality (not the commonness) of
equine and human existence. Unity in reality does not resemble
unity in thought. We arrive at the universality of a separate man
not by abstracting the properties common to us human beings but
by submersion in his oneness <by getting through to his
uniqueness, singularity>.]79
This Berdyaev’s explanation of the universal as the concrete, sheds light on
what Wordsworth flashes out in his poem. The pastoral prettiness of young
lasses, the elegiac dignity of the drowned figure give way to the shepherds,
abstract and universal in their remoteness. And when, during the Great Terror,
the general and abstract human figures become lost in the formless void of
general masses and among the heaps of dead bodies, the poet comes to
embrace the value of the human concreteness. “Uncouthness” does not
frighten Wordsworth from that point on. The reserve he felt with the
discharged soldier vanishes; the poet freely talks to the poor and vagrant
people on the road and learns their unique stories:
Awed have I been by strolling Bedlamites;
From many other uncouth vagrants (passed
In fear) have walked with quicker step; but why
Take note of this? When I began to enquire,
To watch and question those I met, and speak
Without reserve to them, the lonely roads
Were open schools in which I daily read
With most delight the passions of mankind,
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Whether by words, looks, sighs, or tears, revealed;
There saw into the depth of human souls,
Souls that appear to have no depth at all
To careless eyes.80
At the same time, Wordsworth continues, he does not justify oppression. The
social aspect of slavery should be dealt with, as well:
True is it, where oppression worse than death
Salutes the being at his birth, where grace
Of culture hath been utterly unknown,
And poverty and labour in excess
From day to day pre-occupy the ground
Of the affections, and to Nature’s self
Oppose a deeper nature; there, indeed,
Love cannot be; nor does it thrive with ease
Among the close and overcrowded haunts
Of cities, where the human heart is sick,
And the eye feeds it not, and cannot feed.81
Berdyaev would have agreed with such a perspective:
Raby dolwny bytπ osvobowdeny putemƒ soc∂alπnago akta, no
oni vnutri mogutƒ ostatπsq rabami, pob∫da nadƒ rabstvomƒ
estπ duhovnyj aktƒ. Socialπnoe i duhovnoe osvobowden∂e
dolwno bylo by idti ruka obƒ ruku. (95)

[Slaves ought to be set free by social action, but even so they
might still remain slaves inwardly. The victory over slavery is a
spiritual act. Social and spiritual liberation ought to go hand in
hand.]82
Having shifted from the general to the individual, the poet promises
another vision “of a new world — a world, too, that was fit / To be transmitted,
and to other eyes / Made visible” (XIII, 370-72), that is visible not to the
bodily eye, and which is the vision on Mount Snowdon in the closing Book
XIV of The Prelude.
In the second movement of The Prelude, Wordsworth transcends the
determinism of powerful ideas, the abstractions which do not allow him to see
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a concrete human being behind the general slogans. The concrete hungry girl
with a heifer whom the poet meets in France should not be helped exclusively
in the happy future: she may not survive the revolution itself. She should be
helped right away, and she should also grow spiritually to become a free
person. The poet starts seeing liberty not as the end, but as a process of
growth. Otherwise, it is terror and unstoppable violent dismembering that hold
sway; the heroes would transform into villains, as it happened with
Robespierre. When the poet realizes that freedom is a matter of spirit, he starts
paying more attention to the individual humans. Again, he is capable of seeing
their sublime form. Those people are not necessarily before his bodily eye; they
can be long passed away; still, Wordsworth is capable of recognizing their
individual value, and he can conjure up their individual sublime forms. Sheer
transgression in social matters is as unfortunate as stealing. In the end, it is the
transcendent communion with concrete individual human beings, as with
nature, that liberates both man and society. And the poet turns to Book XIV to
dwell on this discovery.
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CHAPTER 5: WORDSWORTH’S TRANS-FIGURATION ON
MOUNT SNOWDON AND “GENUINE LIBERTY”: CONCLUSION
In criticism concerned with Wordsworth’s interest in Nature and
landscape, the Snowdon vision is traditionally compared to the Simplon Pass
passage or to the poet’s Godlike hour, when he recognizes his vocation to be
a “dedicated spirit.” Thus, for Geoffrey Hartman, when he investigates how, in
Wordsworth, Nature leads beyond itself, the comparison is with the Alpine
Crossing, with the result that both spots of time present “a culminating
evidence that imagination and the light of nature are one.” In effect, Hartman
advocates “the certainty that there is an imagination in nature analogous to
that in man.” 1 For M. H. Abrams, who is more concerned with Wordsworth’s
“crisis of identity,” when reading The Prelude as “a poem which incorporates
the discovery of its own ars poetica,” the comparison is with the poet’s
Godlike hour of Book VI, when the young poet recognizes his vocation to be
a “dedicated spirit.” As for the Snowdon vision, Abrams continues, “What has
been revealed to Wordsworth in this symbolic landscape is the grand locus of
The Recluse which he announced in the Prospectus.” 2 This last spot of time in
The Prelude is so all-embracing and resolves so many issues brought up in the
poem, that it is amenable to a variety of comparisons, depending on the critic’s
perspective.3
From my perspective, in which I trace the sublimation of the human
form, the ascent of Snowdon epitomizes the vision of the spiry-rock shepherd.
The reader, conditioned by Wordsworth through repetition of patterns, in
which the human form becomes more shapely defined with almost each spot of
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time, can recognize in the figure of the poet the same striding, sun-contoured,
and “stationed above all height” human forms Wordsworth himself once
discerned in the shepherds.
It was a close, warm, breezeless summer night,
Wan, dull, and glaring, with a dripping fog
Low-hung and thick that covered all the sky;
But, undiscouraged, we began to climb
The mountain-side. The mist soon girt us round,
And, after ordinary travellers’ talk
With our conductor, pensively we sank
Each into commerce with his private thoughts:
Thus did we breast the ascent, and by myself
Was nothing either seen or heard that checked
Those musings or diverted, save that once
The shepherd’s lurcher, who, among the crags,
Had to his joy unearthed a hedgehog, teased
His coiled-up prey with barkings turbulent.
This small adventure, for even such it seemed
In that wild place and at the dead of night,
Being over and forgotten, on we wound
In silence as before. With forehead bent
Earthward, as if in opposition set
Against an enemy, I panted up
With eager pace, and no less eager thoughts.
Thus might we wear a midnight hour away,
Ascending at loose distance each from each,
And I as chanced, the foremost of the band;
When at my feet the ground appeared to brighten,
And with a step or two seemed brighter still;
Nor was time given to ask or learn the cause,
For instantly a light upon the turf
Fell like a flash, and lo! as I looked up,
The Moon hung naked in a firmament
Of azure without cloud, and at my feet
Rested a silent sea of hoary mist.4
Here, the giant shepherd, striding through the fog, with his sheep like
“Greenland bears,” is writ large from the inner perspective. If not the sheep,
another companion quadruped, the shepherd’s lurcher, teasingly lurks in and
whirls out from the white thickness of a mist. Meanwhile, the men keep
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stalking up a mountain, surrounded by silence and sunk into their own hidden
thoughts, as if into a fog itself. It is a measured and directed movement of the
striding poet that singles him out from the mysterious background. The two
other human figures, the guiding shepherd and Robert Jones, labor up in the
same manner, and the poet makes the vision of the whole group sneak on the
reader’s eyes.
Suddenly, in symmetry with the sun-drenched shepherd whose form
flashed upon the poet’s eye in Book VIII, Wordsworth separates himself from
the foggy group, revealing himself as “the foremost of the band” and
brightened by the flashing light (34-39). Even syntactically, the poet positions
himself between the reader and the source of light, which, at a glance, turns out
to be the moon: “and lo! as I looked up, / The Moon hung naked in a
firmament.” First, in his address to the reader, he names himself, and only then,
the moon. The poet is also poised between the moon, hanging above in the
cloudless sky, and the obscurity of the hoary mist, curling below, “at his feet.”
Thus, a moon-contoured Wordsworth is stationed on top of the world, as the
cross-like shepherd once was. The poet does not explicitly compare himself
with the “aerial cross,” but if the repeated pattern is to be completed, readers
may take this comparison to its logical conclusion by creatively reexperiencing the previous spots of time in their minds. Then the poet’s transfiguration, out of the “uncouth” fog-hidden form into the sublime index of
delight, can be fulfilled.
As we see, up to this point, the rhythm and the pattern of the human
sketches repeat that of the mounting shepherds in Book VIII. The difference is
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that the human forms we perceive in the Snowdon passage are not abstract:
they are definitely not portraits of unknown generic shepherds. Despite their
universality, they do not look like abstracted types, because they are being
discerned in the figure of a very real and known person, Wordsworth himself.
The concreteness of and close familiarity with the human beings of
Book XIV is reinforced by Wordsworth from the very beginning of this Book.
The shepherd, who is to be the “trusty guide” during the ascent of Snowdon,
sounds like a friend or a good reliable acquaintance, rather than an
unapproachable stranger. Also, unlike the Discharged Soldier or the ArabQuixote, he is not frightfully and tenaciously “uncouth:” the threshold of his
house is not uncrossable; his night rest is not imperative; the cheer of
“refreshment” is not denied.
In one of those excursions (may they ne’er
Fade from remembrance!) through the Northern tracts
Of Cambria ranging with a youthful friend,
I left Bethgelert’s huts at couching-time,
And westward took my way, to see the sun
Rise from the top of Snowdon. To the door
Of a rude cottage at the mountain’s base
We came, and roused the shepherd who attends
The adventurous stranger’s steps, a trusty guide;
Then, cheered by short refreshment, sallied forth. 5
Embarking on his literary walk with friends, Wordsworth would end it and the
whole poem with dedications and gratitude to even more concrete and familiar
friends of his who supported him in his poetic strivings: sister Dorothy, Calvert,
Coleridge. Dorothy, he says, with her quiet and mild ways, strengthened him
and motivated “to penetrate the lofty and the low” as does “one essence of
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pervading light” (271-75). She also was his inspiration on the way towards
his recognition “of more refined humanity:”
At a time
When Nature, destined to remain so long
Foremost in my affections, had fallen back
Into a second place, pleased to become
A handmaid to a nobler than herself,
When every day brought with it some new sense
Of exquisite regard for common things,
And all the earth was budding with these gifts
Of more refined humanity, thy breath,
Dear Sister! was a kind of gentler spring
That went before my steps.6
Raisley Calvert, the brother of one of Wordsworth’s school-friends,
who in 1795, dying of consumption, left William a very handsome sum of £ 900
to continue writing poetry, is also cordially remembered: “He cleared a passage
for me, and the stream / Flowed in the bent of Nature,” utters the poet
thankfully (370-71).
The poet friend Samuel Taylor Coleridge, finally, is the one to whom The
Prelude is lovingly dedicated. He is the “capacious Soul” (277), whose
“kindred influence” to Wordsworth’s “heart of hearts / Did also find its way”
(281-82). And Wordsworth exclaims:
beloved Friend!
When, looking back, thou seest, in clearer view
Than any liveliest sight of yesterday,
That summer, under whose indulgent skies,
Upon smooth Quantock’s airy ridge we roved
Unchecked, or loitered ’mid her sylvan coombs,
Thou in bewitching words, with happy heart,
Didst chaunt the vision of that Ancient Man,
The bright-eyed Mariner, and rueful woes
Didst utter the Lady Christabel;
And I, associate with such labor, steeped
In soft forgetfulness the livelong hours,
Murmuring of him who, joyous hap, was found,
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After the perils of his moonlight ride,
Near the loud waterfall; or her who sate
In misery near the miserable Thorn;
When thou dost to that summer turn thy thoughts,
And hast before thee all which then we were,
To thee, in memory of that happiness,
It will be known, by thee at least, my Friend!
Felt, that the history of a Poet’s mind
Is labor not unworthy of regard:
To thee the work shall justify itself.7
In all three of Wordsworth’s dedications, the love of humankind is that
of concrete human beings. He invites Coleridge to see “in clearer view / Than
any liveliest sight of yesterday” both themselves and their literary characters.
Wordsworth does not need to paint gestalten for Coleridge: the creative mind
can supply them all by itself, much as it was capable of bringing to life the
Ancient Mariner, Geraldine, and Christabel. Wordsworth, on the other hand,
also has graduated from the murmuring descriptions of the “uncouth” shapes
of the Idiot boy and Martha Ray, lost and camouflaged in the mystified
landscapes, to the clarified vision of the real people’s gestalten, as they appear
in the Snowdon episode.
For all their universality, the clear-cut sublime human shapes
Wordsworth evokes directly — or by association with previous passages of
The Prelude — are far from being abstract; they are concrete and particular. In
that trick of linking the universal with the particular and concrete rather than
with the general and abstract, Wordsworth again takes an “existentialist”
stand, which Berdyaev articulates in philosophical theory.8
In Book XIV, the concrete poet has a concrete visual experience. And,
unlike the shepherds of Book VIII, whose sublimity was prepared from without
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by the Natural sublime, in Book XIV the poet’s human form is made apparent
first, and it sets the sublime tone before the Natural sublime comes into view.
Only after we have envisioned the set of sketches of the climbing poet, only
after he has been gestaltically stationed on top of the world, “above all
height,” reminding us of the aerial “index” of a shepherd, a shift in camera
view occurs, and the poet tells what sublimity the cross-like shepherd might
have projected onto the world while on his spiry rock. The Snowdon vision
unfolds. Imagination usurps the vision, and other kinds of sublime “horizons”
— beside the clearly outlined form of the poet — find way into the poet’s
description. Beyond those horizons the transcendent roars. They are Nature’s
etherial vault, the full-orbed moon, and, especially, the rift in the mist.
A hundred hills their dusky backs upheaved
All over this still ocean; and beyond,
Far, far beyond, the solid vapours stretched,
In headlands, tongues, and promontory shapes,
Into the main Atlantic, that appeared
To dwindle, and give up his majesty,
Usurped upon far as the sight could reach.
Not so the ethereal vault; encroachment none
Was there, nor loss; only the inferior stars
Had disappeared, or shed a fainter light
In the clear presence of the full-orbed Moon,
Who, from her sovereign elevation, gazed
Upon the billowy ocean, as it lay
All meek and silent, save that through a rift —
Not distant from the shore whereon we stood,
A fixed, abysmal, gloomy, breathing-place —
Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams
Innumerable, roaring with one voice
Heard over earth and sea, and, in that hour,
For so it seems, felt by the starry heavens.9
Under this extreme condition, on the border of infinity (which
sometimes is linked with the terror of death; sometimes, with the sublime), man
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comes to perceive the core of his existence, his existentia. The poet is aware of
the whole vision, and at the same time, he is conscious of his own presence and
existence there, when he declares, “we stood.” The unity of subject and
object, of the perceiver and of the world around and within him, as inseparably
fused together but not defaced by each other, is existential. Reading the
passage in an existential light, I see no dominated or dominator in this
communion described by Wordsworth, unlike M. H. Abrams, who, drawing on
the Fichtean and Hegelian alienation between master and servant, reads the
Snowdon passage as continuous struggle of the mind against the outer world
for supremacy. Mind and “not-mind,” in his reading, pull in different
directions, with the result that at the moment of vision, a balance is achieved
between those separate forces. In Abrams’s reading, the separateness of the
mind from the outer things is never utterly transcended: autonomy on either
side is never sacrificed. It is that autonomy which Abrams stresses when
interpreting such phrases as “interchangeable supremacy,” and “mutual
domination” of mind and Nature. And hence, Abrams glosses, “this
sovereignty and peace, translated from the political state to the state of the
perceiving mind, is the essential human freedom.” 10 In my existential reading,
by contrast, the emphasis is on “interchangeable” rather than on
“supremacy.”
The loving unity of the poet and the world modulates back into
sublimity when the transcendent experience subsides. The poet is aware of the
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visionary threshold again, and three reflecting human shapes, of all three
fellow climbers reflect themselves upon the worthy eye:
When into air had partially dissolved
That vision, given to spirits of the night
And three chance human wanderers, in calm thought
Reflected, it appeared to me the type
Of a majestic intellect, its acts
And its possessions, what it has and craves,
What in itself it is, and would become.
There I beheld the emblem of a mind
That feeds upon infinity, that broods
Over the dark abyss, intent to hear
Its voices issuing forth to silent light
In one continuous stream; a mind sustained
By recognitions of transcendent power,
In sense conducting to ideal form,
In soul of more than mortal privilege.11
The emblem of the mind and the ideal form perceivable through senses is
absolutely not without a human element for Wordsworth. Such a poet’s
attention to the human form is made overt in his latest and much revised
version of The Prelude, for it is there that the poet adds the above passage. In
the corresponding lines of the 1805 text, the human forms are not yet evident:
A meditation rose in me that night
Upon the lonely mountain when the scene
Had passed away, and it appeared to me
The perfect image of a mighty mind,
Of one that feeds upon infinity,
That is exalted by an under-presence,
The sense of God, or whatsoe'er is dim
Or vast in its own being — above all,
One function of such mind had Nature there
Exhibited by putting forth, and that
With circumstance most awful and sublime:
That domination which she oftentimes
Exerts upon the outward face of things,
So moulds them, and endues, abstracts, combines,
Or, by abrupt and unhabitual influence
Doth make one object so impress itself
Upon all others, and pervades them so,
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That even the grossest minds must see and hear,
And cannot chuse but feel.12
Returning to 1850, we note how Wordsworth describes the “glorious
faculty / That higher minds bear with them as their own.” It is not the mind’s
dominance I see him praising, but what Berdyaev a personalist would call,
“communality that passes from within outward,” meaning that “Personality
must be God-human, whereas society must be human.” 13 This personalistic
insistence upon the creative and forming impulse of the “higher mind” that
strives for emotional unity with the world leads to Wordsworth’s recognition
of the “kindred mutations” abroad, rather than of those that should be
overpowered.
This is the very spirit in which they [higher minds] deal
With the whole compass of the universe:
They from their native selves can send abroad
Kindred mutations; for themselves create
A like existence; and, whene’er it dawns
Created for them, catch it, or are caught
By its inevitable mastery.14
And further, yet another human-like gestalt singles itself out on the principle of
common movement, angelically holding “fit converse with the spiritual
world”:
Like angels stopped upon the wing by sound
Of harmony from Heaven’s remotest spheres.
Them the enduring and the transient both
Serve to exalt; they build up greatest things
From least suggestions; ever on the watch,
Willing to work and to be wrought upon,
They need not extraordinary calls
To rouse them; in a world of life they live,
By sensible impressions not enthralled,
But by their quickening impulse made more prompt
To hold fit converse with the spiritual world,
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And with the generations of mankind
Spread over time, past, present, and to come,
Age after age, till Time shall be no more.15
“A like existence” is led by many human beings, in various epochs and
places. Historical pessimism and renunciation of fragmented time, characteristic
of both “disillusioned” romantics and of existentialists, leads to eschatology.
Chronological, historical time is transcended by the poet again. “Genuine
liberty,” in his view, becomes not the “ends” of social development or of
violent revolution, but primarily the “means,” the process of personalistic
growth itself. To know and practice such liberty is a feat and privilege, indeed.
Oh! who is he that hath his whole life long
Preserved, enlarged, this freedom in himself?
For this alone is genuine liberty:
Where is the favoured being who hath held
That course unchecked, unerring, and untired,
In one perpetual progress smooth and bright?16
In keeping with that position, the note on which The Prelude ends parallels
Berdyaev’s assertion that the “genuine” revolution aims to create not a free
society, but a free man.17 Likewise, Wordsworth’s ambition is, as he
communicates to Coleridge, to facilitate through poetry that kind of genuine
liberation by inspiring men to become inwardly beautiful, exalted, and hence,
free:
Oh! yet a few short years of useful life,
And all will be complete, thy race be run,
Thy monument of glory will be raised;
Then, though (too weak to tread the ways of truth)
This age fall back to old idolatry,
Though men return to servitude as fast
As the tide ebbs, to ignominy and shame
By nations sink together, we shall still
Find solace — knowing what we have learnt to know,
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Rich in true happiness if allowed to be
Faithful alike in forwarding a day
Of firmer trust, joint labourers in the work
(Should Providence such grace to us vouchsafe)
Of their deliverance, surely yet to come.
Prophets of Nature, we to them will speak
A lasting inspiration, sanctified
By reason, blest by faith: what we have loved,
Others will love, and we will teach them how;
Instruct them how the mind of man becomes
A thousand times more beautiful than the earth
On which he dwells, above this frame of things
(Which, ’mid all revolutions in the hopes
And fears of men, doth still remain unchanged)
In beauty exalted, as it is itself
Of quality and fabric more divine.18
Revolutions, which are merely social, which do not have on their immediate
agenda — right as they go — spiritual blossoming of as many individual
human beings as possible, bring only “hopes and fears:” hopes — for the
never-to-come happy future; fears — for the never-to-end horrible present.
Personalistically, freedom should emanate from within. Existentially, under
extreme conditions, every personality recognizes him- / herself as existence
(the central concept of existentialism) rather than “punctual” essence and,
through spiritual and physical efforts, makes a choice of his / her way in life.
Existentialists recognize this choice and process of creative realization of
vocation, of achieving loving union with the world, as genuine freedom.
In effect, narratively, in The Prelude, Wordsworth shows how his
understanding of freedom and liberty evolved into an existential one, even
though the word “existential” was not yet in use in his times. Visually, in the
poem, Wordsworth makes apparent the gradual ennobling of the human form,
proceeding from the “uncouthness” of the initial books to the sublimity and
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concreteness of the last. In the finale, the perfect human gestalten discerned in
concrete people lead to the natural sublime and then to the transcendent union
of all: of subjects and objects.
If Wordsworth’s understanding of freedom, of “genuine liberty” with
its rebelliousness against the determinism from without, is quite similar to
Kierkegaard’s, the poet’s treatment of time resembles and prefigures much in
discussions of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and other philosophers, who came
to prominence at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Wordsworth’s interest in individual forms, on the other hand, seems to
prefigure the later Gestalt Psychology, based on the phenomenology of
Husserl. All the above — Kierkegaard’s theory, Bergson’s studies, and
phenomenology — contributed to the formulation of existentialism.19 In this
dissertation, via Berdyaev’s developed existentialism, I have mostly focused
on two aspects of Wordsworth’s proto-existentialism in The Prelude: both of
which look forward to Kierkegaard and to gestaltpsychology, fused so aptly
by Berdyaev. I have discussed Wordsworth’s treatment of time only in
connection with human figures. Much remains to be said about Wordsworth’s
other poetry, as well as the poetry of other Romantics. How gestaltic are
Keats’s human shapes, for instance? Is Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner perceived
as “uncouth” or sublime? What part of Shelley’s and Byron’s poetry do
gestaltic human figures comprise? Are such sketches produced by the
“visionary company” linked with the notion of liberty, and in what way?
Also, much remains to be said about connections between the English
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Romantic poets and different existentialist philosophers of the twentieth
century, be it of the religious strand (S. Kierkegaard, F. Dostoevsky, M. Buber,
L. Shestov, N. Berdyaev, G. Marcel), the agnostic (K. Jaspers), or the atheistic
(M. Heidegger, A. Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir). Individual
comparative studies can prove illuminating.
The Prelude was never published during William Wordsworth’s life. On
Shakespeare’s birthday, April 23, 1850, on the midnight stroke of the clock,
Wordsworth expired. Later that year The Prelude saw print. There remained
almost seventy years till Kierkegaard (1813-55) became influential, above all in
Germany, half a century till Edmund G. A. Husserl (1859-1938) proposed his
phenomenology, and existentialism, having incorporated all those strands, took
shape as a movement. Revolutions, wars, and post-revolutionary terrors
continued to shake Europe, making new generations of human beings ponder
their personal existence. And almost a full twenty-four years after Wordsworth
– who had posed many existential questions in his Prelude – closed his eyes
for the last time, Berdyaev – who was destined to answer some of those
questions philosophically – was born.
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of figures? . . .
[A]n examination of Wordsworth’s writing questions, I think,
whether we can ever be immune from the influences of local and
particular causes. What is ‘natural’ in the country is not so in the
city. There may be no such society of “men in general,” since all
social groups subsist in particular places. Thus, it may be that any
consensus sufficiently complete to be called ‘universal’ would
have to be thought of as something imposed by a dominant
faction or subgroup. (xi / xvii)
9 Book XIV, 43-62.
10 Natural Supernaturalism, p. 372.
11 Book XIV, 63-77.
12 The Prelude 1805, Book XIII, 66-84.
13 Slavery and Freedom, p. 47.
14 The Prelude 1850, Book XIV, 91-97.
15 Ibid., 98-111.
16 Book XIV, 78-135.
17 Slavery and Freedom, p. 199.
18 Book XIV, 432-56.
19 See, for instance, T. Z. Lavine, From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic
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Quest; Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning:
Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology; Walter Kaufmann,
Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre; Wesley Barnes, The Philosophy
and Literature of Existentialism, etc.
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